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Summary
This study examines the theoretical contradictions of 'cultural democracy' in
Britain and the United States. Cultural democracy here refers to the claim
that community participation in cultural activities (artistic production and
consumption) leads to participation in a democratic society. In Britain
'cultural democracy' has been associated especially with the 'community arts'
movement of the 1970s and 1980s.
Using Gramsci's theory of 'hegemony' as a framework for analysis, I will
argue that the theoretical inconsistencies of 'cultural democracy' in the 1970s
and 1980s can be traced back to a fundamental contradiction in British and
U.S. cultural policy, between 'materialist' and 'idealist' conceptions of
culture. This contradiction has resulted in moments of crisis in British and
U.S. cultural policy, followed by periods of 'unstable equilibrium'. In
support of this argument I will focus on four of these moments of
contradiction and crisis. First I will develop my hypothetical model of
contradiction, crisis and equilibrium in relation to the British community arts
movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Then I will apply this model to three
successive 'moments of crisis' in British and U.S. cultural policy: the
'civilising mission' of the late nineteenth century public cultural institutions
in Britain and the U.S., particularly the settlement house; the U.S. federal
arts projects of the 1930s; dilemmas of access and accountability in recent
media policy. I will conclude by exploring some alternative theoretical
formulations of the relationship between 'culture' and 'community' and their
possible application to cultural policy and cultural democracy.
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Preface: Background to the research
This research project began with my interest in community arts and the so-
called cultural democracy movement in Britain and Europe in the 1970s and
1980s. I wanted to examine the intellectual basis for the belief that a
democratic, participatory artistic culture is the prerequisite for a democratic
political system. The rhetoric of cultural democracy seems to have it both
ways: on the one hand cultural elitism is seen as the inevitable consequence
of social inequalities based on class and race, on the other hand participation
in cultural activities is presented as the solution to social alienation and
exclusion. The key question seems to be one of `determination'; is culture
'determined' by social class, race, gender, geography, or is participation in
cultural activities capable of transforming, even overcoming social divisions
and a variety of social ills from voter apathy to rising crime rates? Behind
the two positions sketched out here lie two conceptions of culture: the
'materialist' or 'Marxist' view of culture as part of the 'superstructure'
determined, in the last instance, by the base of 'material relations', and the
'idealist' or `culturalist' view of culture as a transcendent common good, a
'general perfection' in which and through which social class and social •
difference ceases to matter. Community artists seem to be idealists when
describing their own work, materialists when describing the culture of the
'establishment'. This central contradiction has formed the starting point for
my work.
I also wanted to challenge the perception that the cultural democracy
movement represented a 'radical break' from the post-war policies of cultural
democratisation. There is a danger here of consigning the movement to the
nostalgic list of heroic radical failures; thus according to one regional arts
officer in the U.K, community arts 'had its day' in the early 1980s and is
now a quaint anachronism. Yet 'community arts' has more in common with
the nineteenth century 'civilising mission' and the merry England of the 1945
Arts Council than its supporters care to admit. The community arts
movement is rooted in long-running dilemmas of cultural policy; these
dilemmas will continue to be important even if the term 'community arts' has
fallen out of fashion.
Finally, community artists and community arts and media activists are
unusual in British cultural policy in that they actually seek to ground their
work in a coherent theoretical analysis, even if that analysis is not always
clearly articulated. I hope that in taking a theoretical approach to my subject
I may stimulate some debate about the motives and objectives of community
arts and cultural democracy.
On a personal level, this study has been an attempt to rationalise my own
mixed feelings towards the community arts movement, based on my
experiences first as a 'community arts worker' and then as an arts
development officer in London in the 1980s and early 1990s. My conclusion
has been that the internal contradictions and buried assumptions charted in
this study may actually be the source of the movement's dynamism; as soon
as one faction claims to have discovered a 'definitive' strategy or rationale,
the movement falls apart. By exposing the internal dynamic of 'democratic'
and 'democratising' cultural institutions, I am not intending to offer a
blueprint, only a plea for continuing experiment and debate.
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Notes on Text, References, Bibliography
Because I have used British and American sources, spellings of certain words
(eg. theatre / theater, realise / realize) are not consistent; I have used the
British spelling except in quotation from U.S. sources.
References within the text use the author-date format. I have used copyright
dates rather than publication dates. In the case of some historical sources I
have included original publication dates alongside the date of the edition to
which I am referring, in order to place a work in appropriate context (eg.
Habermas 1962/1992). References to UK publications include only the city
of publication (eg. London); references to U.S. publications may include
city and state (eg. Boulder, CO; Cambridge, MA) if there seems to be a
danger of confusion between cities of the same name.
In the bibliography I have not separated out 'primary' and 'secondary'
sources because in the case of my research such a distinction would be
arbitrary. A single list should make it easier for readers to track down
specific references from the text. I have also abandoned any attempt to
separate works directly referred to in the text from 'background reading';
again the distinction seemed to be arbitrary and unnecessarily complicated.
In one or two 'one-off cases I have included a reference in the footnotes
instead of the bibliography.
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1	 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY: THE CRISIS OF
CULTURAL DEMOCRACY
In this introduction I will establish the theoretical framework for this study, based on
Gramsci's theory of hegemony as an 'unstable equilibrium' born out of contradiction
and crisis. I will argue that Gramsci's theory of hegemony offers a convincing
explanation both for the historical development and ideological inconsistencies of the
British community arts movement in the 1970s and 1980s, and for other 'moments'
of crisis in cultural policy in this study. I Will then map the contradictions in
cultural policy between 'idealist' and 'materialist' conceptions of culture, both in
recent British cultural policy and among the competing theoretical positions of recent
cultural studies and cultural theory. Finally I will return to the story of British
community arts, examining how these various contradictory tendencies have played
out over the last ten years.
1.1	 The historical pattern: contradiction and crisis
The orthodox history of British 'community arts' describes a golden age of cultural
radicalism rising out of the counter-culture of the late 1960s and reaching its peak in
the late 1970s. This ascendancy was followed by a gradual process of assimilation
in the 1980s, leading to limited gains in official recognition and funding which were
offset by marginalisation, depoliticisation and tokenism. As funding cuts began to
bite in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially at the local level, community arts
organisations found themselves financially threatened and politically isolatedl.
1 This is a summary of the argument put forward by Owen Kelly (1984). It also corresponds to
the anecdotal received wisdom among many former and present-day community artists and arts
officers.
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The factual content of this history will be evaluated at greater length below. At this
stage I want to consider the broad outline as a pattern containing certain
assumptions. The pattern has three principal components: a crisis in the old order;
the rise of the 'progressive' forces; the incorporation of these progressive forces in
the old order, implying their eventual defeat or marginalisation. This pattern, as
will become clear from other examples, represents a peculiar late twentieth-century
perspective on the possibilities of social change 2. The period of crisis and the
promise of renewal are trumpeted with self-conscious radicalism; the period of
incorporation is greeted with disillusionment and bitter (self-) recriminations. The
circular process is ultimately futile; the old order triumphs and we are back where
we started.
The intellectual justification for this fatalism is a particular variant on Gramsci's
theory of cultural hegemony. According to this view, 'hegemony' represents the
dominant social group's political 'leadership' of society by non-political means.
Even in the process of conceding ground to its opponents, the dominant social order
extends its network of alliances and colonises new ideas from within; every step
forward represents two steps backwards. I believe that this view of hegemony as a
static system of power relations dominated by a single social class represents a
misreading of Gramsci at the theoretical level. At the empirical level, this
'conspiracy theory' of cultural institutions as instruments of social control does not
square With evidence that cultural policies and institutions tend to be driven by a
shifting internal dynamic of conflicting objectives rather than a single monolithic
point of view.
2 Rosalind Coward associates this pattern with the British Left's view of socialist history as a
succession of "periods of crisis and stabilization", a view she associates with a blMkered and outdated
class analysis (Coward 1977, 82). The pattern can also be seen in psychological terms as evidence of
the alienated personality of the radical, alternating between rampant optimism and bitter despair (cf.
Lasch 1965).
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There are three basic flaws in what I have characterised as the typical, 'orthodox'
history of the community arts movement. First, the emphasis on the moment of
crisis means that cultural democracy is `periodised' as a fleeting historical event
which 'had its day' in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is also defined
geographically as a reaction to `welfarism' and the Western European tradition of
government intervention in culture since 1945. Secondly the idea of a 'radical
break' suggests a polar opposition between the old order and the new, ignoring a
common thread of contradiction and contingency which I believe to be a
characteristic of 'democratising' cultural institutions and cultural policies. Thirdly,
the moment of 'incorporation' exaggerates the coherence of the resulting cultural
policy, which (at the risk of repetition) I regard as being made up of conflicting and
competing elements rather than a single 'point of view' or ideology.
Instead of the historical framework sketched above, I want to suggest an alternative
reading of the 'crisis' of cultural democracy in which cultural policies and
institutions can be traced through a succession of contradictions and realignments.
According to Gramsci, the gradual accumulation of certain "incurable structural
contradictions" builds to a crisis, "sometimes lasting for decades" (Gramsci 1971,
177 - 178). These contradictions are incurable because they are rooted 'organically'
in the fundamental (economic) organisation of society. During the ensuing period of
crisis, competing factions attempt to construct a new consensus, based around their
own interests. Although the consequent realignment may result in a new
'hegemony', it is premature to assume that the situation is resolved. The basic
elements may have been rearranged, different views representing different factions
may predominate, but the inherent contradictions and conflicts will remain
suspended in solution ready to reemerge in the future. The contradictions are
"resolved to a relative degree", only to recur through a series of "convulsions at
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ever longer intervals" (ibid., 180). Furthermore the different stages in this process
overlap, so that 'hegemony' is continually being undermined and renewed.
Gramsci's theory of hegemony as an 'unstable equilibrium' 3 is based on a Marxist
view of history as the product of a fundamental, 'organic' conflict between the
classes under capitalism. Adapting this model to the field of cultural policy, I will
begin with the hypothesis that cultural policy is the product of an analogous conflict
between opposing factions with different aims, moulding cultural policies and
institutions to their own interests. While a class analysis may throw some light on
these oppositions, the internal dynamic of cultural institutions does not follow the
predictable lines of social class. In the case of cultural democracy, the ultimate
source of these conflicts is ideological, based on an 'incurable' opposition between
two conceptions of culture. This fundamental opposition often takes unpredictable
and deceptive forms, reflecting the slippery nature of ideological language, an
institutional tendency to fudge or ignore conflicts of interest and a gap between the
rhetorical aims of cultural policy and a hidden agenda of covert objectives 4.
However, the contradictory conception of culture discussed in the next section
remains a constant source of potential and actual conflict.
Following this hypothesis, the crisis of cultural democracy will be examined as a
continually unravelling crisis based on an 'incurable structural contradiction'
between two opposing conceptions of culture. Using Gramsci's terms, we can
expect this 'organic' contradiction to build to a moment of 'conjuncture' or
'convulsion', when the contradictions stitched together by a network of expedient
compromises and alliances break into open conflict. Such a moment occurred with
3 "The life of the state is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of
unstable equilibria (on the juridicial plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those
of the subordinate groups - equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only
up to a certain point..." (Gramsci 1971, 182).
4 Cf. Kawashima 1995.
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the community arts movement of the 1970s. It is an essential part of my argument
that this was not an isolated event, and that the 'moment' of the 1970s was no more
than the latest eruption in an ongoing crisis. Tracing the pattern further back, I will
highlight other 'convulsions' in cultural policy, from the emergence of
'democratising' cultural institutions in the late nineteenth century to the 'moment' of
the federal arts projects in the United States in the 1930s. In the transition from
theory to practice, the contradictions implicit in the cultural democracy project and
the search for a common culture are made manifest in institutional, factional,
political and psychological conflicts. This enquiry will examine four such
'moments' of contradiction and crisis in cultural policy; the next three chapters are
devoted to nineteenth century cultural institutions, U.S. federal arts policy in the
1930s and the media access movement in the 1970s and 1980s. In this introductory
chapter I will continue my analysis of the 'moment' of cultural democracy and
community arts in the late 1970s.
1.2 The Contradiction of Cultural Democracy
Having referred to an ideological contradiction in cultural policy between two
theories of culture, in this section I will introduce these two conceptions and trace
their impact upon the cultural democracy project.
The argument for cultural democracy in the late 1970s was premised on a belief that
active participation in cultural activities would encourage people to take control over
their own lives and communities. Cultural democracy was thus the harbinger of a
genuinely democratic society, and art was seen as a catalyst for social changes.
5 See Simpson 1976, 1978; Kelly 1984; Braden 1978. Simpson even suggests that a direct
correlation can be expected between a 'democratic' cultural policy and higher turn-outs in local
elections.
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Behind these assumptions lies a hybrid of Marxist cultural theory and the cultural
idealism of Matthew Arnold.	 This hybrid brings together two conflicting
. conceptions of culture. On the one hand 'culture' is used in an expansive,
anthropological sense to describe a whole way of life, the shared meanings and
values of a community or class; at the same time, 'culture' is also used more
narrowly to describe a specialised artistic tradition, at first growing out of the
anthropological 'culture' and then gradually recognised as a distinct, autonomous
sphere of 'art' (Williams 1958). The 'anthropological' or 'sociological' conception
relates the work of artists and cultural institutions to the shared experiences of class
and community; the 'idealistic' or 'aesthetic' conception of culture relates art to the
specialised activity of artists within an autonomous artistic tradition.
These two conceptions correspond respectively to the materialism of Marx and to the
idealism of Arnold and Leavis. Arnold described culture as "the study of
perfection"; culture was thus raised to an ideal realm of "general perfection",
within which all social discord, especially the discord of class conflict, could be
dissolved in an appeal to "best selves" and the pursuit of perfection and harmony.
Similarly Leavis described a "great tradition" of literature which transcended the
constraints of time and place, forming a universal canon of great culture. This
idealist tradition also drew on the Romantic conception of the artist as the
unacknowledged legislator of mankind and the nineteenth century search for a
common culture.
Orthodox Marxist theory on the other hand takes as its starting point the 'productive
forces' of material production. In a capitalist society the class relationship between
capital and wage labour forms a structural 'base', from which all other aspects of the
social formation (the 'superstructure') arise. In Althusser's analogy, the economy is
like the foundations and ground plan of a house; culture and ideology are
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represented by the upper floors, determined "in the last instance" by the base
(Althusser, 1970). In this crude 'economist' model, culture is thus determined by
material forces. Far from leading social change, as in the idealist and Romantic
traditions, culture is the product of social change.
The oft-lamented6 intellectual incoherence and political vagueness of the British
community arts movement stems from a failure to reconcile these two theories of
culture. In describing the benefits of cultural democracy, the community artists'
faith in the uplifting and transforming power of culture resembled the idealist
tradition at its most mystical. In their attack on the cultural establishment, they
drew on Marxist theory at its most reductive. The community arts movement was in
effect invoking Arnold's faith in culture, disguised in the language of Marx.
Similarly the romantic image of the artist as (revolutionary) hero was dressed up in
the reassuringly unromantic 'Marxist' language of class relations, history and social
formation; perhaps this vocabulary struck a chord with community artists in the
1980s because it reproduced the pseudo-scientific, 'economist' jargon of funders,
bureaucrats and politicians. However, there was little remaining of orthodox
Marxism behind the language. In their assimilation of Marx and Arnold, the
community arts movement turned Marx's 'base and superstructure' model upside
down. Thus the 1986 'manifesto' for cultural democracy claimed that culture "is
not simply the evidence of an unequal economic situation" but "its foundation"
(Kelly et al., 1986). If this was Marxism, it was a heretical variant, branded by
more orthodox Marxists as "culturalism".
As the community arts movement began to mobilise in the 1970s, these ideological
contradictions came to the surface. The initial assault on the British Arts Council's
post-war policy of cultural democratisation was in effect a Marxist critique of the
6 See Kelly 1984, Braden 1978; Kelly is especially damning.'
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idealist tradition. The Arts Council's promise of 'the best for the most' was exposed
as representing a false consensus which served the interests of a socially dominant
'cultured' elite (the educated, white middle class) behind a rhetoric of classlessness
and 'art for art's sake'. Dismissing the idealist concept of a 'universal' common
culture, community artists differentiated between 'bourgeois', 'working class' and
'ethnic' cultures, where 'culture' was a product of social and economic relations.
In the next phase of the struggle, the competition for official funding and recognition
during the late 1970s and 1980s, community artists reverted to the idealist tradition
of art as a specialised activity requiring professional expertise and aptitudes. Forced
to justify their status as artists, they fell into familiar problems of hierarchy,
debating why one project, group or individual should receive funding over another.
By 1980 the Association of Community Artists was being accused by some of its
members of representing the professional interests of "a chosen few of funded
practising community artists"; the claim to professional competence, specifically the
demand for ACA "delegates" (representing whom?) to regional arts association
funding panels, was seen by some as "potentially a threat to working class
initiatives" (Ross et al. 1980, 13 - 16), while others claimed that the whole emphasis
on 'community' had undermined the (Marxist) idea of culture as the product of
class. There were signs of splits within the movement between funded and unfunded
artists, between a rural emphasis on 'community' and an urban emphasis on 'class',
between collective and individual working methods, between artists / animateurs and
their 'clients'. Above all there were accusations of betrayal, based on a fear that the
community arts movement had failed to live up to its principles and promises.
The latent contradictions in the cultural democracy project extended into the phase of
'incorporation' of community arts within official funding policies during the 1980s.
Initially the Arts Council was reluctant to fund community arts on more than an
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experimental basis. With the complicity of many community artists, the attempt to
challenge existing definitions of 'art' and 'culture' became sidetracked into an
argument over the relative degrees of merit and 'relevance' of different art forms;
characteristically the Arts Council first addressed the problem of community arts
funding through the 'New Activities Committee' (ACGB 1970). Responsibility for
these 'new activities' was gradually passed to the expanding regional arts
associations, on the grounds that they would be better equipped to evaluate the
'grassroots' nature of the community arts phenomenon. The regional arts
associations enthusiastically complied with this effective partitioning of
responsibilities, seeing in the nascent community arts movement an opportunity for
expanding their own distinctive regional role. Local authorities were also drawn to
the new movement, seeing in the community artists' desire to engage with excluded,
marginal communities a reflection of the municipal responsibility to provide
'services' to those in need; community arts festivals and other large scale local
events also satisfied local councillors' desire to engage with their constituents,
providing a cheerful (and cheap) alternative to the more sober image of municipal
provision.
Community arts funding policies in the 1980s thus became polarised between a
search for aesthetic novelty ('new activities') and an instrumental cultural policy
which placed art at the service of community development. While the Arts Council,
abetted by the Association of Community Artists, remained preoccupied with the
'artistic' component of the 'community-arts' couplet, regional and local authorities
used artistic projects as a mechanism to build a 'community' constituency. At the
local authority level, 'community arts' was fast becoming a catch-all phrase,
synonymous with 'local arts'. Local authorities favoured arts projects which
supported other departmental priorities in the field of 'statutory' service provision7;
7 Despite lobbying, arts funding remains 'non-statutory'. This means that arts funding is not
included in the local authority's 'Standard Spending Assessment' which determines the level of grant
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increasingly community artists found themselves co-opted as surrogate youth
workers, social workers, mental health workers, painters and decorators of a
decaying infrastructure. At the local level 'community arts' had become primarily a
matter of social policy, shaped by the imperatives of local service provision; at the
other extreme, 'community arts' was also regarded favourably by the cultural
missionaries of the Arts Council, as a grab-bag of aesthetic novelties and fringe
activities, a suitable vehicle for 'outreach' to 'disadvantaged' communities who were
not yet ready for 'real' culture but might yet be seduced by the bait of murals, street
festivals and video cameras.
In 1990, in a classic piece of bureaucratic rationalism, Richard Wilding attempted to
make explicit the structural polarisation of British arts funding in a government-
commissioned report into national arts funding. Wilding proposed a reorganisation
of the funding structure assigning the 'social' arts, in which the primary purpose was
not artistic but social, to local and regional funding bodies, leaving the Arts Council
free to concentrate on its original province of 'authentic' arts.
Wilding's modest proposal struck at the heart of the contradictory nature of
community arts policy and was greeted with predictable outrage, especially by the
regional arts associations. By designating a (relatively small) percentage of their
respective budgets for what Wilding categorised as 'social' arts, the official arts
funding bodies would be free to spend the remainder of their money without regard
to tiresome 'social' issues such as equity, access, participation and diversity.
Meanwhile the funders responsible for 'social' arts could relegate artistic
considerations to the margin in pursuit of the principal aim of community
development.
awarded by central government to top up local taxation. As a result, arts funding is regarded as
'optional' and is always vulnerable whenever the local authority is required to save money as a result
of funding cuts or in the pursuit of a reduced local taxation level.'
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The subsequent restructuring of funding responsibilities in the 1990s moved in the
opposite direction from the partitioning of national-artistic and regional-social
funding proposed by Wilding. 'Devolution' or 'delegation' of Arts Council clients
to the regions, in their new incarnation as Regional Arts Boards, broke the Arts
Council's monopoly on 'prestigious' clients and directly challenged Wilding's
perception of the Arts Council as the sole arbiter of 'authentic' art. The newly
delegated 'flagship' organisations brought a new glamour and corporate seriousness
to the regional arts portfolio and increased pressure on regional resources previously
enjoyed by pre-existing clients; community arts organisations found themselves
sliding down the regional pecking order.
A related effect of the post-Wilding restructuring was an outbreak of demarcation
disputes across the geographical borders of the funding system. Regional arts boards
demanded 'regional significance', which for community-based organisations
translated into a polycentric, one-off approach to arts development and a new
generation of flexible, 'proactive' organisations replacing the old-fashioned,
building-based, community arts centre. Meanwhile, local authority arts funders,
under pressure as a result of reductions in government spending and changes in local
authority finance, began to look askance at projects which extended beyond local
borders and local tax payers; they also demanded value for money and a clear
relationship to the local authority's corporate objectives, resulting in an ever tighter
emphasis on 'service provision'. Squeezed from both sides, passed back and forth
between local and regional funders in the mutual blackmail of reciprocal funding
cuts, community arts organisations were obliged either to meet increasingly specific,
quasi-contractual funding requirements at the local level, or to sacrifice their
community-building, culturally specific functions in the pursuit of 'flagship' status at
the regional level.
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Running through this brief account of the rise and fall of community arts in Britain
is the underlying contradiction between the two theories of culture from which the
movement began. Ironically the community arts movement's initial 'success' in
challenging the post-war Arts Council's 'art for art's sake' consensus resulted in a
polarisation of the British arts funding system. This polarisation has undermined the
funding base for community arts. At the local level, British arts funding is
increasingly devoted to a purely instrumental view of cultural policy, based on the
'sociological' conception of culture as the product of a collective way of life; local
arts funding is for the most part a vehicle for social policy or, since the late 1980s,
for economic development. Local arts projects are funded or justified on the back of
local service provision, urban regeneration programmes, local economic
development schemes, even regional health funding. Meanwhile at the national and
regional level, British arts funding is primarily driven by the idealist conception of
culture as a transcendent common good, disconnected from considerations of social
context or content. Caught between these poles, clinging to its contradictory ideal of
culture as both the product of collective experience and the agent for collective
transformation, the community arts movement can no longer expect either hand to
feed it.
1.3 The Origins of Cultural Democracy in Britain
In this section I will argue that the ideological inconsistencies of the community arts
movement outlined above were not new, but were closely linked to similar
contradictions in 'official' post-1945 cultural policy. The advocates of community
arts and cultural democracy in the 1970s, like all good polemicists, tended to
overemphasise the newness of their ideas. One commentator even claimed that "the
end of the epoch of the democratization of culture" can be traced to a 1972 Council
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of Europe conference (Simpson 1976, 26). This `periodisation' of the moment of
cultural democracy was confirmed by the hegemonic view of social change as a
succession of moments of crisis, radical breaks and incorporations. I have argued
that Gramsci's description of a continually unfolding 'crisis' of contradictions and
unstable equilibria provides a more convincing model for the real history of the
community arts movement, as opposed to its rhetoric. The 'moment' of community
arts in the 1970s developed out of 'organic' contradictions in cultural policy and can
be traced back through earlier comparable moments of crisis. The ideology of
cultural democracy was rooted in the traditions of cultural democratisation; the
British community arts movement had more in common than it liked to admit with
the British Arts Council.
The 1945 Arts Council's policy of 'cultural democratisation' was an ambivalent
product of two opposing cultural traditions, the sociological view of culture as a
'whole way of life' and the idealist view of culture as a transcendent common good.
The idealist tradition was a continuation of the nineteenth century search for a
common culture. According to this tradition, Britain's cultural heritage represented
a focal point for the aspiration of the British people's 'best selves', a classless
common good, merging with a wartime mythology of social unity around
quintessential British values. After the war the rediscovery (and reinvention) of a
great national tradition of culture was part of the wider European process of national
reconstruction8 . In Britain, as in other European countries, this faith in culture
translated into an emphasis on excellence and access. Access was interpreted to
mean availability rather than education 9 , as if the bald offer of 'great art' would
8 French cultural policy in the 1950s, led by Andre Malraux, followed a similar pattern of
Gaullist-inspired national reconstruction through the rediscovery of a national culture; by the late
1960s, Malraux's 'Maisons de la Culture' had come to symbolise the failure of a post-war strategy of
cultural democratisation based on a merely physical / geographical notion of 'access' to the arts.
9 See Hutchison 1982, pp. 130 ff. Hutchison suggests that education slipped off the Arts Council
agenda for cultural access during the 1950s partly as a result of growing unease over the paternalist
implications of education as 'improvement'.
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result in a mass rediscovery of a common cultural heritage. The result was a
growing emphasis on centres of excellence in the most literal sense, from the long-
standing national emphasis on London as a cultural capital to the more localised
fetish for building arts 'centres', dating from the 'Housing the Arts' programme of
the 1960s and continuing into the National Lottery arts building boom of the 1990s.
It was the perceived failure of the 'excellence and access' strategy which was so
vigorously attacked by the community arts movement in the 1970s; in Britain as in
Europe, the half-empty temples of high culture and the statistical failure to trickle
down to a truly representative, diverse audience (beyond an established constituency
in the metropolitan middle class) stood as potent symbols of the hollow promise of
the 'best for the most'.
Yet the Arts Council also grew out of another tradition of culture, represented in
part by its wartime precursor, the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the
Arts (CEMA). Although CEMA anticipated the Arts Council's post-war drift
towards professionalism, it was initially rooted in a characteristically British ideal of
amateurism, the 'encouragement' of active cultural participants rather than 'access'
for passive cultural consumers. The ideal of a participatory culture of local
initiatives reflected an anthropological conception of culture as the common pursuit
of a community; the wartime emphasis on 'pulling together' and 'making do'
removed culture from its idealist pedestal and relocated it in the local, makeshift
sphere of amateur dramatics and community singing. CEMA also drew on the
impetus of the British adult education movement, capitalising on initiatives
pioneered by the Workers Education Association, university extension and extra-
mural studies programmes; for example, CEMA coopted a 1935 initiative from the
British Institute of Adult Education, 'Art for the People', a popular experiment in
staging free exhibitions and discussions in small towns and rural areas. In time
CEMA surrendered most of its support for amateur arts and arts education to the
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support of private organisations, principally the Carnegie Trust and the Pilgrim
Trust. However, CEMA's origins indicated the existence of an alternative tradition
of public support for the arts in Britain, based on amateurism, active participation,
arts education and regional diversity. Many of the wartime innovations, for example
the deployment of local `animateurs' and 'music travellers', or the use of improvised
facilities rather than purpose-built arts 'centres', anticipated the principles and
practice of community artists thirty years later.
The Arts Council of 1945 was born out of these conflicting traditions. The drift
towards professionalism and centralisation in the late 1940s resulted from a
dialectical opposition between the ramshackle amateurism of early CEMA and pre-
CEMA initiatives and the idealist tradition of culture as the production of great art
by great artists. The shift in Arts Council policy in the early 1950s from regional
diversity to national centres of excellence, from amateur participation to
professionalism, from concern with audiences to the rival claims of artists, has been
well documented (Hutchison 1982, Hewison 1995). What I wish to emphasise here
is the dialectic between two conceptions of culture and the continuing existence of
tacit contradictions in policy. This dialectic continued even after the Arts Council
appeared to have committed itself to a narrowly idealist conception of culture,
represented by a narrow and exclusive band of institutions, artists, art forms and
audiences. The materialist conception of culture, in which artistic culture is the
inevitable product of culturally specific social groups and 'ways of life', has
survived as an implicit subtext in Arts Council policy, a latent contradiction which
the community arts movement has been able to expose and exploit.
The survival of a regional component in official British arts policy provides an
example of the resilience of this materialist tradition, rooted in regional diversity,
active participation and cultural education. In 1945, John Maynard Keynes, the
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Chairman of the newly-created Arts Council paid lip service to the wartime
emphasis on a healthy regional diversity of cultures, claiming that the Arts Council's
aim was not to impose 'metropolitan' standards of excellence, but to "let every part
of Merry England be merry in its own way" 10 In virtually the same breath he
reminded listeners that "it is also our business to make London a great artistic
metropolis, a place to visit and to wonder at". In the 1950/51 annual report the
policy of "few, but roses" had explicitly become one of concentration and
consolidation rather than decentralisation; in 1956 the Arts Council's regional
offices, a remnant of CEMA's regional structure, were closed. Yet the regional
structure survived on a voluntary basis with the creation of the first regional arts
associations in the South West in 1956 and in the Midlands in 1958. These
associations lay dormant, sustained through local 'art clubs' and a small secretariat,
until the introduction of the 'systematic partnership' between the Arts Council and
the local authorities for regional funding led to the growing importance of the RAAs
in funding policy in the 1970s. Today the future of the Regional Arts Boards,
established in 1990, ironically appears considerably more secure than that of the Arts
Council itself.
Keynes' radio broadcast announcing the creation of the Arts Council in 1945
provides a further example of the Arts Council's continuing ability to stitch together
opposing objectives in a seamless list of tacit contradictions. The latent
contradictions between culture as a way of life and culture as a transcendent ideal
have continued to be sustained through a series of dexterous couplets ('raise and
spread', 'excellence and access', 'best for the most'), culminating in the
concatenation of conflicting objectives strung together in the recent National Arts
10 John Maynard Keynes, 1945 radio broadcast (quoted in Hewison 1995, p. 44). 'Merry
England' here is presumably taken to include Scotland and Wales, within what Hewison identifies as
"a patronising view of what he [Keynes] imagined to be popular culture" (ibid., 45).
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and Media Strategy (ACGB 1993) 11 . The desire to be all things to all people, the
myth of bipartisan political neutrality (the so-called 'arm's length principle') and a
bureaucratic tendency towards double-speak have combined to obscure any clear
sense of official Arts Council policy. What emerges from the Arts Council's history
is a succession of overlapping contradictions never fully resolved, the site for a
continuing struggle both within the Arts Council and outside it over the meaning of
culture.
The drift towards a more narrowly idealist conception of culture in the 1950s, partly
as a result of bureaucratic streamlining and growing financial responsibilities as
much as any internal ideological conviction, stretched these contradictions to
breaking point by the late 1960s. However, the community arts movement did not
resolve these contradictions any more effectively than the Arts Council itself had
buried the legacy of CEMA. Returning to Gramsci's description of hegemony as a
succession of 'unstable equilibria', it can be seen that the community arts movement
did not invent a new radical critique of the Arts Council, it simply excavated the
latent contradictions behind a seeming consensus. The basic component of these
internal contradictions was a continuing argument over the meaning of culture; this
fundamental 'organic' contradiction remained as part of the new consensus, a
continuing source for internal factional disputes within the community arts
movement in the 1980s and in official arts funding policy in the 1990s.
1.4	 Theoretical Perspectives: The Culturalist Solution
In the next two sections, I will review some of the recent theoretical debates over the
meaning of 'culture' in cultural studies. These debates, while they did not
II See for example the rehearsal of six different and largely incompatible definitions of 'quality'
in the report (ACGB 1993, 50).
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necessarily directly influence the community arts movement, nevertheless provided
an intellectual rationale for the movement's contradictory ideals and assumptions.
Before the moment of direct confrontation between the old order and the new
counter-hegemonic forces, Gramsci describes a 'war of position' in which competing
parties lay the groundwork for the 'war of movement', constructing an intellectual
position as the core for a new set of alliances and a new consensus. A comparable
intellectual 'war of position' took place within the British Left which helped to
prepare for the 'moment' of community arts in the 1970s. During the 1960s and
1970s a theoretical debate over the meaning of 'culture' resulted in a hybrid of
orthodox Marxist materialism and cultural idealism. This intellectual compromise,
labelled by some of its critics as 'culturalism', rearranged inherited theoretical
contradictions into a new 'unstable equilibrium'. As with the contradictory
intellectual position of those who advocated 'community arts' and 'cultural
democracy', this equilibrium was continually vulnerable to factional conflict and a
repolarisation of old positions.
Culturalism grew out of a dissatisfaction with the determinist categories of orthodox
Marxism. This dissatisfaction passed through four phases. First British and
European communists in the 1950s attempted to reintroduce an understanding of
human agency and responsibility into the impersonal machinery of Stalinist
'Marxism'. Secondly, beginning from the opposite direction at roughly the same
time, cultural critics and historians attempted to reconcile a culturalist variant of
Marxism with idealist and empiricist methods of literary and historical analysis.
Thirdly, political commentators of the 1960s and 1970s turned to Gramsci's
description of cultural hegemony as a means of understanding the resilience of
capitalism and the crisis of the left. Fourthly, the cultural studies movement of the
late 1970s and 1980s increasingly preferred using the alternative or intermediate
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categories of 'culture' and 'community' to describe popular culture and 'sub-
cultures', superseding or modifying the traditional Marxist analysis based on class.
Disillusionment with the brutal certainties of Stalin reached a peak following the
Soviet repression in Hungary in 1956. Confronted by an impersonal, mechanistic
view of history which excluded (by force if necessary) the possibility for human
agency, human responsibility or dissent, Western communists began in the 1950s to
rediscover a more humanist Marx in the classic texts. In France, Louis Althusser
would emphasise the "reciprocal action" between ideology and economic forces
(Althusser 1970, 129 - 131) and describe the crucial role of subjectivity within this
theoretical framework (ibid., 165 - 170). In Britain, the Marxist historian E P
Thompson and the cultural critic Raymond Williams attempted to show how history
was 'handled' through a mediating sphere of culture and experience. Thompson
described his approach as 'historical materialism', basing his work on the 'dialogue'
between individual behaviour and collective experience (Thompson, 1978);
Williams referred to a tradition of 'cultural materialism', defined as "a theory of the
specificities of material culture and literary production within historical materialism"
(Williams 1977, 5). In support of this revisionist approach to Marxism, Williams
and Thompson referred to letters written by Engels after Marx's death which implied
that Marx's emphasis on the mechanics of base and superstructure had been
interpreted too literally. According to Engels, ideology, culture and individual
experience did after all enjoy at least a 'relative autonomy': "We make our history
ourselves,' but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions"
(Engels, cited in Williams 1977, 84 - 7; cf. Thompson 1978, 50 - 70).
The humanist rehabilitation of Marx in the 1950s coincided with Williams' writings
on culture and society (Williams 1958, 1961) which applied the principles of
historical materialism to cultural production. Seeking to reconcile an idealist faith in
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culture with a Marxist understanding of culture in the 'anthropological' sense as the
product of 'material forces', Williams began to reexamine key words in the Marxist
lexicon: 'base', 'superstructure', 'determination' (Williams 1971, 1973, 1977).
Drawing on the Marxist literary criticism of Georg Lukacs and Lucien Goldmann,
Williams identified culture as both the product of material forces and as the aesthetic
engine which acted upon human consciousness; in Marxist terms, art was removed
from the determined sphere of culture and ideology and allowed into the determining
sphere of productive forces. 'Determination' was taken to mean not an exact
reproduction, but the exertion of pressures and the setting of limits; the rigid
distinction between base and superstructure gave way to a concept of mutual
interaction between different levels of experience. These concepts converged in
Williams' formulation, the 'structure of feeling'.
Initially Williams defined the 'structure of feeling' as an "organising view" of the
world arrived at by "individuals in real and collective social relations" (Williams
1971, 12), rooted in "a central system of practices, meanings and values" which
"saturate" the way we live (Williams 1973, 8 - 9). Here Williams refers to the
materialist, Marxist tradition of culture as the product of socio-economic
relationships ('superstructure' and 'base' respectively). However, Williams went on
to relate the 'structure of feeling' to the idealist tradition of culture. Within the
'structure of feeling' the great work of art (in the 'great tradition' of Leavis) enjoys
a privileged role. Every culture consists of 'dominant', 'residual' and 'emergent'
cultural elements, incorporated into a complex, interlocking whole (Williams 1977,
121 - 127). One of the properties of great art is to draw out the emergent cultural
elements, by revealing "the maximum possible consciousness of the social group"
(Williams 1971, 12). Williams' structure of feeling thus effectively encompassed
two theoretical traditions of culture. Culture is the Marxist, anthropological
structure determined (albeit loosely) by historical reality and collective experience; it
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is also the individual work of art within that structure, capable of transforming our
reality by revealing something at the fringes of our collective experience through an
act of individual genius. Such acts of genius are "embedded" in "real social
relations" (Williams 1977, 201 - 204) but do more than simply reproduce reality;
art thus becomes both the barometer by which incipient social change can be felt and
the lever by which change can be effected.
Williams' integration of two cultural traditions and his understanding of individual
behaviour as both cause and effect of collective experience provided a theoretical
rationale for the cultural democracy ideal. Even if they had not followed through
the details of Williams' theoretical arguments, most community artists were aware of
the dual meaning of culture and felt that their work was contributing to a process of
social change as well as (or instead of) the production of art. However, the
culturalist synthesis achieved by Williams and Thompson was precarious. As the
`culturalist' debate continued into the 1970s and 1980s, the formulations of
culturalism appeared to split in two as the old contradictions reemerged.
1.5 Culturalism 2: Culturalist Optimism and the New Determinism
With the rediscovery of Gramsci by political theorists in the 1970s and the
emergence of 'cultural studies' as a recognised discipline in the 1970s and 1980s, the
culturalist revision of Marxism begun in the 1950s would ultimately lead Marxist
cultural theory in two opposite directions 12. One route explored the seductive
possibilities of a cultural sphere, cut loose from the constraints of Marxist
determinism, where the rituals of cultural activism, subcultural style and academic
theorising constituted a new form of 'political' resistance. The other direction
12 For a summary of the British Left's treatment of the `culturalist question' between the 1950s
and 1970s, see Johnson (1979). Johnson refers to the two factions described here as `culturalists' and
'structuralists'.
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swung to the opposite extreme, reverting to a new form of ideological determinism,
in which artistic culture and human experience were all determined 'in the last
instance' either by 'economic forces' or by a variety of post-Marxist structures,
including language, ideology, community, even 'culture' itself. I will refer to these
two directions as `culturalist optimism' and 'cultural determinism'; the fork in the
road ultimately provided new routes back to the old contradiction between nineteenth
century cultural idealism and Marxist determinism. It also pointed forward to the
conflicting extremes of cultural policy which beset the community arts movement in
the 1980s and 1990s.
The theoretical possibilities of culturalist optimism and cultural determinism were
immensely appealing to cultural theorists and producers, since both directions
appeared to invest their activities with a renewed 'political' seriousness and self-
importance. However, both routes were theoretical cul-de-sacs, leading away from
the dynamic interactions traced by Williams and Thompson towards a self-conscious
theoretical sterility. Poised at the crossroads lay the political writings of Gramsci,
rediscovered by the British Left in the 1960s, and the cultural studies tradition
pioneered by Stuart Hall in the late 1970s. However, whereas Gramsci and Hall,
like Williams and Thompson, were interested in the interaction between cultural and
material forces, many of their disciples split into the opposing camps of culturalist
optimism and cultural determinism, each claiming Marx and Gramsci as one of their
own.
Writing in the 1920s and 1930s, Gramsci, like Williams and Thompson, was
consciously attempting to disentangle Marx from orthodox Marxism. The
revolutionary fatalism of Marxism had failed to explain both the resilience of
capitalism and the failure of the proletariat to seize the revolutionary moment in the
years after the first world war. Gramsci identified the success of the ruling class
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with a combination of coercion and consent maintained through a network of class
alliances and a broad range of superstructural institutions spanning the fields of
education, language and culture.
Pieced together after his death from fragmentary letters and notebooks, Gramsci's
ideas were subject to considerable reinterpretation by his translators and editors.
The first British and American editions of Gramsci appeared in 1957, following the
post-1956 backlash against Stalinism. His work also benefited from the "indirect
brokerage" of Thompson and Williams in the late 1950s and 1960s and was initially
"interpreted mainly in a culturalist way" (Forgaes 1989, 74 - 77). After 1968, a
more radical, younger Gramsci was discovered with a greater emphasis placed on
state coercion and revolutionary politics than on the gradualist, culturalist version of
social change. In the 1980s, Stuart Hall pointed to Gramsci as a political strategist,
describing the need for the British Left to build alliances and work across a broad
front instead of remaining trapped in the introverted posturing of revolutionary
theory.
There thus emerged from Gramsci's original political writings two distinct schools
of interpretation (cf. Mouffe 1979, Forgacs 1989). The `culturalist' camp saw
Gramsci as a 'theoretician of the superstructures'; the revolutionary kernel in
Gramsci's writing, specifically his insistent emphasis on underlying class relations,
was buried in the amorphous superstructure of cultures and communities,
disconnected from their roots in class. Here games of stylistic, cultural and
linguistic subversion were played out in a floating world of culture without reference
to the realities of class relations and economic inequality. The 'determinists' reacted
against the 'post-Marxist' heresy of `culturalism', referring back to the framework
of class relations; from here the concept of hegemony was elided into a conspiracy
theory of cultural institutions, as noted earlier in this introduction. Gramsci's
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complex analysis of the process of hegemony was here reduced to a theory of static
power relations in which social control fell to a single dominant group.
In the late 1970s, Stuart Hall turned to Gramsci in order to explain the crisis of the
Left and the appeal of Thatcherism in cultural terms (Hall 1988). The old categories
of class and the predictable constituencies of the two main political parties had
undergone a decisive shift. Thatcherism had taken advantage of this crisis, using a
set of popular British values (thrift, hard work, insularity, law and order, self-
righteousness) to "remake common sense" (Hall 1988, 8); the Left had meanwhile
been left stranded in a reductive political rhetoric tied to an outdated, static analysis
of the class struggle. Using Gramsci's theory of 'cultural hegemony' as the key to
an interlocking pattern of class alliances, belief systems and constituencies, Hall
emphasised that Thatcherism's power was based in its ideological effect and its
cultural hegemony.
What Hall, following Gramsci, managed to retain in his description of cultural
hegemony, was an understanding that hegemony was based around "the decisive
nucleus of the economic" (Hall 1988, 170). The categories of class, economic
differences and "material interests" were profoundly important to Hall, but they
were "always ideologically defined" (ibid., 261); in the case of Thatcher's
economic policy for example, "there is no point giving people tax cuts unless you
also sell it to them as part of a 'freedom' package" (ibid., 274). The 'nucleus of the
economic'; like the 'objective core' of Gramsci's theory referred to by David
Forgacs, tended to be forgotten by many of Hall's successors in the cultural studies
field. The `culturalist' legacy resulting from Hall's rediscovery of Gramsci was the
emergence of a new generation of cultural criticism emanating from the Birmingham
Centre for Cultural Studies, where Hall was the Research Fellow before he
succeeded Richard Hoggart as acting director in 1968.
24/
Initially the centres's principal theoretical sources were a sociologically inflected
Leavisite idealism, inspired by the 'culture and society' tradition of Hoggart and
Williams, and a culturalist Marxism influenced by Williams, Hall and Gramsci.
These influences were reflected in the joint stewardship of Hoggart and Hall. For
both Hoggart and Hall, the experience of class was refracted through individual
consciousness, family, culture and tradition; the centre therefore aimed to study
'culture', especially popular culture, both from an anthropological / sociological
perspective and in the literary / idealist sense. While Hall arrived at this culturalist
perspective from a Marxist background, Hoggart's interest in popular culture was
driven by an essentially conservative, Leavisite concern for an idealised common
culture, threatened by the defensive conformism of the British working class and the
"syndicated ordinariness for the millions" produced by the entertainment industry
(Hoggart 1958).
Given the centre's interest in popular culture and the mass media, a third theoretical
influence was the development in media studies of 'audience theory', an awareness
of how audiences decode and reinvent media messages. An important source for
this perspective on mass media and entertainment, albeit seldom directly
acknowledged, was Marshall Mcluhan (1964). Mcluhan's 'medium is the message'
was an extreme culturalist inversion of Marx's material base and cultural
superstructure. Mcluhan described a world in which technology (the form or
medium by which information is passed) defined human consciousness; thus, for
example, "Print created individualism and nationalism in the sixteenth century"
(Mcluhan 1964, 19). This technological determinism bypassed Marxist perspectives
on class relations and the material realities of cultural production; according to
Mcluhan, the inequalities between the consumers and producers of the culture
industry, the spectre of media manipulation, the corporate skyscrapers looming over
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the global village, could all be disregarded. Mcluhan's rhetoric and his reputation as
a scion of the 1960s counterculture were seductive; analysing the media as an
autonomous, self-creating system, no longer determined by the machinery of
corporate manipulation and consumer impotence, allowed an optimistic vision of
liberation and consumer sovereignty.
Extrapolating from an expansive or "discursive" version of Gramsci's cultural
hegemony concept I3 , from the 'culture and society' writings of Williams and
Hoggart, from Mcluhan's influence and the discovery of 'audience theory' in media
studies, and from Stuart Hall's analysis of culture and ideology, it became possible
to construct a highly optimistic, `culturalist' reading of popular culture. By focusing
on the way popular culture is consumed, appropriated and transformed by its users,
writers associated with the Birmingham cultural studies school were able to describe
a 'symbolic' form of rebellion, in which "commodities can be symbolically
repossessed in everyday life, and endowed with implicitly oppositional meanings, by
the very groups who originally produced them" (Hebdige 1979, 16). Thus young
people could "obliquely" challenge cultural hegemony through an ironic, stylistic
subversion of the social roles assigned to them (Hebdige, 1979) or by reshuffling the
messages sent out through the mass media into 'new' forms that were "relevant to
them and anchored in their own lives" (Willis 1990).
The cultural studies tradition thus made possible a self-deluding culturalist optimism
in which a Whole series of cultural revolutions could take place in the stratosphere of
'deviant' and 'subversive' readings of popular culture. The battleground for the
class war had been shifted from Marx's base of productive relations to the realm of
the superstructures. While this optimism may have been a welcome corrective to the
13 1n a "fully discursive" position, cultural 'discourse' is cut loose from its determining causes
and effects; anything goes. While Hall emphasised that ideological effects were complex and
multiple, he nevertheless insisted that dominant ideologies set limits on what could be articulated
(Hall 1988, 9 - 10).
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cultural pessimism of Adorno's description of the culture industry as an exercise in
mass self-deception, there was nevertheless something self-deceiving and self-
important in this belief in the subversive potential of popular culture, investing the
cut of a lapel or the subtext of a soap opera with a quasi-revolutionary significance.
The problem with these acts of subcultural subversion or tricolage' was that they
remained purely symbolic; as Hall noted, although the subcultural strategy of
'resistance through rituals' might "win space" within the dominant culture, it was
"fated to fail" because it failed to engage with the structural problems (the Marxist
'base') of unemployment, educational disadvantage, low pay (Hall et al. 1976, 45 -
47). It similarly failed to account for the privileged position enjoyed by dominant
institutions (eg. mass media conglomerates) and social groups (the well-educated,
the wealthy, the powerful) who consistently set the agenda in the process of cultural
production, even if that agenda was occasionally subject to minor 'subversions' at
the fringes.
To be fair to Willis and Hebdige, neither was wholly convinced by the revolutionary
content of their own arguments. Quoting Sartre, Hebdige acknowledged that
subculture constituted only a marginal form of resistance, "the small movement
which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back
completely what his conditioning has given him" (Hebdige 1979, 138 - 9; 167 fn);
this was little more than a blurring at the edges of Marxist orthodoxy, an
acknowledgement that the determining influence of productive relations and the
dominant culture are "handled" through human experience (cf. Thompson 1978,
164). In a similar coda at the end of his book, Willis likewise drew back from the
posture of cultural revolutionary, recognising that these gestures towards rebellion
through subculture may simply "accommodate power or find myriad compensations
for suffering it - and so help to reproduce it by default" (Willis 1990, 156). Behind
these celebrations of sub-cultural subversion, Hebdige acknowledged "a kind of
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romanticism" (Hebdige 1979, 138); Willis meanwhile confessed to suffusing every
area of social practice with "an historical romantic glow of creativity" (Willis 1991,
153). The reference to romanticism brings us full circle to the nineteenth century.
We have travelled from Marx, through a selective reading of Gramsci into the
`culturalist illusion' of making cultural practice the means of social transformation.
In effect, we are back with the transcendent idealism of Matthew Arnold in which a
few 'aliens' can stand aloof from the determinations of class and material reality and
create a better world through an abstract, classless indeterminate world of culture.
Ironically, the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies and the `culturalise tradition
also came under attack from the other direction, for remaining devoted to an
outdated, Marxist analysis of culture in terms of class (Coward, 1977). While some
of the later work coming out of the centre spiralled into culturalist romanticism, Hall
himself continued to emphasise the connections between culture and class. Williams
had earlier described "the facts of the economic structure and the consequent social
relations" as "the guiding string on which a culture is woven and by following
which a culture is to be understood" (Williams 1958, 269). This umbilical
attachment to class relations was retained by Hall in his concept of a relationship
between subcultures and a 'parent culture', determined by "material and social class
position and experience"; class thus formed a "determining matrix" from which
there could be no escape (Hall et al. 1976, 12 - 15). From this perspective Hall
claimed that "cultures always stand in relations of domination - and subordination -
to one another..." (ibid., 12). As Coward notes, this assumption led to a belief that
working class sub-culture was automatically 'subversive' or opposed to the dominant
'bourgeois' culture; working class culture is "one step on the road towards
socialism" (Coward 1977, 84). This belief in the revolutionary potential of working
class culture was another source of culturalist optimism; by describing 'working
class culture' as a class phenomenon, culturalism discounted the possibility that the
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culture enjoyed by the working class (or any class) might be passive, depoliticised or
even actively oppressive.
Having promised a synthesis of idealist and materialist perspectives to describe the
interactions between material social conditions and cultural production, the
Birmingham school ultimately split into two opposing positions. These theoretical
positions failed to make the connection between culture and democracy sought by
the community arts movement. 'CuRuralist optimism' allowed the spectacle of
culture to fill the screen, blotting out the determining realities of political and
economic power. The liberating possibilities of culture thus promised to transcend
the inequalities and privileges of social inequality; yet this liberation was limited to
the theoretical sphere, with little impact outside its own 'language games'. The
'cultural determinist' perspective simply replaced the economic determinism of Marx
with determinism by culture or ideology. Here the possibilities for social change
were defined by larger 'structural' patterns, with the isolated cultural action or
project condemned as ephemeral or irrelevant; one could only wait for the
'structures' to wield their magic and wait for the revolution. What both these
perspectives lack is the sense of a dynamic interaction between cultural activity,
social conditions and human behaviour, as described by Williams, Gramsci and
Hall. This absence explains their intellectual sterility.
Meanwhile, the orthodox 'determinist' view of culture as a product of class had
enjoyed a revival in the 1960s as the credibility of 'neutral' cultural institutions came
under attack. By the late 1960s the role of cultural institutions in public life was no
longer regarded as politically neutral, still less as altruistic. American university
departments, French maisons de la culture, the British Arts Council and the BBC
were taken to task by civil rights activists, student protesters, community artists and
media activists. Cultural institutions which had claimed since 1945 to be the
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disinterested providers of culture for all were stripped of their paternalistic, liberal
pretensions and revealed as the contentious symbols of the national establishment,
charged with reinforcing the social and cultural authority of a white, middle class
social elite.
The political protests of the 1960s and 1970s in Britain and America fed into the
'culture wars' fought over college curricula in the 1980s. Schooled in these debates,
the new generation of commentators cast a sceptical eye over the sacred cultural
institutions of the past. Many of the new generation of cultural commentators were
self-consciously revisionist, reacting against a liberal orthodoxy which had
complacently viewed cultural reform as a 'heroic' progression towards a classless
common good. The new critical orthodoxy was partly a matter of academic
'positioning', with the academic emphasis on originality encouraging commentators
to contradict their predecessors". It also drew on contemporary polemics to present
an ahistorical caricature of the past. Disillusionment with the rhetorical claims of
American social reform in the 1960s, from Kennedy's New Frontier to Johnson's
Great Society, led to a 'revisionist' attack on the moral high ground of American
liberalism, the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt's Square Deal, Wilson's New Freedom
and Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal (Weinstein 1968, Kolko 1963, Margolies 1963,
Mowry 1971). In Britain community artists referred dismissively to 'nineteenth
century' art forms and institutions as if the entire century had been annexed by the
Victorian middle class (Braden 1978, Kelly 1984). Here the determinist view of
culture as a class product resulted in an orthodoxy no less limiting than the heroic
simplicities of its liberal predecessor or the blind optimism of its culturalist
counterpart.
14 For a good example of this 'positioning', see the preface to Dee Garrison's account of
nineteenth century libraries (Garrison, 1979) or Anthony Platt on the nineteenth century 'invention of
delinquency' (Platt 1969).
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The effects of this revisionist history of middle class cultural reform will be
considered in the next chapter. First I will conclude this chapter by considering how
the perspectives of academic culturalist optimism and cultural determinism have fed
back into recent community arts policy.
1.6 From theory to practice: culturalism and community arts
The failure to bridge the theoretical divide between culturalist optimism and
determinism was mirrored in the breakdown of the community arts movement and
the emergence of conflicting approaches to community arts policy and practice.
Cultural determinism eventually led into a purely instrumental approach to cultural
policy, while culturalist optimism encouraged artists to skate over the social and
economic context of their work in a celebration of artistic freedom and consumer
sovereignty. These perspectives converged in the new rationale for cultural policy
as a vehicle for economic development in the late 1980s.
Cultural determinism affected community arts practice as a self-conscious insistence
on the class component in working class and middle class culture. The community
arts movement's attitude to working class culture was coloured by a faith in the
innate 'anti-bourgeois' radicalism of the working class. This belief that cultural
needs were 'determined' by class blocked out other versions of community identity
(eg. race, gender, sub-culture) resulting in a simplistic template of 'community
needs' and a kind of revolutionary fatalism; the working class would spontaneously
'produce' an authentic 'working class' culture of its own, once space and resources
were made accessible. The determinist perspective also resulted in a crude hostility
to the 'bourgeois' culture of the middle class, represented by the Arts Council.
Because many community artists were themselves middle class, this hostility turned
in on itself. Artists learned to resent their own privileged, 'cultured' backgrounds
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and sought to bury this 'bourgeois culture' in the 'authentic' culture of the working
class community; I will return to this theme of middle class guilt and self-
abnegation in chapter 2 when I examine the psychology of the nineteenth century
settlement worker.
Two consequences followed from this insistence on class determinism. First, many
of the cultural resources intended to empower a fictive 'politicised working class'
were co-opted by middle class activists. Secondly, the faith in 'spontaneous' or
'natural' working class cultural expression and the guilty class associations of
'bourgeois' culture made animateurs reluctant to 'impose' middle class cultural
values on their working class clients. Consequently animateurs attempted to lead
from the back or to become invisible (Simpson 1978). In denying their role as
artistic leaders, community artists described their work in resolutely non-artistic
terms, either in the technical jargon of 'skills development' and 'training', or in the
political language of 'empowerment' and community or social development.
This vocabulary was perfectly attuned to the bureaucratic language and non-artistic
objectives of funders. Whereas community artists used this language to indicate the
broader social aims of their work, the funding bodies, especially local authorities,
referred to their primary interest in 'service provision'. Community artists thus
played into an 'anti-cultural', instrumental approach to cultural policy in which art
was simply the means to an end, a vehicle for the delivery of statutory services. As
community artists became increasingly dependent on local authority funding, the
instrumental vocabulary seeped into their grant applications and policy statements;
community arts organisations scrambled to make impossible commitments to the
funders' demographic, geographical and social priorities. The artistic component in
community arts had shrunk to the wrapping on a package of services delivered at the
behest of the funder, described by one community arts pioneer as 'psychedelic
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elastoplase". In the 1990s the funders' introduction of performance indicators and
'quality assurance measures' has increased the emphasis on the social priorities of
community arts work, the artistic component remaining elusively unquantifiable.
Culturalist optimism was directly opposed to these determinist assumptions, denying
the importance of social class in culture and encouraging an uncritical faith in
cultural activities as inherently liberating. Among community artists this faith took
three related forms. First there was a generalised faith in culture as a universal
panacea for a plethora of social problems; as already noted, this faith was a
throwback to nineteenth century cultural idealism and romanticism.
Secondly there was a faith in new forms of culture, especially the new technologies
of video and television; this reflected the emancipatory rhetoric of culturalist writers
like Willis and Mcluhan, coupled with an infatuation with the limitless potential of
technology, even though (often precisely because) the new media and the new jargon
were only dimly understood. In a 1980 article criticising Belgian community video
workers, Mattelart and Piemme attacked the "culturalist illusion" at the heart of the
cultural democracy movement. The video workers' faith in culture was, they
suggested, a specifically middle class malaise, and of little relevance to their
working class 'clients'. Community media had failed to achieve its goal, "a
rejuvenation of democracy by the media", because of its credulous faith in the
panacea of new technology, based on a belief that the new media could "bypass the
effects of productive relations on the social body". The vocabulary reflected the
writers' Marxist scepticism regarding the possibility of culture or technology (mere
15 "The worst demand is for psychedelic elastoplast where we are expected to patch up all the
social ills in their neighbourhood and provide massive turn-on entertainment more likely to benefit an
administrator's career than the community itself". (Interview with John Fox in Engineers of the
Imagination: The Welfare State Handbook, ed. Tony Coult & Baz Kershaw (London: Methuen,
1983)
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'superstructure') having any real effect on essential economic and social power
relations (Mattelart and Piemme, 1980).
Thirdly culturalist optimism shaded into a faith in the market, especially in the
popular cultural industries of television and popular music. Again this faith was
driven partly by a blind faith in new technology, partly by a continuation of the
romantic attitude to class; television and the music industry represented not only
'new' cultural forms, but also the adopted culture of working class youth, hence
automatically preferable to the antiquated 'bourgeois' cultural forms of the
nineteenth century. Perhaps too there was a reaction against the latent snobbery of
an older generation of culturalist advocates for cultural democracy. For Simpson
(1976) and Hoggart (1958), a participatory culture was the best defence against the
encroachment of a mass-produced global consumer culture. For Paul Willis (1990)
cultural emancipation could only come through the "contradictory empowerment" of
the market and the "symbolic creativity" of the creative consumer. Willis
epitomises the hallmarks of culturalist optimism, the trembling excitement at new
technologies only dimly understood, the 'romantic glow' suffusing the cultural
choices of working class youth, leading towards a reluctant surrender to the 'hidden
hand' of the market16.
Willis's arguments were echoed by cultural policy makers, especially at the local
authority level (cf. Wynne 1992). The GLC Cultural Industries Strategy concluded
that "the only way for the public sector to have an impact 'both on economic and
employment patterns and on 'culture' in its broadest sense' would be to intervene
'through and not against the market" 17 . The urge that community artists learn to
16 
"There may well be a better way, a better way to cultural emancipation than through this
continuous instability and trust in the hidden - selfish, bind, grabbing - hand of the market. But
'official art' has not show it yet. Commercial cultural commodities are all most people have. History
may be progressing through its bad side. But it progresses". (Willis 1990, 26).
17 Bianchini, Franco (1989): "The Arts and the Urban Regeneration Process in 1980s Britain" in
The Culture Industry, ed. Derek Wynne (1992)
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seek empowerment 'through, not against the market' dovetailed with urban attempts
at industrial and economic development by cultural means and the 'cultural
industries' strategy of cities like London and Sheffield in the 1980s.
Culturalist optimism, like cultural determinism, thus encouraged community artists
to become complicit in cultural policies which were only marginally concerned with
cultural democracy. The empowerment afforded to the cultural consumer was, as
Willis acknowledged of a contradictory and marginal nature; on offer was not "the
power to set the cultural agenda" which remained in the hands of the programmers
and producers, only a more limited "choices over choices" from a fixed menu
designed around the imperatives of corporate marketing and advertising (Willis
1990, 159). The primary aim of local authority cultural industry strategies was the
creation of an industrial infrastructure. While this might trickle down into local
employment and local business opportunities for a lucky few, it would be pointless
to look for any radical transformation of the economic realities of the industry; real
power would remain concentrated at the corporate level, and consumer sovereignty
was unlikely to extend beyond the remote control button. 'Empowerment' remained
trapped in the realm of cultural consumption, with few material consequences in the
wider world of economic and social disenfranchisement, restricted to self-referential
language games, the deconstructions of media studies and kitsch consumerism.
The theoretical tendencies to `culturalist optimism' and 'cultural determinism' within
the Community arts movement represented a tacit admission of defeat, retreating
from the connection between art and social change which lay at the heart of the
cultural democracy ideal. The cultural determinists had lost faith in the potential for
'bourgeois' art to engage with the material realities of working class life; cultural
activity was thus reduced to a form of irrelevant window dressing, while the real
social and economic transactions were conducted elsewhere.
	 The culturalist
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optimists had begun by celebrating cultural emancipation, but this optimism was
only made possible by turning a blind eye to the overarching mechanisms of social
and economic power and 'bypassing' the Marxist belief in social change as a
material process. In time this faith shrank to the credo of consumer sovereignty and
the celebration of a cultural consumerism which had no meaning outside its own
introverted 'cultural' sphere. As the economic rationale for cultural policy gathered
momentum in the late 1980s, cultural policies rooted in instrumentalism and
consumerism continued to marginalise community arts organisations. However, this
marginalisation had begun with the theoretical contradictions of `culturalism' and the
inherited contradictions of 'cultural democracy' discussed in this chapter.
Cultural democracy is premised on a belief that culture can be both the product and
the producer of social change; however, once tested by practice, the inherent
contradictions in this position unravel and the relationship between culture and social
change breaks down. The question remains whether the contradiction between
idealist and Marxist conceptions of culture is indeed 'incurable'.
To answer this question we first need to establish the theoretical rationale for
cultural democracy. This rationale is rooted in the 'cultural materialism' of
Williams, Hall and Gramsci and the 'reciprocal action' between material base and
cultural superstructure. Hall, paraphrasing Marx, states that "men and women make
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please" (Hall et al. 1976, 11);
their ideas and values are shaped by history and their shared culture, individual
experience and works of art in turn shape history. Cultural expression is thus
framed by economic and social factors but it is also capable of advancing new ideas
and interpreting a given reality in unexpected, even revelatory ways. Culture is
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embedded in the various 'structures of feeling' (rooted in social class, tradition,
family, community) which shape our experience of the world; the interchange
between individual and collective experience, and between different, overlapping
'structures of feeling' is what makes up our experience of culture.
It is this interaction between different levels of experience which distinguishes the
cultural materialism of Williams, Hall and Gramsci from the 'optimist' and
'determinist' extremities of culturalism considered above. If there is to be a
connection between culture and democracy, our conception of culture must
encompass a dynamic, mutual interaction between artists and society, between
individual and collective experience and between the mutually transforming potential
of both cultural ideals and material social conditions.
While this position is tenable in theory, in practice it results in a continuing tension
between contradictory assumptions and beliefs. At certain moments, the inherent
contradictions which drive cultural policies and institutions break into open factional
conflict and a crisis occurs. In the remainder of this study I will focus on three such
moments of contradiction and crisis, in which the 'incurable contradiction' between
two conceptions of culture emerges in cultural policy, is partially resolved into an
'unstable equilibrium, then forms a new polarisation which will be challenged at the
next moment of crisis.
Geographically, I have considered cultural policies in both Britain and the U.S.,
partly because I want to challenge the assumption that the story of 'cultural
democracy' is a specifically British or European phenomenon. U.S. cultural policy
has been described as "pluralism by default" (Mulcahy 1987, 330), almost a non-
policy; direct federal subsidy for the arts, via the National Endowment for the Arts,
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is minimal by European standards and may become non-existent in the near future".
In Britain the ideal of cultural democracy has become embroiled in a series of
skirmishes over government funding; while these battles are of immense practical
importance to the artists and organisations concerned, cultural democracy is not just
about winning a share of subsidy or overturning the 'arts establishment'. In the
U.S., concerns of access, accountability and equity have been no less important
despite the relatively minor role of the federal government in supporting the arts.
Cultural policies in Britain and the U.S. share similar roots, especially in the
nineteenth century when U.S. educational and cultural institutions were still linked
with the legacy of colonial rule; while institutions and policies have developed
differently, the 'incurable contradiction' between materialist and idealist versions of
culture has remained constant, producing a similar set of dilemmas in cultural
policy, including the cultural democracy question.
Historically, I have begun in the late nineteenth century where I believe the pressure
to 'democratise' culture through public or 'free' institutions resulted in the first of
my moments of crisis (chapter 2). The nineteenth century was the source for the
basic ideological contradiction which runs through to present day 'democratic'
cultural policies, between cultural idealism and 'materialist' or 'utilitarian' positions.
This contradiction extended to the conflicting psychological drives of the cultural
worker; the alienation of the nineteenth century cultural worker may throw light on
the motives of contemporary community artists. In the next chapter I examine the
U.S'. federal arts projects of the 1930s (chapter 3). Here, nineteenth century cultural
idealism converged with a new, more overtly 'materialist' tradition. The federal arts
projects represented both a fresh eruption of the 'incurable contradiction' of late
18 Of course the federal government does give a very substantial indirect subsidy to arts
organisations in the form of tax exemptions for private funders. Also, while the NEA continues to be
on a knife edge, State Councils for the Arts continue to provide support for the arts; New York State
Council for the Arts actually outspent the NEA in the 1960s and recently announced a 15% increase
in state arts funding. However, the NEA continues to be the only vehicle for a national cultural
policy, and continues to be 'at risk'.
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nineteenth century cultural democratisation, and anticipated the promises and
problems of late twentieth century 'cultural democracy'. They also challenged the
stereotype of U.S. cultural policy as a matter for private patronage, anticipating such
grand cultural experiments of European government funding as Jack Lang's French
Ministry of Culture in the 1980s. Finally I examine the emergence of 'community
media' in Britain and America in the 1970s (chapter 4); here the legacy of past
contradictions is placed in the context of the theoretical issues discussed in the
introduction.
By examining these 'moments' where different beliefs and ideals came into open
conflict, I hope to highlight some of the specific areas of contradiction within
cultural institutions and in the related fields of ideology, educational policy, cultural
policy, artistic practice and individual psychology. At the same time I hope to show
how the equilibrium between these contradictory forces has been shaped by a
continuing pattern of contradiction, crisis, incorporation and renewal.
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2. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CIVILISING MISSION: A STUDY IN
CONTRADICTION
In this chapter I will apply the theoretical model of crisis and contradiction
developed in the introduction to an analysis of 'democratising' cultural institutions in
the late nineteenth century. These institutions represented a concerted attempt to
make middle class culture available to working class consumers. It would be an
exaggeration to say that this phenomenon was invented in the late nineteenth
century; there were of course precedents in the utilitarian attempts at working class
improvement in the 1830s through institutions such as the Society for the Diffusion
of Useful Knowledge and the Mechanics' Institutes (Kelly 1977, 115 - 128; Kett
1994, 102 - 140), and the democratising popular education movements in the U.S
during the Revolutionary period in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
(Cremin 1977, 36 - 38; Kett 1995, 32 - 34). Similarly there was also an earlier
generation of cultural and educational institutions in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century directed primarily at middle-class 'self-improvement', from
gentlemanly historical and philosophical societies and the American Lyceum to semi-
private museum collections and libraries where entrance was restricted to scholars
and sophisticates. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, these earlier sporadic
attempts to make 'culture' available gave way to a more comprehensive movement
for cultural reform. The fact that this movement was born out of widely contrasting
precedents points to some of the underlying contradictions which will be examined
in this chapter.
The 'democratising' cultural institutions of the late nineteenth century also reflect
forwards in history to contemporary versions of 'improving' democratic culture,
from the BBC and the Arts Council to the plethora of educational and outreach
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programmes attached to contemporary cultural institutions on both sides of the
Atlantic. I will in the remainder of this study be referring back to the late nineteenth
century as the period when the contradictory search for a 'democratic' culture began
to take shape. The basic elements for the later 'moments' of contradiction in
cultural policy in this study, including the ideological contradictions, psychological
conflicts, the dynamics of social class, in some cases even the financial and
institutional infrastructure, can be traced back to the 'moment' of cultural reform in
the last part of the nineteenth century.
2.1. The 'moment' of cultural reform 1870 - 1910
In the last thirty years of the nineteenth century there was a rapid expansion in
'public' cultural institutions in Britain and the U.S.. British and U.S. libraries were
being founded at an increasingly rapid rate through the 1870s and 1890s (Kelly
1977, 16; Garrison 1979; Kett 1994, 205 - 208). The Metropolitan Museum of
Art In New York and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston were both chartered in
1870, Henry Cole's South Kensington museum complex in London was founded in
1883. The first settlement house in Britain was founded in London in 1884,
followed by the first U.S. settlement house in New York in 1886.
These new institutions sought to make 'culture', specifically the culture of the
economically and politically powerful, available to the new working class, on the
premise that increased access to culture would produce a social benefit, described
variously as 'educating', 'uplifting', 'improving', 'softening' or 'civilising'. In this
chapter I will attempt to unravel the intentions behind the new cultural institutions in
relation to a 'crisis' in the meaning and purpose of middle class culture.
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When discussing the middle class 'civilising mission' it is important to recognise that
this 'mission' was driven by competing, sometimes contradictory intentions, and that
the 'middle class' (still at the time a relatively new term) consisted of competing
factions, not a unified class interest. There were two competing approaches to
cultural reform in the new institutions. One approach, reacting to a perceived
breakdown in the social order, centred on the search for a 'common culture' as the
key to social harmony between classes. The other approach sought to make culture
socially 'useful' by applying cultural solutions to practical social problems, from
industrial design to political and social reform. These competing approaches were
based on competing idealist and materialist conceptions of culture; in turn these
competing conceptions grew out of 'liberal' and 'utilitarian' traditions in middle
class higher education.
In the last quarter of the century these factions converged in a fragile consensus, as
illustrated by the temporary coalition between parliamentary reformers, industrial
philanthropists and cultural missionaries responsible for the British public library.
However, the civilising mission represented an 'unstable equilibrium' vulnerable
both to external pressures (for example, the changing market demand for libraries
and museums) and to internal dissent (for example the self-doubt of the settlement
worker). As the consensus which held the civilising mission together began to
unravel, inherited contradictions regarding the meaning and value of culture
resurfaced.
In order to explore this process of unfolding contradictions, I have chosen to focus
on the nineteenth century settlement house. The settlement house brought
university-educated young men and women into direct contact with working class
communities in the poorer districts of British and U.S. cities at the turn of the
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century. More blatantly than the museum or the library, the settlement house sought
to take the 'culture' of the middle class to the urban working class and the immigrant
poor.
The settlement house exemplified the contradictory nature of that 'culture'. Firstly,
the settlement worker combined a faith in the transforming power of culture with a
desire to be socially useful, reflected in the combination of artistic or educational
activities with practical attempts at community development or social reform;
conceptions of culture as 'uplifting' or 'useful' frequently came into direct conflict.
Secondly these conflicts were dramatised at the subjective level; the settlement
worker's search for useful culture was rooted in a sense of alienation and the
uselessness of her own 'culture'. I will argue that these conflicts were partly the
result of contradictory tendencies in higher education, in particular the contested
value of the classical, liberal arts 'cultural' curriculum in the ancient British
universities and the U.S. women's colleges.
Before examining the 'culture' of the settlement house, I will begin by tracing some
alternative views of the nineteenth century civilising mission and develop my
argument that the 'moment' of cultural reform was a crisis in Gramsci's sense, the
cumulative outcome of contradictions and factions in the nineteenth century middle
class conception of culture (section 2.2). In the following section (2.3) I will relate
these contradictions to competing traditions in middle class university education and
the extension of educational 'privileges' to the working class. The remainder of the
chapter is devoted to the settlement house, but the arguments are intended to apply
to the broader project of nineteenth century cultural reform.
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2.2. The Conspiracy Theory of Cultural Democratisation
In this section I will review two opposing tendencies among commentators on the
nineteenth century civilising mission. On one side, writers like Thomas Kelly
(1970, 1977) and Edward P Alexander (1983) see the nineteenth century cultural
institution as the product of genuine altruism. This altruism is seen as the property
of individuals, not the product of collective middle class virtue or self-interest. Thus
Kelly suggests the 1850 Public Libraries Act derived from "the enlightened goodwill
of a sector of the ruling class" (Kelly 1977, 3 - my emphasis). The principal
advantage of this view, which I will refer to as the heroic tendency, is the
recognition of individual agency and separate 'sectors' of opinion within the middle
class; its principal disadvantage is the refusal to examine collective self-interests
behind the altruistic facade.
Other commentators have noted that the new cultural institutions were not just the
result of individual initiative or of an eccentric, 'enlightened sector' of middle class
opinion. Behind the individual curators, visionary legislators and entrepreneurial
pioneers described by Alexander (1983), Kelly (1977) and Orosz (1990) stood a
coalition of middle class philanthropists, board members, parliamentary supporters
and local rate-payers. Where the heroic tendency sees the nineteenth century
cultural institution as the result of heroic individual effort, their sceptical opponents
see the workings of class politics. This view, which I will refer to as the
tegemonic tendency', extends the analytical terms from individuals to collective
interests. However, the danger of the hegemonic tendency is that it lumps these
various class interests together in a single category, referred to generically as
'middle class opinion' or 'middle class cultural hegemony'. Again the tendency is
towards simplification; instead of the heroic individual we are offered the middle
class conspiracy theory. Neither tendency seems capable of recognising the existence
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of competing individual and collective intentions within and outside the new
institutions, the gap between intention and execution, and the fact that institutional
policy is subject to internal faction and external circumstance.
The hegemonic tendency corresponds to the determinist view which sees cultural
democratisation as a tactic in the class struggle. As noted in the introduction, the
view of cultural institutions as instruments for class hegemony and ideological
domination was the dominant paradigm in cultural studies during the 1970s and
1980s, reacting against the empirical, culturalist school of the previous generation.
The hegemonic critique of cultural democratisation was thus a conscious act of
intellectual 'positioning'; accordingly, Dee Garrison in the introduction to her study
of American libraries positions her work in reaction against the complacent, 'heroic'
view of the librarian as an enlightened social missionary (Garrison 1979). As this
class-based analysis represents the dominant paradigm, I will devote most of this
section to a review of the tegemonic' critique of nineteenth century cultural
institutions.
In its cruder forms, the hegemonic tendency views the 'democratising' institutions of
the late nineteenth century as a form of middle class conspiracy. The first version of
this conspiracy theory concentrates on the uses of nineteenth century cultural
institutions as agencies of social control, deployed by the middle class elite to soothe
dissent, dissolve anarchic threats to the social order and cultivate an efficient
workforce. The second version argues that cultural institutions represented a Trojan
horse of middle class values, invading the hearts and minds of the working class and
displacing an alternative, subversive tradition of indigenous working class culture.
Both versions tend to reduce the combination of internal and external elements which
drive a cultural institution to a single controlling interest, such as the board members
of the organisation or the political legislature. As a result the competing interests
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and objectives at play within the institution are glossed over and the adaptations to
external changes in the cultural market are ignored.
The 'social control' argument invests the new cultural institutions with a unity of
purpose, together with a degree of influence over their imagined constituency, which
they did not possess. Nineteenth century advocates of museums and libraries
intended that the new cultural institutions would provide two basic forms of social
control. The first function was as a kind of virtual police force, reinforcing the
moral and social order; culture would 'soften' the masses, imbuing a proper respect
for the Victorian virtues. The second function was as a utilitarian regulator of the
economic order; introduced to culture, the British workman would become more
efficient and productive. The idea of 'social control' allowed these arguments to
work in concert within a loose coalition; however, the British Parliamentary debate
over the 1850 Public Libraries Act revealed a basic split between one faction
concerned primarily with the worker's virtue, the other with his productivity.
Accordingly Parliament was informed that the library was a means of "economic
betterment", "social reform" and "a means for the prevention of crime" (Kelly
1977, 26); an earlier Select Committee had even suggested that libraries and
museums might curtail "the prevailing vice of intoxication among the labouring
classes of the United Kingdom" (Kelly 1977, 7).
This list of hopes and promises made possible a coalition of supporters in
Parliament; it also facilitated support at the local level, where libraries depended on
philanthropic contributions (both for building costs and for books and magazines)
from industrial benefactors, and on the backing of a majority of ratepayers. At first,
the libraries were supported by the professional classes and clergy as a means for
moral and social 'improvement', but opposed by "landlords and shopkeepers" who
feared potential interference with their trade; however, in order to win the electoral
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majority required by Parliament and the financial support of local industrialists, the
libraries began from the late 1860s to emphasise their utilitarian function as engines
of educational progress over their 'moral' function (Kelly 1977, 30 - 31). The
libraries were obliged to cultivate the support of patrician and philistine elements in
the nineteenth century middle class; accordingly they became the servants of two
masters, seeking to satisfy competing claims for moral or social improvement and
economic betterment.
The attempts to win the support of different constituencies forced the new cultural
institutions to make ambitious and sometimes self-defeating promises. Conflicts
over the institution's internal mission were inevitably reproduced in doubts over its
external market. The intended 'working class' market for the nineteenth century
cultural institution was vaguely conceived by its middle class supporters. While the
arguments for moral improvement conjured up a constituency of criminals and
drunkards, industrial philanthropists like Carnegie were concerned primarily with the
able and industrious who would climb the ladder from rags to riches. Meanwhile
many working class users regarded the new institutions with suspicion; in the U.S.,
some working class organisations actively resisted the new Carnegie libraries,
remembering the clashes between Carnegie and the steel workers.
At the same time a new market for culture was emerging among the lower middle
class, including teachers, shopkeepers, clerks and skilled artisans. Attendance
statistics at the libraries, the Mechanics' Institutes, university extension classes,
settlement house 'clubs' and museums confirm a growing dependence on white
collar clerical and service staff, not the vague working class constituency imagined
by their middle class benefactors19.
19 For library attendances in the UK and US, see Kelly (1977, 82 - 3) and Garrison (1979, 50).
For the Mechanics' Institutes, see Kelly (1970, 198 - 99); Inkster (1985). For the settlement house,
see Meacham (1987, 122 - 123).
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The new market for culture capitalised on the appetite for self-improvement within a
relatively new social sector. In the U.S., Richard Hofstadter estimates that "the new
middle class of technicians and salaried professionals, clerical workers, salespeople
and public service personnel" grew by "almost eight times" between 1870 and 1910,
as against an overall population increase of about two and one third times
(Hofstadter 1955, 215). In Britain, this upwardly mobile 'white collar' constituency
not only attended the new cultural institutions but provided an outlet for the
expanding market in high-circulation, low-cost fiction, and in 'general interest'
periodicals such as 'Titbits' (established in 1881), of the type satirised by Gissings in
New Grub Street. Paul DiMaggio and Michael Useem argue that "cultural
differentiation" through the purchase of cultural goods (CDs, classical concerts,
museum visits, etc.) is especially important for the 'new' professions, "jobs for
which no clear technical criteria of evaluation exist" (DiMaggio and Useem 1982,
185 - 186). The teachers, shopkeepers and clerks who made up the emergent white
collar 'new middle class' of the late nineteenth century appear to fall into this
category of indeterminate, insecure professions; belonging neither to the property-
owning middle class nor the industrial working class, this new sector of the
population sought to compensate for its cultural rootlessness with a reassuring
cultural distinction. They were hungry for the trappings of middle class cultural
refinement rather than for earnest 'self-improvement'; the new, cultural institutions
responded to this demand by diluting their educational mission with a general
interest programme, 'education as entertainment'20.
A similar market trend affected nineteenth century popular education. Educational
institutions like the British Mechanics' Institute and the American Lyceum and
20 The American appetite for 'self-culture' is well documented by Kett (1994). For similar trends
in British educational and cultural institutions, see Kelly 1977, 82 - 83; Jarausch 1983, 25 - 28;
Kelly 1970, 212.
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Chautauqua, designed to propagate 'useful knowledge' to the working class, were
coopted by the white-collar appetite for 'self-culture' (Bode 1956; Case 1948; Kett
1994, 143 - 179). In the U.S. both the Lyceum and the Chautauqua were initially
grounded in a programme of self-improvement and popular education. The Lyceum
was created in 1826 as a Massachussetts-based "Society for Mutual Education"; like
the Mechanics' Institute, it was intended to provide practical information to working
men but by the 1860s it had been transformed into a commercial lecture and
entertainment circuit, providing a bowdlerised version of middle class culture to
small town America. The American Chautauqua followed a similar trajectory,
beginning as a "Sunday-School Teachers' Association" on the shores of Lake
Chautauqua in New York in 1874, and maturing into a kind of open university for
Middle America21 ; however, in 1903 the first of the travelling 'tent chautauquas'
began repackaging this educational programme as a travelling circus of culture, with
salesmen touting a fixed programme of music, lectures, theatre and variety acts, sold
'wholesale' to town chautauqua committees. When the town committees refused en
masse to book the 1925 chautauqua programme, the new market for culture was
abruptly exposed as an exploitative fraud; the appetite for self-improvement had
been exploited by showmen and hucksters dressed in the trappings of 'culture' and
'self-improvement'. Once the illusion cracked there was no product left to sell.
The successful confidence trick of the tent chautauqua salesmen of the 1900s and the
Lyceum Bureaus of the 1860s depended on an association between a generalist,
'cultural' education and the acquisition of aristocratic social status. According to
Joseph Kett, both the Lyceum and the Chautauqua derived from the eighteenth
century British and American literary and philosophical societies, rooted in "a
culture of gentlemanly self-improvement that flourished in the eighteenth century"
21 The Chautauqua University was established in 1883 and pioneered the use of correspondence
courses. The continuing popularity in the U.S. of cultural self-help programmes of the type
pioneered by the Chautauqua suggest that American cultural anxieties continue to be ripe for
exploitation.
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(Kett 1994, 15). Thomas Kelly claims a similar tradition behind the British
Mechanics' Institutes (Kelly 1970, 115 - 117), contradicting the conventional
historical view that the Mechanics' Institutes originated in the utilitarian tradition of
industrial education in the 1830s, the 'diffusion of useful knowledge' to the working
class (Inkster 1985, 6; Roderick and Stephens 1985, 21). The origins of this
connection between educational generalism and aristocratic social status will be
discussed in the next section.
Given the internal confusion of aims within the social control mission, the
uncertainty of their market, and their growing reliance on a lower middle class
constituency, the new institutions began to concede their initial missionary claim of
reforming the working class. The shift from a mission-led to a market-led policy
was apparent in the librarian's gradual surrender of moral authority over the reader
in the late nineteenth century, reflected in changing attitudes to the 'great fiction
question'. At first British and American librarians attempted to steer the reader
away from fiction, demand for which always outstripped supply. In the United
States tactics included 'literary guidebooks' in the 1880s which steered the reader
through the immoral maze of fiction, and the 'two book' ticket which effectively
used popular fiction as the bait for more worthy non-fiction titles (Garrison 1979, 68
- 72, 89 - 91). With the introduction of 'open shelf' access in the 1890s and the
introduction of the Dewey Classification System, Melvil Dewey effectively resigned
a major part of the library's social control mission, grudgingly conceding the
reader's right to "get their own meat or poison" 22. Professionalisation reinforced
the shift in the librarian's function from self-appointed cultural gate-keeper to
service-provider. The establishment of national library associations in the 1870s and
the introduction of professional training in the 1890s reinforced the new
22 Melvil Dewey, quoted in Garrison (1979, 96). Open shelf access was pioneered in Britain by
James Duff Brown in the Clerkenwell Library in 1893, but did not become general until 1919 with
the removal of the rate limit, allowing libraries to replenish book stocks; it seems that many British
librarians were worried that the public might steal their books.
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professionalism of the 1ibrarian23 . A new generation of librarians appeared more
concerned with the organisational goals of efficiency and competitiveness than with
the missionary aims of moral uplift and economic betterment. The growing interest
in attendance and lending statistics, and the professional emphasis on customer
service, which replaced the paternalistic emphasis on the formation of 'character',
reflected this shift. Many of the more enterprising British libraries, such as
Liverpool in the 1880s, extended their activities to include societies, clubs and
university extension classes, while others provided smoking and recreation rooms
(Kelly 1977, 95 - 97). The transition to the modern 'demand-led' library indicated
the extent to which the 'social control' mission of the library, as for other cultural
institutions, gradually gave way to the municipal function of service provision by the
turn of the century.
Here the new libraries and museums followed the lead of the Mechanics Institutes in
the first half of the century. The attempt to interest the working class in a middle
class idea of cultural 'improvement' was a failure; as with the Lyceum and the
Chautauqua, the new institutions were increasingly reliant on a socially diverse,
'white collar' constituency whose primary desire was to be entertained, but who
wanted their amusements to be dressed up in a generalist 'cultural' context which
promised respectability and self-improvement. The 'social control' function of the
libraries was thwarted by conflicting missionary intentions and by a failure to retain
the interests of their vaguely conceived 'working class' constituency. Far from
providing a mechanism for social control, libraries and museums thus found
themselves, in order to survive in a competitive market, increasingly controlled by
consumer demand.
23 The American Library Association was founded in 1876, the British followed in 1877. The
new profession of 'library science' was created "almost singlehandedly" in the United States by
Melvil Dewey in the 1890s and reflected his interest in "scientific management" and the 'Efficiency'
movement
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The 'Trojan Horse' version of the conspiracy theory follows the logic of Engels'
argument that the Mechanics' Institutes were "established in order to halt the
independent workers' education movement" (Inkster 1985, 7). The imposition of
utilitarian mass education and 'useful knowledge' from above was a direct attempt to
displace a thriving network of radical working class culture (cf. Worpole 1984).
There are four problems with this 'Trojan Horse' theory. First of all it exaggerates
the strength of the radical independent working class cultural tradition; for example
while there was an independent, informal network of libraries in Britain before the
1850 Public Libraries Act, including libraries in public houses, Chartist reading
rooms and union and labour libraries, the total book supply remained "very
inadequate" according to Kelly, "especially for the poorer classes" (Kelly 1970,
176). Secondly it assumes that the decline of that tradition was caused by a
conscious policy on the part of the new cultural institutions; again this
underestimates the effect of the 'new market for culture' referred to above, and the
possibility that the radical strain of working class literature, like the civilising
mission of the reformers, was swept aside by consumer demand. Thirdly, it
assumes that the new cultural institutions were successful in influencing the working
class; as I have suggested, the new cultural institutions, like the Mechanics'
Institutes before them, were not primarily patronised by the working class. Fourthly
and most problematically, the Trojan Horse model requires a unity of purpose
among the disparate supporters of the new cultural institutions which simply did not
exist.
Other critiques pursue a more sophisticated line of argument but nevertheless retain
traces of the hegemonic tendency. For example Paul DiMaggio (1986a) suggests
that the new cultural institutions did not attempt to impose a civilising missionary
idea of culture on a working class who were unlikely to take the bait. Instead,
cultural 'publicity' was directed at the rising middle class; the 'civilised' patrician
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minority displayed their values to those in the social stratum immediately below,
reinforcing their claim for cultural leadership whilst simultaneously extending their
constituency just far enough to guarantee their continuing legitimacy. Joel Orosz
describes this strategy as "widening the base of the elite" (Orosz 1990, 69); the old
"respectability" (the old pre-industrial middle class) was politically isolated and
threatened by the growing influence of the industrial (non-hereditary) middle class
and needed to reassert its dominance through culture.
Unlike the other cruder tegemonic' critiques of cultural institutions, DiMaggio's
constituency-building model is based on an awareness of the conflicting elements
within the nineteenth century middle class and the internal dynamic within cultural
institutions between the entrepreneurial pioneers, professional staff and board
members. Despite these qualifications, DiMaggio suggests that Boston's Museum of
Fine Arts and Symphony Orchestra were determined by the intentions of Boston's
'Brahmin' elite; he also implies that the non-profit system of organisation
represented a conscious attempt by this elite to establish a cultural monopoly from
which 'popular' cultural forms were excluded. However, once we accept that
cultural institutions are characterised by a multiplicity of internal factions and
missionary goals, and that these conflicting missionary intentions are further
compromised by the financial imperatives of the market place, it becomes
increasingly difficult to insist on a single intention stemming from a single governing
interest.
The heroic and hegemonic tendencies focus on the intentions of the new cultural
institutions, not their effects. The civilising mission is presented as the product
either of a handful of pioneering individuals pursuing universal enlightenment, or of
a unified middle class pursuing 'cultural hegemony'. Yet the 'causes' of the
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'civilising mission' were not so straightforward, nor were they straightforwardly
reproduced as 'effects'.
Judged on its outcomes, the 'civilising mission' was remarkably ineffective. First of
all, as noted above, competing missionary intentions undermined any coherent sense
of mission or target audience. As the new cultural institutions carved out their niche
as municipal service providers and competitive cultural attractions, the vague and
contradictory missionary intentions were submerged in the institutional logic of
market survival. Their audience was increasingly the 'white collar' lower middle
class; their mission was to provide this audience with a satisfying but not over-
taxing mix of education and entertainment.
Instead of being the driving force of the new institutions, the 'civilising mission'
became part of the marketing strategy. A lightweight, undemanding version of
'education' and 'improvement' became a means of stimulating (but not necessarily
satisfying) the lower middle class appetite for self-improvement; meanwhile
'educational seriousness' was dusted off to impress municipal funders. Earlier in the
century the entrepreneur and 'museum master' Charles Willson Peale pioneered this
dual strategy at his Philadelphia Museum. Visitors to the museum between 1794
and 1827 were primarily from the "high non-manual occupations" (Brigham 1992,
84 - 87). The museum provided this audience not only with lectures and scientific
demonstrations but a succession of bizarre attractions, from Peale's mammoth
skeleton (the `carniverous [sic] elephant of the north') to Signor Hellene's one-man
band and the 'Learned Dogs' introduced by Peale's sons (Alexander 1983, 58;
Alderson 1992, 49 - 65). Meanwhile Peale continued (unsuccessfully) to lobby the
municipal, state, even the federal governments for public money, projecting his
museum as "educationally serious" and stressing its function as a "school for civic
responsibility" (Brigham 1992, 79 - 80; Orosz 1990, 49).
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Peale's quirky mix of "scientific information and rational amusement" was before its
time and the museum eventually went out of business in 1850. What Peale grasped
was the market potential of 'education', both as a form of niche marketing designed
to flatter and amuse his white collar constituency, and as a form of corporate
marketing designed to impress potential funders. Ironically his competitor, Phineas
T Barnum attempted something similar in New York in the 1860s, proposing an
educational emporium designed to capitalise on the new market for culture in the
upwardly mobile lower middle class and on the 'civilising' intentions of
philanthropic supporters. In the end Barnum failed to convince his financial backers
of the project's potential; Barnum was after all perhaps more convincing as a
showman than as an educator (Orosz 1990, 227). Peale's misfortune on the other
hand was that he arrived too early to capitalise on the nineteenth century civilising
mission. Later in the century, his combination of corporate high seriousness and
education-as-entertainment would surely have found favour in the new cultural
institutions. Peale also anticipated the market position of today's museum education
programmes (Zolberg 1986), combining a high-minded corporate image of
community service and outreach (designed to impress corporate and municipal
funders) with a user-friendly appeal to the middle class cultural consumer (not the
'working class' non-attender featured in the mission statement).
Trapped in a cause and effect model of cultural analysis, the heroic and hegemonic
tendencies take the 'civilising mission' of the nineteenth century cultural institution
at face value, overestimating its coherence and effectiveness. Consequently they fail
to account for the contradictions and compromises which emerged through the
cracks in institutional policy. The libraries and museums of the late nineteenth
century, like the mechanics' institutes in the 1830s, encompassed a variety of
missionary intentions which were adapted to meet consumer demand, in particular
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the lower middle class appetite for 'self-culture'. In order to understand the
contradictions behind the middle class 'civilising mission' and the new appetite for
cultural self-improvement, it is necessary to examine the conflicting traditions of
nineteenth century education.
2.3. Education and Social Class in the Civilising Mission
I have referred to a 'coalition' between competing strands within the nineteenth
century middle class. In this chapter I will argue that competing versions of the
'civilising mission' were rooted in nineteenth century educational theory.
Behind nineteenth century idealist and utilitarian ideas of 'culture' lay a collision
between two educational traditions, the 'liberal education' of the old elite
universities and newer forms of 'utilitarian' professional, vocational and technical
education. The genteel faith in a neutral, 'classless' culture was informed by liberal
education's faith in a fixed body of knowledge, preserved and perpetuated through
the prescribed 'classical' curriculum; similarly the idea that art and culture should
serve a useful purpose in the economic order can be traced back to the utilitarian
educational tradition's emphasis on 'useful knowledge' in the 1830s and the attempt
to educate the several classes and professions according to their station in industrial
society. The rapid expansion of higher education in Britain and the U.S. during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century brought these conflicting ideas about education
and culture into direct competition24. The resulting synthesis of idealist and
utilitarian educational traditions in higher education, which I will refer to as the
search for 'useful culture', would have a critical influence on the new cultural
institutions, and more especially on the new cultural workers.
24 See for example the exchanges involving J S Mill, T H Huxley and Matthew Arnold in the
1870s and 1880s (Sanderson 1975, 122 - 141).
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'Liberal education' in the first half of the nineteenth century referred to a
'gentlemanly' tradition of generalist education, with a narrow, fixed curriculum
based on close study of the classics, directed towards the discipline and adornment
of the mind, not towards any profession or career (other than the clergy or
government). This tradition was rooted in a medieval, feudal society and preserved
in Oxford and Cambridge University and in the American 'colonial' colleges
(Harvard, Yale, William and Mary), the so-called 'ancient universities' 25 . It was
also closely tied to the church; until the 1850s, Oxford and Cambridge students
were subjected to a religious 'test' designed to weed out non-Anglican 'dissenters'
and the American colleges were each attached to religious denominations. Liberal
education in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was designed to serve
the needs of the ruling class, firstly by providing a generalist 'mental discipline'
suitable for future legislators, secondly by perpetuating a body of 'useless
knowledge' which, by its very impracticality, became a badge of status for the
'gentleman' intent on a life of leisure and refinement. The primary beneficiaries of
the liberal education tradition in this period were the landed gentry and the sons of
clergymen; the majority of British graduates (about two thirds) joined the clergy26,
while some joined the government (including a majority of the American Founding
Fathers and of British parliamentarians).
By the 1870s, the liberal education tradition was in retreat on both sides of the
Atlantic, as the utilitarian demands of an industrial society gradually penetrated the
old academic institutions. The new utilitarian tradition was driven by three
developments. Firstly, there was a recognition, both in the established universities
25 In Britain this phrase is primarily used to refer to Oxford and Cambridge, officially the only
universities in Britain pre-1800. I have extended the term to include the old 'colonial' colleges and
the newer 'Ivy League' colleges in the United States, all heavily influenced by the Oxbridge model.
The University of Durham should also be included in this category. On the other hand the University
of London (1828) and Owens College in Manchester (1851) qualify as 'new' universities; both were
radical departures from Oxbridge and signalled the beginnings of the so-called 'university revolution'
discussed below.
26 This estimate based on Oxford and Cambridge Universities (Sanderson 1975, 17).
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and in the newer colleges of the need for specialist professional and technical
training to meet the specialised needs of a manufacturing economy and 'scientific'
approaches to farming; the new British civic colleges and American land grant
colleges of the 1870s27 can be seen, at least in part, as a direct response to these
specialised, technical needs. Secondly the German research university inspired a
new professionalism and a shift in power from the collegiate hierarchy to the faculty
'professoriat'; this encouraged British and U.S. universities to replace the generalist
cultivation of the gentleman-amateur with a new emphasis on scientific and 'applied'
research. Thirdly, there was a commitment to 'democratise' education, reflected in
reforms in secondary and adult education as well as in higher education; at Oxford
and Cambridge secularisation was accompanied by an expansion of educational
opportunity for the new middle class 28 . These three trends converged in the massive
expansion of higher education in the last quarter of the nineteenth century;
university enrolment more than tripled in Britain and the United States between 1870
and 1900, and the expansion of non-university higher education was even more
rapid29 . The synergy between higher education and industry was reflected both in
the involvement of industrial benefactors in the foundation and funding of the new
institutions in the 1870s, and in the emergence of new faculties and specialisms (eg.
metallurgy, chemistry, electronics) which complemented local industry (Sanderson
1975, 10 - 12; Hofstadter 1952).
One version of history describes this transition as the 'university revolution', with a
new era of utilitarian expansion sweeping aside the outmoded, preindustrial tradition
'27 The Land Grant Act (the Morrill Act) of 1862 granted public land to each of the states,
proceeds from which were to be used for "the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes
in the several pursuits and professions in life" (Hofstadter and Smith 1961, 568)). The foundation of
the civic colleges in the early 1870s was directly related to a desire to improve the competitiveness of
British industry (Sanderson 1975, 143 - 4).
28 Oxford and Cambridge ceased religious 'testing' of students in the 1850s. The opening of
recruitment of working class and middle class to British and American universities in the late 19th
century, following Germany's lead, is described by Jarausch (1983, 23 - 28).
29 Figures derived from Jarausch (1983, 12 - 18).
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of liberal education (Hofstadter 1952, Sanderson 1975). Another version focuses on
the traditional university as a last surviving bastion of the 'liberal' education
tradition, as with Mina Carson's description of the nineteenth century American
university as "the only remaining locus for the preservation and propagation of that
refinement fostered by familiarity with the Western cultural tradition" (Carson 1990,
20). In reality the transition was not characterised by a radical break between 'old'
and 'new' universities, but by a merging of 'liberal' and 'utilitarian' traditions which
affected both the traditional universities and the new civic colleges. A new
equilibrium developed in which liberal education remained as a strong 'residual'
element, utilitarian education had become the 'dominant' rationale, while a hybrid
movement towards 'useful culture', can be seen as the 'emergent' ideology, growing
out of these competing traditions. This merging of traditions, reflected in the
'emergent' search for 'useful culture', was a major source of the contradictory
versions of the 'civilising mission'. The search for 'useful culture' differed from the
purely utilitarian view of culture because access to culture was assumed to have
intrinsic benefits beyond its instrumental functions; at the same time, 'useful
culture' differed from the idealist faith in a 'common culture' because its supposed
benefits were to be applied to 'practical' tasks, not just to the cultivation of character
and moral improvement.
In the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the merging of 'liberal' and
'utilitarian' educational traditions affected both the 'old universities' and the new
civic colleges. Despite their links with industry and agriculture, the 'new' British
civic colleges and American land grant colleges of the 1870s retained a residual faith
in the old classical curriculum. In the U.S., the Land Grant College Act did not
exclude "scientific and classical studies" from its remit, and some of the Act's
primary beneficiaries were in fact the traditional universities (eg. Yale). In Britain
the civic university colleges continued to provide the rudiments of a generalist
59/
'liberal education' alongside specialised vocational training (Sanderson 1975, 145 -
146); a 'balanced' curriculum was one of the conditions for achieving an
independent university charter. In the old universities a practical, vocational
emphasis was attached to the classical curriculum. Oxford and Cambridge began
introducing the natural and social sciences in the 1870s. Harvard introduced an
'elective' system in 1869, allowing students to choose their areas of specialisation
and recognising the place of scientific subjects on the curriculum (Hofstadter &
Smith 1961, 601 - 624). There was no clean break between 'liberal' and 'utilitarian'
education, only differences of emphasis and different configurations of the same
basic elements.
Traditional liberal education tradition remained especially strong in three areas.
Firstly, the established universities (Oxford and Cambridge in Britain, Harvard and
the Ivy League colleges in the United States) remained defiantly attached to the old
classical, humanist curriculum despite 'progressive' changes of the type noted
above; this resistance stemmed from vested interests and internal politics as much as
any intellectual position (Sanderson 1975, 5 - 6). Secondly, some of the "small
colleges, closely related to churches" in the United States also resisted reform
(Hofstadter 1952, 50), again partly as a result of their religious affiliations rather
than any attachment to the liberal education ideal. Finally the expanded area of
women's higher education, especially in the United States, maintained the 'genteel'
tradition of 'culture studies' into the late nineteenth century. This 'genteel tradition'
was partly an extension of traditional 'womanly' gender roles as teachers, educators
and cultural guardians within the family (Conway 1974, 3 - 4); more importantly,
women sought an outlet in a quasi-domestic sphere of culture in the absence of
vocational opportunities elsewhere (ibid., 8 - 9). Politics and industry remained
virtually exclusively the preserves of men; thus, according to Dee Garrison, "the
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division of labour produced by industrialism assured the feminization of American
culture" in the late nineteenth century (Garrison 1979, 12).
Instead of abandoning the classical curriculum, these institutions emphasised its
social utility and vocational applications. Oxford and Cambridge defended the
vocational utility of an unreconstructed classical curriculum, securing a virtual
monopoly on the civil service examinations as a result. The American women's
colleges of the 1870s, whilst mimicking the classical curriculum of the older male
elite colleges of the east coast, emphasised the utility of this curriculum in preparing
the female student to uphold the ideal of "true womanhood" both in the home and in
society as teachers and missionaries; Smith College (founded 1875) hoped its
graduates would influence society by "forming manners and morals, moulding
society, and shaping public sentiment", while the founder of Wellesley (also 1875)
described higher education as "putting on God's armour for the contest" in
preparation for a life of "noble usefulness" (Rousmaniere 1970, 50 - 51). Thus
while these new institutions continued to emphasise the value of liberal education,
they did so in terms of its social purpose; 'culture' was to be made useful in the
home and the school, 'religion' was to be applied to practical social problems.
One way of making the cultural curriculum of liberal education socially useful was
by applying it to the acculturation of the working class. The universities found a
new social purpose by redirecting the liberal education ideal towards the civilisation
and uplift of the working class. The university extension movement, originating
with Oxford and Cambridge in the 1870s and reaching a peak in the 1890s, offered
'liberal studies' to those unable to afford further education (Kelly 1970, 222 - 238).
A parallel attempt to apply the fruits of a liberal education to the cultivation of the
working class developed out of the American women's college. The first generation
of women graduates emerged from the new women's liberal arts colleges established
61/
after the American civil war in the 1870s, inspired both by an ideal of culture and by
a desire to be socially useful. They sought fulfilment in the socially oriented
professions (teaching, social work, missionary work and cultural guardianship)
which remained the only career options open to them in the outside world". Like
the originators of British university extension, the graduates of American women's
colleges sought to offset the perceived redundancy of their educational inheritance by
redirecting this inheritance towards the acculturation of the urban poor, especially
the new immigrant communities. The idea of 'useful culture' thus spilled out of the
academy into new attempts at working class education.
The emergent ideal of 'useful culture', born out of the opposition between utilitarian
and idealist conceptions of education and culture, was thus expressed in the
trajectory both of the institution's extramural activities and in the individual
graduate's career path. Firstly, the surviving centres of 'liberal education' (the
ancient universities, American's women colleges, religious seminaries) either
instigated or collaborated in the construction of institutional outlets through which
the fruits of a liberal education could be 'applied' to the business of administration,
education and social reform. Secondly the cultured graduates of these universities
themselves attempted to apply their educational inheritance to a career of social
reform. At both levels 'useful culture' can be seen as a response to internal demand
(the search by institution and graduate for a 'useful' vocational role) as much as it
was a response to the plight of the poor.
It is possible to trace three distinct tendencies within nineteenth century higher
education, each with a stake in the late nineteenth century 'civilising mission'. The
first faction included the remnants of the landed gentry and the clergy. Schooled in
the old classical curriculum at the ancient universities, they retained a more or less
30 According to Jill Conway "approximately sixty to seventy percent of the first generation of
graduates from women's colleges did not marry and many pursued specifically identifiable careers".
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undiluted faith in a 'common culture' as the key both to social harmony and
individual character; this same common culture also underpinned their own elite
status, shoring up cultural distinctions even as their political and financial reserves
diminished. While this faction represented 4 'residual' minority, they retained
disproportionate influence, especially in Parliament, in the U.S. Congress and in the
clergy; their primary contribution to the new cultural institutions was their political
influence. The second faction, representing the 'dominant' element, included
industrialists, factory owners and businessmen. This faction included both graduates
of the 'new' technical and vocational colleges and self-made philanthropists who had
helped to create them. They saw culture's importance primarily in economic terms.
Culture was a useful commodity which could improve the quality of industrial
design and raise the efficiency of the work6rce. They contributed to the new
cultural institutions financially.
The third 'emergent' faction was a product of the new emphasis on 'useful culture'
in the old universities and women's colleges. While the idealistic young graduates
of Oxford and the female graduates of Vassar, Smith and Wellesley had been
profoundly influenced by the cultural core of the 'liberal' curriculum, they had also
learned to distrust culture as an end in itself, seeking to offset their perceived
'uselessness' by plunging into a socially useful, practical vocation. The liberal-
utilitarian debate in British and American universities paved the way for the new
public cultural institutions by creating this pool of culturally disaffected, culturally
educated, reform-minded workers. Alienated from their class, their culture and their
family, these cultural workers sought an outlet in the warm glow of 'community'
and plunged into the work of social reform by cultural means. However, the buried
contradictions of their educational inheritance would erupt in their new role as
cultural missionaries. In the next section I will examine this contradictory creed of
'useful culture' in the context of the nineteenth century settlement house.
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2.4. The Settlement House: from 'useful culture' to 'neutral space'
In the previous section I described a widening gap between a classical 'liberal'
education and the industrial economy's demand for 'useful' vocational skills.
Responding to the threat of redundancy (literally and metaphorically), the classical
liberal educators sought to justify their work in terms of a hybrid ideological
concept, the search for 'useful culture'. A new generation of graduates inherited the
liberal-classical faith in a transcendent 'common culture', tempered by a sceptical,
utilitarian view that culture was ultimately useless when confronted by real social
problems. In the nineteenth century settlement house the idea that culture could and
should be socially useful was stretched to breaking point, and the latent
contradictions between two belief systems erupted in institutional conflicts over
policy and psychological conflicts over motives and ideals.
The first settlement house, Toynbee Hall, was founded in London's East End in
1884 by the Reverend Samuel Barnett. At Barnett's invitation, a group of idealistic
Oxford graduates settled in a house in London's East End and attempted to live
among the urban industrial poor in a spirit of friendly neighbourliness. This
individual human contact with the 'residents' would, it was hoped, result in the
moral, spiritual and cultural uplift of their new 'neighbours'. Activities at Toynbee
Hall included university extension classes, debating clubs, art exhibitions and visits
to 'friends' in the country (Barnett 1888). From this beginning other British
settlements followed, including Oxford House (established 1885); the first
American settlement house followed in New York in 1886. The emphasis was on
individual human relationships, not philanthropic good works.
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The 'university settlement idea' was born from the connection between Barnett, an
Oxford-educated clergyman, and Balliol College Oxford. The settlement house was
rooted in Barnett's insistent belief that the problem of poverty could be 'solved' in
cultural terms; seeking to promote a 'common culture' as the solution to social
breakdown, Barnett identified this 'common culture' with the habits of thought and
behaviour fostered by a classical liberal education, specifically with the 'culture' of
the Oxford graduate. Despite the emphasis on 'practicable' interventions, notably in
researching and publicising the conditions of poverty and in pushing for social
legislation and improved municipal provision, Barnett emphasised that poverty was
not simply an aggregate of material wants. In common with other late nineteenth
century 'charity reformers', Barnett mistrusted the 'dole' of organised charity;
handing out money to the poor had not solved the problem of poverty, moreover its
distinctions between the 'worthy' and 'unworthy' poor appeared cruel and arbitrary.
The distribution of 'relief' funds, while relieving the conscience of a few rich
benefactors, was often either ineffective or counterproductive for most poor
recipients31.
Rejecting this purely economic version of philanthropy (and ignoring any larger
economic analysis of poverty as a product of industrial capitalism), Barnett focused
instead on the 'cultural' condition of poverty and its debilitating effect on the
individual's 'character' and capacities. At the individual level then, the problem of
poverty was to be addressed in 'cultural' terms, by restoring dignity, independence
and self-respect to the working man. Having diagnosed the cultural roots of poverty
among the poor, Barnett also identified poverty with the 'cultural' failings of the
31 Henrietta Barnett described the harmful effects of 'penny dinners' for poor children; these
effects included deflating the local economy, lowering wages and undermining family life. In similar
vein Samuel Barnett warned that short term, indiscriminate relief efforts would undermine long term
attempts to rebuild poor communities: "The flood of charity, like a torrent, swept away the tender
plants which the stream of charity had nourished" (Barnett 1888, 19 - 20; 36 - 37)
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rich, partly in such vices as greed and waste, but more especially in their destruction
of community. The urban middle class had deserted the city and the urban poor;
Barnett urged these "wealthy middle class deserters from the commonwealth" to
"take up again their civic responsibilities" (Meacham 1987, 40). The renewed
'connection' between rich and poor would be made at a personal level between the
settlement residents and their poor 'neighbours', held together by a common culture.
The 'common culture' of the settlement house was to revolve around the 'universal'
values of liberal education, the curriculum of classic texts and the cultivation of
mental discipline; university extension classes and related 'clubs' featured
prominently in the Toynbee Hall programme. The settlement house's roots in liberal
education were apparent in the career paths of the settlement 'residents'. In Britain
the first settlement houses were occupied by male Oxford graduates schooled in a
tradition of 'manly Christianity'; here the genteel tradition of religion and liberal
education was rooted in the British public schools, refined and developed by the
Oxford colleges (especially Balliol), which according to one commentator owed as
much to Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby School, as to Matthew Arnold,
the writer of Culture and Anarchy (Meacham 1987, 1 - 9). In the United States, the
first generation of settlement workers were primarily the female graduates of the
new women's liberal arts colleges (Rousmaniere 1970, Carson 1990 20 - 26); they
also tended to come from strongly religious, middle class family backgrounds
(Kalberg 1975), and had in some cases attended religious 'seminaries'.
The influence of the traditional liberal university on the nineteenth century
settlement house in Britain and the United States has been well documented
(Trolander 1987, 11 - 20; Meacham 1987, 50 - 56; Carson 1990, 198). If anything
this influence has been overstated, with the settlement house presented as a last
bastion of liberal culture transplanted into working class neighbourhoods and the
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settlement workers' faith in culture taken at face value. In fact the settlement
movement's relationship to liberal education was tempered by contradictions and
compromises. Within the settlement house attitudes to culture were polarised
between the two generations. Barnett represented the older generation's
unconditional faith in culture, inherited from Oxford and the liberal education
tradition. Part of this inheritance was a 'residual' patrician subtext which belonged
to liberal education's feudal, genteel past, reflected in a fascination with the
aristocratic trappings of cultivation and refinement and certain ingrained habits of
hierarchy. The younger generation of settlement workers had their own educational
inheritance, schooled in the 'emergent' search for a 'useful culture'; this led to a
profound scepticism at the apparent 'uselessness' of culture when faced with real
social problems, as expressed by the young William Beveridge at Toynbee Hall and
by Jane Addams at Hull House in Chicago.
The residual patrician associations between 'culture', liberal education and social
class can be traced in the settlement's attachment to middle class artistic 'taste' and
to the `extracurriculum' of collegiate living. Barnett's wife, Mrs. Henrietta Barnett,
embroidered his cultural idealism with more specific descriptions of the uplifting
power of art and music; the Toynbee Hall search for community was expressed
through specific cultural forms, as in Mrs. Barnett's description of pictures as
"stepping stones towards the truer life" and music "which more than anything else
helps to smooth away class as well as other inequalities" (Barnett 1888, 124; 87).
Here the pursuit of a classless culture based on 'general perfection' shaded into more
specific prescriptions of middle class culture through 'at home' musical evenings,
visits to galleries and outings to wealthy friends in the country. The 'culture' of the
settlement house also reproduced the atmosphere and habits of an Oxford college,
with its rigid internal hierarchy, its emphasis on individual conversation rather than
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collective negotiation and its imposing design and architecture, in a manner likely to
exacerbate class differences rather than dissolve them32.
The emergent neo-utilitarian strand of liberal education, the search for 'useful
culture' challenged Barnett's faith in culture from the opposite direction. Younger
Toynbee Hall residents doubted the relevance of 'culture' to social reform; in 1903
the young William Beveridge dismissed the idea that "colossal evils could be
remedied by small doses of culture and charity and amiability" and claimed to
distrust the "saving power of culture and mission and isolated good feeling as a
surgeon distrusts 'Christian Science'" (Meacham 1987, 137) 33 . In the United
States, Jane Addams identified one of the 'subjective' drives of the settlement
worker as an attempt to escape from the atrophying uselessness of a life of
`cultivation' 34 and described the young college-educated woman's keen "sense of
futility, of misdirected energy" in the "pursuit of cultivation" and her "moral
revulsion against this feverish search after culture" (Addams 1910, 44, 46).
According to Addams, the American settlement worker was both the product of a
liberal education and in revolt against it.
The common culture of the settlement house was thus an amalgam of residual
associations and emergent discontents. At Toynbee Hall, the conflict between
Barnett's patrician confidence in the saving power of culture and Beveridge's uneasy
scepticism and self-doubt never reached a point of crisis. Perhaps because Toynbee
Hall was so closely modelled in the image of Barnett and of Oxford, it never fully
transcended its original status as an eccentric experiment in communal living. The
32 Thus Meacham describes "public school notions of authoritarian high-mindedness and
disinterested service", transferred to Toynbee Hall via Balliol, and "habits of mind and action whose
theatrical artificiality inhibited true connection" (Meacham 1987, 7; 50).
33 Meacham however also points out that Beveridge's claimed 'distrust' of culture needs to be
taken in context, in a letter to his parents reassuring them of his 'practical' future career plans.
34 This theme was developed in Addams' 1892 lecture, "The Subjective Necessity of Social
Settlements". The lecture was included as a chapter in Twenty Years at Hull House (Addams 1910,
68 - 76) but was originally published in November 1892.
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alternative, non-cultural approaches to social reform sought by Beveridge, R H
Tawney and the younger generation of Toynbee Hall residents were only expressed
outside the confines of the settlement house; for Beveridge himself, Toynbee Hall
constituted a form of postgraduate education before embarking on the real business
of social reform as a senior civil servant and politician. This educational function,
giving the nation's future ruling class a first-hand experience of the reality of
poverty, would emerge as perhaps the single most important legacy of the nineteenth
century British settlement house. In 1911, Beveridge characterised Toynbee Hall as
"a school of post-graduate education in humanity" (Briggs & Macartney 1984, 70);
in 1932, Henrietta Barnett commented on "the swarming men now in the high places
of this country who owe all their knowledge of the working classes to their Toynbe,e
Hall days" (Briggs & Macartney 1984, 27). However, Toynbee Hall itself, in
common with the other British settlement houses, had little direct influence upon
social reforms either at the local or national level. This inertia stands in marked
contrast to the American settlement house.
In the American settlement house, the latent tensions between the older generation's
liberal-educated faith in culture (represented by Barnett) and the younger
generation's uneasy search for useful culture (represented by Beveridge) reached a
crisis point. Firstly, the American settlement house was primarily concerned with
immigrant communities; confronted with sharply differentiated ethnic and religious
cultures, the universality of an Oxford tutor's private rooms seemed increasingly
suspect'. Secondly, the dire state of local government in many American cities
encouraged many settlement workers to take an active part in local political and
social reform; direct involvement in social reform bypassed the old faith in reform
by cultural means. Thirdly, the self-doubts over the 'uselessness' of culture
expressed by Beveridge were exacerbated for the predominantly female American
settlement worker by gender; the inadequacies of a purely cultural approach to
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social problems were complicated by the `feminisation of culture', by 'role conflicts'
over the place of women in society and by what Jane Addams described as the
'family claim'. These three distinguishing features are considered below.
The period of large-scale immigration to the United States, following the end of the
American Civil War and preceding the introduction of the quota system in 1919,
happened at roughly the same time as the American settlement movement's period of
ascendancy. The American settlement house came to be defined by its distinctive
contribution to the 'Americanisation' of European immigrants, to the extent that
many Americans today believe that the 'settlement house' title refers to settlement by
immigrants rather than by middle class `residents' 35 . Where British settlement
workers had regarded London's East End as a cultural vacuum waiting to be filled36,
the American settlement workers were inclined to treat immigrant customs and
traditions with respect. Ironically this respect was partly inspired by a classical
education which reverenced Greece, Rome and the Italian Renaissance as the cradle
of civilisation; thus while Jane Addams remained either dismissive or fearful of
indigenous working class culture, she was able to compare an elderly Italian woman
to a work by Michelangelo (Addams 1910, 139). The American settlement house
also had to compete with ethnic and religious societies catering for immigrants; to
win the immigrant's loyalty the settlement house had to show a modicum of respect
for immigrant culture.
In Britain the settlement house worked alongside municipal authorities in pursuit of
Barnett's 'practicable' reforms; eventually the settlement house would prove of only
marginal significance as the reform process was taken over by newly
35 This became apparent in discussing the contemporary settlement movement with various
agencies in 1995/6.
36 See for example Henrietta Barnett's musings on "the extreme dulness of the lives of the poor"
in "At Home to the Poor" (Barnett 1888, 76 - 95). The middle class hostess is advised to fill the
"barren" minds of her guests with music, art, and good table manners.
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professionalisal civil servants. In the United States there was no guarantee that
reformers' demands would be taken up by government; the settlement house, along
with the 'muckraking' campaigning journalists and other 'Progressive' reformers
spent much of their energies working against, not with, a local government machine
they saw as corrupt and ineffective. Thus while Jane Addams envied London its
City Council and praised London's civic amenities of 1896 as being "at least a
decade and a half ahead of Chicago" (Addams 1910, 153 - 154), her British visitors
complained of the "lack of political machinery adapted to modern city life" in
Chicago (ibid., 170). Settlement concerns for the welfare of workers and families
inevitably escalated from local political skirmishes to campaigns for federal
legislation, abetted by a sympathetic President 37. In order to bypass the corrupt
'machine' of ward politics, American settlement workers became increasingly
involved in federal committees and enquiries (from the National Child Labor
Committee to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
The intractability of local politicians even led some settlement houses, notably Hull
House and Henry Street, to put up candidates for political office and other municipal
functions38 . Settlement workers could not afford to take the machinery of political
reform for granted (Addams 1910, 130); constant vigilance was needed to ensure
"the more consistent enforcement of existing laws and their advance" (ibid., 170).
Given the symbiotic relationship between Toynbee Hall, Oxford University and the
upper echelons of the British civil service, it is no surprise that the British settlement
house was willing to entrust its reforming mission to the professionals. American
37 For example, see Davis's account of Hull House's involvement in the 1904 Chicago
stockyards strike. The settlement workers raised money for the strikers but resolutely opposed
violence. The strike eventually failed, but Hull House's continued advocacy of the workers' case led
to a government investigation into the meat-packing plants instigated by Roosevelt (Davis 1967, 112 -
122)
38 See for example Addams' electoral struggle with the corrupt Alderman Johnny Powers
(Addams 1910, 183 - 185), her successful bid for the local garbage collection contract against a
corrupt administration (ibid. 164 - 170), her tenure on the Board of Education from 1905 (ibid. 189 -
195).
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settlements, by contrast, found in the absence of an accountable municipal political
mechanism a reason to exert growing political influence. While many of the first
American settlement houses were directly inspired by Toynbee Hal139 , the American
settlement house thus developed its own distinctive identity as an engine for practical
reform. The practical turn of the American settlement house was emphasised in the
definition offered by Greenwich House in New York: "A settlement aims to get
things done for a given neighborhood" (Woods & Kennedy 1911).
Alongside its relationship with immigrants and its emphasis on practical reform, the
third distinctive feature of the American settlement house was its predominantly
female character. Female residents and volunteers far outnumbered men in
American settlements, whereas many British settlements (especially Toynbee Hall)
retained the flavour of a male Oxbridge college. In Chicago in 1911, combining
figures for all religious and non-religious settlements, approximately 72% of all
residents and 77% of all volunteers were women 40 . Women also formed the
majority in the most influential Chicago settlements, ranging from Hull House (61%
of residents, 67% of volunteers) to the Chicago Commons (89% of residents, 93%
of volunteers). In contrast, out of 435 residents in all British settlements in 1913,
only approximately 57% were women while Toynbee Hall, the largest and most
influential of the British settlements had a staff of 20 residents and 200 non-
residents, all men41 . Women were also prominent in the American settlement
movement's leadership. Their influence extended through other related agencies,
such as as the women's trade union movement and investigative bodies such as the
National Child Labour Committee. In contrast, the British settlement movement
39 The first settlement house, the Neighborhood Guild founded by Stanton Coit in New York in
1886 was directly inspired by Toynbee Hall. Jane Addams and Robert Woods, two of the settlement
movement's leading advocates, were both visitors and admirers of both Toynbee Hall and the
Reverend Barnett.
40 Proportions based on figures from Woods and Kennedy (1911)
41 Proportions based on figures from Picht (1914, 99 - 104)
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revolved around the leadership of Samuel Barnett and the influence of the male
Oxbridge college.
Emancipated by education but still constrained by family expectations and limited
career opportunities, young college-educated women felt the 'burden' of liberal
education more keenly than their male counterparts. In her 1892 lecture on "The
Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements", Jane Addams claimed that these
women were forced to "bear the brunt of being cultivated into unnourished,
oversensitive lives" and to endure "a fatal want of harmony between their theory and
their lives" (Addams 1910, 68). Prepared by her upbringing for a life of "useless"
refinement as a 'woman of culture', the college-educated women nevertheless sought
a life of social service. Yet her career options were limited not just by social
conventions but by family expectations; in the young woman who was "taught to be
self-forgetting and self-sacrificing" and who at the same time was held back by "the
family claim", could be seen "all the elements of a tragedy". (Addams 1910, 71).
In the mind of the college educated woman, the conflicting ends of liberal education
and social usefulness vied for predominance.
According to Christopher Lasch, Addams' decision to found Hull House in 1889
stemmed from a subjective sense of "revulsion" against her family, class and
culture, sparked by her visit to Europe in 1888 (Lasch 1965, 25 - 29; Addams
1910, 51 - 53). During this visit, Addams would later write of experiencing "a
sense of futility, of misdirected energy, the belief that the pursuit of cultivation
would not in the end bring either solace or relief" (Addams 1910, 44). Three years
later, in "The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements", Addams linked her own
personal sense of futility with the situation of other educated young women: "We
have in America a fast-growing number of cultivated young people who have no
recognized outlet for their active faculties" (Addams 1910, 71). "This young life",
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seemed to Addams "as pitiful as the other great mass of destitute lives" (Addams
1910, 72). The settlement's promise of "social and individual salvation" (Addams
1910, 76) was thus extended not just to the urban poor but to the college educated
woman. The settlement would provide the necessary 'outlet' for her active faculties
by applying her skills to real social problems, while the settlement's quasi-domestic
context and its emphasis on 'culture' would satisfy the claims of her family, her
class and her 'cultivated' background.
These three developments in the American settlement house, the largely immigrant
constituency, the involvement in local reform and the self-doubt of the female
settlement worker, reinforced the American settlement worker's loss of faith in the
evangelical common culture preached by Barnett and Matthew Arnold. One solution
to this crisis of faith was a gradual shift away from the ideal of a single common
culture towards a pragmatic multiculturalism. Instead of inviting their neighbours to
submerge their differences in culture, American settlement workers attempted to
create a neutral zone within which different cultures and communities could interact.
The shift in emphasis was reflected in a change in the definition of 'culture'.
Barnett had sought to create a common culture as "common ground for all classes"
(Barnett 1888, 103); here culture was a unifying common good, rooted in the 'great
tradition' of the liberal arts curriculum. The American settlement house sought to
provide a space for different 'cultures'; culture was here used in the anthropological
/ sociological sense, as a distinctive 'way of life' for different ethnic and religious
communities.
Following what Kett calls her "decade-long dalliance with Arnoldian culture" (Kett
1994, 181) Addams became interested in a new educational philosophy she described
as "socialized education". Hull House's post-1900 educational programmes were
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clearly influenced by John Dewey's view that education should be adapted to the
needs of the workplace and of the student, reflected in the trends towards "domestic
training" and "trade teaching" and Addams' argument for "correlating the schools
with actual industry" (Addams 1910, 244 - 251). A similar shift took place in Hull
House's cultural programmes. Initially these activities, like those of Toynbee Hall,
had revolved around music and art exhibitions; an art gallery was established in
1891 and a music school in 1893. Over the next ten years these classes were
replaced by new participatory programmes such as the Hull House Labor Museum
and the Hull House Players in which culture was rooted in immigrant traditions and
practical tasks. The Hull House Labour Museum sought to reconnect Americanised
children with the craft traditions of their immigrant parents through practical
demonstrations, making the point "that culture is an understanding of the long-
established occupations and thoughts of men, of the arts with which they have
solaced their toil" (Addams 1910, 141). The new cultural programmes emphasised
both the roots of culture in everyday life and the applications of culture to everyday
problems. Thus music was seen as a means of exploring cultural differences and
reviving folk traditions, while theatre was "a reconstructing and reorganising agent
of accepted moral truths", testing ideas by connecting them with experience
(Addams 1910, 217 - 218; 223 - 224).
Hull House's cultural programmes sought to create an idealised version of American
society, a neutral zone within which diverse cultures could find expression and
interact with each other. Many American settlements were explicitly committed to a
policy of religious and ethnic tolerance ('amicable relations') among different
immigrant groups; according to a 1911 survey, among the institutions catering for
the assimilation of immigrants, "the settlement house was unique in that immigrants
of all nationalities were welcome to come together" (Woods and Kennedy 1911, 10).
More than half of the 34 settlements in Chicago were non-religious, compared with
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just three out of 27 settlements in London42 . The American settlement house thus
aimed to create a neutral (secular, tolerant, dispassionate and apolitical) forum
within which different 'cultures' (different ethnic groups, religious affiliations,
'ways of life' and artistic traditions) could freely develop and interact.
By establishing itself both as a 'neutral resource' for immigrant communities, and as
a 'spearhead' for social reform, the American settlement house transcended the more
limited cultural project of the British model. By 1913 there were still only 46
settlement houses in Britain, mostly (approximately 60%) concentrated in London;
according to a contemporary witness the movement had failed to build on its
founders' initiatives and was enduring a period of crisis (Picht 1914, 129).
Estimates of the number of settlements in the United States at this time range from
around 200 to around 400; moreover, while the growth of the British settlement
movement appeared to be levelling out, in the United States the number of
settlements more than doubled between 1905 and 1913. While large numbers of
settlement houses were concentrated in the large cities of the Northeast and
Midwest, especially New York and Chicago, they extended across 109 towns and
cities within the continental US and 33 states (including Hawaii) 43 . The settlement
movement's political influence also appeared to be at a peak, with many of its
planned reforms included in the Progressive Party platform in Roosevelt's 1912
presidential campaign.
Despite this success story, American settlement workers were not entirely
comfortable in their new role. In particular the ideal of a 'neutral' cultural space
was problematic; the strategy of cultural neutrality perhaps owed more to the
'subjective' needs of the alienated middle class settlement worker than to the
'objective' needs of her working class neighbours. In the next section I will review
42 Source Woods and Kennedy (1911), Picht (1914).
43 Source: Woods & Kennedy (1911), Picht (1914), Trolander (1987).
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this critique of cultural neutrality and its relationship to the settlement worker's own
problematic search for 'useful culture'.
2.5 Neutrality and Sacrifice in the American Settlement House
In the previous section I traced the American settlement house's trajectory from
promoting a 'universal' common culture, based on the idealist assumptions of liberal
education, to the creation of a 'neutral' zone within which different community
'cultures' could interact. In this section I will outline why I believe this assumption
of neutrality was problematic, both in its ideological assumptions and in its effects
on the relationship between settlement residents and 'neighbours'. I will also argue
against the 'sociological critique' which sees the tactic of neutrality as a subtle
means of reinforcing middle class hegemony, arguing instead that the search for
neutrality was driven by the settlement worker's own contradictory ideological
assumptions and her 'subjective' sense of alienation from her class, culture and
background.
In the 1960s the assumed cultural 'neutrality' of the American settlement house was
questioned by sociologists including Herbert Gans and Saul Alinslcy (Gans 1962,
1964; Trolander 1987, 140 - 153), who suggested that the tactic of neutrality had
effectively reinforced middle class 'cultural hegemony'. There were three strands to
this attack. Firstly Gans suggested that the nineteenth century settlement house, for
all its neutrality, had retained its aura of middle class cultural privilege and appealed
especially to a section of the immigrant poor who were prepared to "learn how to
become middle class"; settlement workers had been blind to the alternative cultures
of the slum-dwellers and had sought to change them, not to understand them (Gans
1964, 4 - 5). Secondly, according to Alinsky and other 1960s sociologists, the
political 'neutrality' of the contemporary settlement house amounted to a form of
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conservatism which denied the legitimacy of class consciousness and class struggle
in the 1960s 'war against poverty' (Trolander 1987, 145 - 151); it had also
prevented the settlement from taking effective action in the struggle for black civil
rights (Tro'ander 1987, 94 - 108; 184 - 187; Karger 1987, 1114 - 120). Finally
Gans suggested that the settlement's pursuit of a "warm and cohesive neighborhood"
was itself a middle class construction; here 'cultural neutrality' meant cutting off
the ethnic and family ties on which urban working class communities depended
(Gans 1964, 6). One of the functions of the settlement house was to break up these
loyalties, replacing "the peer group society" with a new orientation towards
participation in "purposive groups", and replacing the ethnic and family loyalties of
the immigrant with a neutral, disinterested form of American citizenship (Gans
1962, 148).
The sociologists who criticised the settlement house in the 1960s related the twin
doctrines of cultural and political neutrality to the self-interest of the middle class.
The critique grew out of the 'revisionist' attack on cultural institutions as centres of
middle class cultural hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s, rather than any historical
context; Gans, Alinsky and others were using the settlement movement's past to
attack policies of the present. The key to their argument was that 'neutrality' had
reinforced middle class political and cultural 'hegemony'. Their criticisms shared
the tegemonic' tendency to reduce the civilising mission to a mechanical
reproduction of class interests. While I share many of Gans' criticisms of the
counterproductive effects of 'neutrality' on the settlement's relationships with the
neighbourhood, I believe that the search for neutral space derived from the
settlement worker's revulsion against middle class culture rather than her secret
alliance with political and industrial elites.
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Undoubtedly the American settlement worker's cult of neutrality prevented her from
engaging with or understanding working class cultural and political aspirations and
forms of organisation. Jane Addams, like most settlement workers, remained highly
critical of the 'subcultural' activities of the young urban working class which
revolved around the saloon and the dance-hall; the settlement house offered
'wholesome' alternatives where alcohol was banned and sexual contact (except in a
controlled, demure environment) was discouraged (Wald 1915, 177 - 180). Critics
of the settlement's 'class' bias go on to suggest that Addams and other social
reformers, in failing to recognise distinctive urban 'sub-cultures' were attempting to
impose "normative behaviour" on the urban ethnic poor (Huggins 1971), and that by
effectively 'criminalising' certain popular activities they were "defining and
regulating the dependent status of youth" (Platt 1969, 176 - 177; 99). However,
we should be wary of sentimentalising autonomous working class sub-culture as a
site of cultural resistance. Rather than imposing an oppressive moral and cultural
code, the settlement house was challenging an exploitative sub-culture in which the
'dependent status of youth' was manipulated through prostitution and alcoholism.
Far from imposing normative behaviour, the settlement house attempted to preserve
and perpetuate immigrant cultures at a time when 'Americanisation' in the school
and the workplace meant abandoning the old immigrant culture in order to embrace
the new country's language and business practices.
Politically, the neutrality of the settlement house came under attack from two
directions. Firstly, Huggins noted the settlement's failure to engage with the
political 'sub-culture' of the ward machine (Huggins 1971, 178 - 179). Secondly,
Saul Alinslcy criticised the settlement house's "slow, consensus, establishment-
oriented methods of achieving social change" which attempted to defuse the class
and race antagonisms which formed the basis of working class political activism; in
contrast, Alinsky advocated a 'conflict-based' approach to community empowerment
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which deliberately stirred up class antagonisms as the catalyst for collective direct
action (Tro'ander 1987, 145 - 151).
Again the settlement policy appears to have been pragmatic rather than normative,
based on the apparent needs of 'neighbours' rather than the need to uphold middle
class political or moral standards. The settlement house opposed the machinery of
ward politics because while the political 'boss' distributed short term favours to his
constituents, he was not interested in long term reform. The refusal to take sides in
industrial disputes was tempered by indirect support for striking workers, as with
Hull House's provision of food and money for strikers' families in 1890s Chicago,
the support for unionisation and the presence of individual settlement workers on
picket lines. However, Jane Addams remained appalled by the "wretched human
waste" of the strikes, and pointed out the backlash against strikers in the form of
blacklists and broken promises as well as the nervous exhaustion of strike leaders
(Addams 1910, 128 - 129). She refused to take sides, claiming that "the labour
movement" represented "a general social movement concerning all members of
society and not merely a class struggle" (ibid., 125). She argued that the settlement
movement could achieve more practical good, through advocacy and through
national and local investigations into labour conditions than through direct action
(Addams 1910, 133). This pragmatism was vindicated by some notable successes,
especially in the campaign against child labour (Davis 1967, 127 - 131).
While Addams' refusal to take sides may have disappointed some of her more
radical colleagues, there is no evidence that Hull House's non-confrontational
approach to industrial disputes was part of a middle class conspiracy. Addams
continued to maintain links with organised labour despite the defections and threats
of some middle class funders (Addams 1910, 133 - 134; Davis 1967, 106 - 108).
Her resolutely non-partisan approach left the settlement house "under suspicion by
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both sides" (Addams 1910, 131). Typically, personal relationships were valued
above political loyalties; in one instance, Julius Rosenwald, a factory owner, sent
his chauffeur to drive Grace Abbott, a Hull House resident, to a meeting of garment
workers, en route to picket Rosenwald's factory (Davis 1967, 108). Addams
herself, in common with other Progressive era social reformers, attempted to reduce
political theories to moral distinctions and personal choices (cf. Hofstadter 1955,
243 - 254).
The sociological critique of the settlement house appears justified in arguing that the
tactic of neutrality prevented settlement residents from engaging with the real
political and cultural needs of working class communities. However, they appear to
have been similarly detached from the interests of factory owners and middle class
philanthropists. In the remainder of this section I will argue that the settlement
house's assumption of political and cultural neutrality was driven not by loyalty to
middle class norms and values, but by the individual settlement worker's sense of
alienation from the political and cultural values of the middle class.
Outwardly, the settlement house was indeed a middle class institution. The early
settlement houses were unabashedly 'for, not of' the neighbourhood. Even the
architecture of the settlement houses, built in the 'old English' style which clashed
with the surrounding neighbourhood, conspired to give the impression of an island
of middle class refinement (Trolander 1987, 20). The rooms were furnished with
expensive furniture, photographs of Europe and "all those adjuncts which the
cultivated man [sic] regards as good and suggestive of the best life of the the past"
(Addams 1910, 57). Despite a degree of embarrassment, Addams herself continued
to live 'naturally' by employing servants (Carson 1990, 59 - 60). However,
inwardly, the settlement workers' relationship to middle class cultural and political
norms was more complicated.
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The settlement house allowed the college-educated woman to escape from traditional
gender and class roles, while its lingering cultural attachments allowed her to remain
not wholly cut off from that life of useless refinement she sought to escape. While
the furnishings of the settlement house remained to remind her of the middle class
family home she had left behind, the real motive of the settlement resident,
according to Addams, was to escape the constraints of her familial, cultural and
social position. The residual cultural trappings may have represented a guilty
subtext of privilege, but the settlement resident had consciously positioned herself
outside the sphere of the nineteenth century middle class.
Cultural and political neutrality must therefore be seen not as a conspiracy for
middle class hegemony, but in relation to what Lasch calls "the estrangement of
intellectuals, as a class, from the dominant values of American culture" (Lasch
1965, xv). This estrangement had its roots in education. In Jane Addams' 1892
account of the 'subjective necessity for social settlements' (Addams 1910, 68 - 76),
the college-educated woman had inherited a sceptical mistrust of the older
generation's genteel middle class faith in culture; the 'idealist' faith in culture was
challenged by a 'utilitarian' desire to be socially useful and by a guilty sense of the
'uselessness' of art and literature when confronted with the reality of poverty. By
plunging into the relentless practicality of the settlement house, the college-educated
woman could escape from the gilded cage of 'useless' culture and the 'family
claim'. The settlement house's 'neutral' community, in which religious, ethnic and
cultural ties were consciously set aside, thus provided the settlement worker with a
therapeutic refuge from her private sense of estrangement.
In Addams' autobiography, the search for a surrogate to replace the religious and
moral values of her youth verged on the neurotic. Brought up under the strict
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influence of her father, her childhood was dominated by a religious consciousness of
sin and guilt and an "excessive sense of responsibility" (Addams 1910, 4 - 6). In
the "black days which followed the death of my father" she claimed to have entered
"a state of nervous exhaustion with which I struggled for years" and to have been
"absolutely at sea so far as any moral purpose was concerned" (ibid., 32 - 41). It is
tempting to resort to a Freudian interpretation for Addams' psychological state.
According to Christopher Lasch, her father's death triggered a personal breakdown
lasting for six years which culminated in her visit to Europe and her decision to cast
off the burden of 'useless' cultivation (Lasch 1965, 25 - 29). However, Addams
also related her youthful confusion to her educational and religious background.
Exposed to the missionary idealism of a religious education at Rockford Female
Seminary, Addams sought refuge in "premature pragmatism" (Addams 1910, 35 -
37). Baptised as Presbyterian, she began instead to search for a Positivist "cathedral
of humanity" (ibid., 47); later in the ethnic and religious diversity of the tenements
she would find what she sought, "the beginnings of a secular religion" (ibid., 23).
Her early loss of faith in Christianity was repeated in her loss of faith in Arnoldian
culture during her trip to Europe as a young woman. This loss of faith later
extended into politics, with Addams unable to accept the political theories of the
Socialists, even as she "longed for the comfort of a definite social creed" (ibid.,
111). Practical tasks and faith in community provided a secular surrogate for her
lost faith in religion, in the cultural idealism of Arnold, in politics. She compared
herself to the clergyman who found in organised labour a quasi-religious alternative
to religious faith, "an opportunity for sacrificial effort" (ibid., 114).
Addams' upbringing was typical of the college-educated women who committed
themselves to settlement work and social reform (Kalberg 1975; Rousmaniere
1970). According to Addams a liberal arts education amounted to a burden which
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"only served to cloud the really vital situation spread before our eyes" (Addams
1910, 43). Accordingly the settlement house's 'neutrality' allowed the college-
educated woman to escape the ties of middle class culture and family life while
granting her a vicarious share in the diverse traditions of her new working class
'neighbours'. Firstly, in the settlement's atmosphere of multicultural 'cooperative
living' residents ceased to be burdened by an awkward sense of their own privileged
middle class, 'cultured' status 44. Secondly the settlement house satisfied the
educated woman's "great desire to share the race life", offering an illusion of
communal warmth in place of the estrangement and isolation typically felt by a
middle class woman among the poor (ibid., 69).
From the perspective of the settlement resident the 'neutrality' of the settlement
house community was an appealing prospect, offering a refuge from her inherited
'role conflicts' amid the warm glow of communal living. It also offered a means of
channelling confused and frustrated religious impulses and culturalist ideals into
practical, non-ideological tasks, an exchange of 'works' for 'dogma' (Addams 1910,
114; Wald 1915, 277).
From the perspective of the settlement house's clients, this neutrality raised a
number of problems. First of all, as Gans notes (1962, 1964), the 'neutral'
community or the settlement house was premised on the abolition of those
attachments of race, religion, class and culture on which the various communities of
the urban ethnic poor depended; they were invited to abandon these older forms of
community in order to subscribe to a free-floating community of 'neighbours' or
'citizens' which may or may not have existed outside the imagination of the
settlement residents. Secondly the settlement house's assumption of political and
cultural neutrality prevented it from aligning itself with any particular group. This
44 In contrast, Addams appears to have found her relationships with Hull House's domestic staff
excruciatingly awkward (Carson 1990, 59 - 60).
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inability to distinguish between different levels of need and different political
interests undermined the settlement house's credibility and effectiveness and was the
source of the settlement house's later 'blind spot' on civil rights in the 1930s and
1940s which prompted much criticism n the 1960s (Trolander 1987, 94). Finally,
for all its 'neutrality', the settlement house favoured a kind of individualism,
appealing primarily to those clients who felt themselves, like the settlement
residents, alienated from the culture of their class.
Faith in religion or in culture was transferred to faith in an abstract, neutral
community. This 'neutral' community, removed from any specific culture, class,
religion or ideology, was a creation of the settlement worker's own imagination,
designed to fulfil her own psychological needs. The settlement house's basic
operational unit was the urban 'neighbourhood'; as Gans notes, from the
perspective of the working class, whose community was bounded by a network of
family and ethnic communities, the community defined by 'neighbourhood' did not
exist (Gans 1964, 6). 'Neighbourhood-building', inspired by nostalgic images of the
village parish or the democratic town-meeting in a small New England town (Woods
1892, 336; 1923, 133 - 163), became something of an obsession for the American
settlement worker. Yet the modern city with its diversity and inclusiveness refused
to behave like a committee of parish elders or a meeting of local landowners,
operating around a consensus of shared values and aims.
The settlement version of community was shaped by the settlement worker's sense of
alienation, disconnection and the absence of ideological, cultural or religious
convictions. Accordingly, the primary constituency of the settlement house
consisted of those who shared the settlement worker's neurotic sense of social
alienation. The settlement house's 'neutral zone' was most appealing to "people
who were marginal to the peer group society" (Gans 1962, 159). Like other cultural
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institutions (libraries, museums, university extension), the settlement house's
cultural programmes thus tended to attract an upwardly mobile sector of the lower
middle class; working class users saw the settlement house primarily as a 'market-
oriented' provider of social services and kept their distance accordingly (Gans 1962,
153). Those 'marginal to the peer group society' included especially the younger
generation of 'Americanised' immigrants, with whom the settlement workers felt a
special affinity. According to Addams, Hull House was to be a "refuge" for
"people of former education and opportunity who have cherished ambitions and
prospects, but who are caricatures of what they meant to be" (Addams 1910, 60).
Addams is here referring to the latent potential of her working class 'neighbours';
however, she could equally have been describing her fellow settlement residents.
The settlement workers were not attempting to impose a 'middle class' cultural
heritage on the poor, nor to dupe the workers into political inertia under the guise of
'non-partisan' negotiation; rather they were attempting to mould their working class
'neighbours' in their own 'non-partisan' image, as rootless, practical citizens in
pursuit of a common good. In order to enter the idealised community of the
settlement house, the settlement resident sacrificed the ties to her culture, her class,
her community. The denial of her middle class cultural heritage represented a
declaration of independence and a ritual act of self-abnegation. Self-sacrifice was
the key to beloved community, sweetness and light. She expected her neighbours to
follow her in this ritual self-immolation and was surprised when they refused.
Hull House's strategy of 'cultural neutrality' could not continue to exist in a social
vacuum. In the period leading up to American entry into the first world war, the
outside world's demands made themselves known in the closed world of the
settlement house and the fiction of cultural neutrality was broken.
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2.6. Culturalism and utilitarianism: the Settlement Movement 1900 - 1919
I have suggested that the settlement house's pursuit of 'useful culture' was shaped by
the contradictory legacy of idealist and utilitarian educational traditions. The
inherited idealist faith in a universal 'common culture' was contradicted by a
pragmatic acceptance of different 'cultures' (in the anthropological / sociological
sense); the culturalist ideal was tempered by a desire to be socially useful. In the
settlement house these contradictions were temporarily suspended in the 'unstable
equilibrium' of 'useful culture' and cultural 'neutrality'. However, in the next phase
of development, the different tendencies within the cultural reform movement would
regroup and repolarise in response to a series of external 'conjunctures'. In the first
decade of the twentieth century, these external factors for the American settlement
movement included the growing professionalisation of social and cultural workers,
the threat of American involvement in the first world war and the emergence of a
reformist 'Progressive' agenda in the two national political parties. In this section I
will describe the collapse of the settlement house's 'unstable equilibrium' and a
renewed eruption of the contradictory ideological attitudes to culture which had been
simmering below the surface.
In the first decade of the twentieth century, it is possible to trace two tendencies in
the American settlement movement's attitude to culture. One tendency saw culture
primarily in relation to a collective way of life rooted in different ethnic traditions;
'culture' was thus seen in terms of 'Americanisation', the attempt to preserve and
reconcile different 'cultures' within a composite American national identity. A
second tendency saw culture in terms of individual talent, unfettered by any
considerations of ethnic context or tradition. Where previously these two ways of
thinking had existed side by side, in the first decade of the twentieth century there
emerged a split between a neo-utilitarian cultural policy based on service delivery,
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which used culture to deliver practical reforms and social services, and a new
generation of settlements providing specialised artistic training, which would allow
the individual talent to rise through the ranks of the poor. The emergence of
separate social service and artistic training functions in the settlement movement
drew upon the latent contradictions between 'utilitarian' and `Arnoldian' habits of
thought instilled in the settlement worker's education and similar ambivalences in
Barnett's settlement mission. Barnett had argued that individual contact between the
working man and the man of culture was the route to individual salvation; he had
also argued for the 'common culture' of the neighbourhood, a collective common
good translated by the American settlement as an argument for practical social
reform.
Specialised 'cultural' settlements, such as the Boston Music School Settlement
(1910) and New York's Third Street Music School Settlement (1904) were dedicated
to the talented individual, not a collective 'common' culture; the Third Street Music
School promised "to lead no one astray into the profession of music who is not
gifted with sufficient talent and industry to accomplish the long-continued necessary
work which such a choice of profession imposes" (Woods and Kennedy 1911, 218 -
219). Other settlement houses established specialist cultural programmes such as the
Neighborhood Playhouse, established by Henry Street Settlement in New York in
1914; such initiatives became part of the 'little theatre' movement of amateur and
community theatres in the first part of the twentieth century, following a cultural
agenda separate from the settlement's social programmes. Meanwhile the main body
of the American settlement movement was increasingly concerned with practical
tasks, especially the 'Americanisation' of immigrants, acting as an unofficial agency
for government policy. Entering Hull House's third decade (1909 - 1919), the
demands of professionalisation, of wartime mobilisation and of government policy
combined to reinforce the cruder utilitarian elements within the settlement movement
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and to marginalise the culturalist ideals of the older generation of settlement
workers, including Addams herself.
Initially the settlement movement had prided itself on its its amateur ethos;
friendship, cultural activities and human contact provided were valued above
professionally administered material relief. Jane Addams praised Toynbee Hall as
being "free from 'professional doing good'" (Carson 1990, 48). Yet the American
settlement house had always been more concerned with 'professional doing good'
than its British counterpart; the harsh winter and the economic slump of 1893/4 had
reinforced the importance of material relief over cultural missionary work. As Allan
F Davis noted of Hull House, "it was difficult to sponsor lectures and art exhibits or
to promote reform while people were starving" (Davis 1967, 20). The new
professionalism was encouraged by the growing dependence on official sources of
funding (as opposed to philanthropic individuals) which stressed accountability and
measurable results, and by the emergence of professional training and professional
associations. The National Conference of Settlements (later the National Federation
of Settlements) was founded in 1908; a 'school of applied philanthropy' began as a
summer school in 1898 in New York, later the New York School of Philanthropy,
leading to a full-time course, established in 1904. Finally professionalisation was a
continuation of the settlement resident's rejection of her traditional role as a 'woman
of culture'; instead of the well-meaning amateurism and cultural uplift of the middle
class philanthropist, she sought accreditation in official professional status,
underwritten by professional qualifications and sound, 'scientific' principles.
The new generation of settlement workers were graduates of a specialised vocational
training which emphasised specific marketable skills, unlike the generalist college
education of their predecessors; in Carson's phrase, the "gift of culture" had been
replaced by the "gift of expertise" (Carson 1990, 136 - 138). While 'welfare
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professionalism' did not become the norm in the US until the 1930s, the younger
generation of settlement workers were increasingly sceptical of the 'cultural'
response to poverty, pointing instead to the 'environmental' realities of economic
power and social circumstances. One effect of the new professionalism was to make
settlement houses more 'problem oriented', moving away from their traditional
generalist, 'whole community' approach. The increased competition for funding
also led to greater professionalism in the operation and presentation of programmes.
In the 1920s the national executive of the settlement movement was forced to choose
between the expansive spiritual mission of the past and a new emphasis on local
service delivery; by the 1930s most of the old guard had passed on and
professionalisation was more or less complete, laying the foundations for the
"comprehensive services" provided by the settlement house today
Professionalisation had a similar impact on the other cultural institutions referred to
in this chapter. DiMaggio has described the rise of the professional cultural worker
in the nineteenth century American museum, partly in response to the need for
improved financial and organisational management (DiMaggio 1986a). The effects
of professionalisation on the new generation of librarians and the shift towards
'service provision' was noted earlier (section 2.2). In Britain the professionalisation
of the civil service provided a new emphasis on professional qualifications and
legislative reform, characterised by Beatrice Webb's call for "grown men" not
"clever school boys" to tackle social problems (Meacham 1987, 96). The effect was
to marginalise the amateur, `culturalise approach to reform championed by Samuel
Barnett at Toynbee Hall. Beveridge's own career reflects this transition from
amateur cultural worker to a professional bureaucratic elite; the eventual creation of
the welfare state simply confirmed the extent to which the 'problem of poverty' had
been nationalised as a government concern.
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The beginning of war in Europe in 1914 was described by Addams as a personal
defeat (Addams 1930, 119). As the United States began to prepare for the
possibility of war, the settlement house's socio-cultural missionary work was
increasingly turned to wartime ends. The area of work most affected by the threat
of war was the settlement house's 'Americanisation' of immigrants. Here again, the
effect of growing external pressure was to drive the settlement into a purely
instrumental function, replacing its earlier idealist attempt to create a common
culture with a narrower objective, the `regimentation' o of a diverse civilian
population under the banner of national unity. The 'multicultural' policy of
Americanisation through mutual respect and interaction between cultures, as it had
developed at Hull House, was in many settlement houses replaced by a more
aggressive approach, which effectively translated 'Americanisation' to mean the
repression of immigrant cultures and the promotion of American nationalism.
Immigrant communities found themselves under suspicion as "nests of dissipation,
of contagious disease, of crime, of disloyalty, of espionage, of actual resistance to
the Government" (Woods 1923, 213 - 217)
Wartime Americanisation of immigrants exposed the dark side of the settlement
house's unconditional faith in 'community'. In 1921 Robert Woods, the director of
Boston's South End House noted the emergence of "a wholly cosmopolitan
composite with little or no regard to what America has been or now is", suggesting
that this multicultural mosaic was "in root and branch un-American" (Woods 1923,
269). The reference indicated how far Addams' cosmopolitan internationalism had
fallen from favour. Addams would later be attacked for her pacificism and her
membership of the board of the American Civil Liberties Union and described her
feeling of being "officially outlawed" (Addams 1930, 135 - 138). Meanwhile
Woods, whose rise in the settlement movement parallelled Addams' fall, wrote of
45 "The Regimentation of the Free" was the title of Robert Woods' 1918 chapter on wartime
immigration policy quoted in the next paragraph (Woods 1923, 207 - 219).
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"the elimination of the feeble-minded strain from our National stock" (Woods 1923,
217) and argued for "the more effectual segregation of the unfit" (ibid., 128); the
"best results" in the search for "common ground" between human beings would
come from "instilling into the minds of the newcomers and their children American
political ideas and American national loyalties" (Woods 1923, 58). The common
culture of 'Americanisation' had become a form of American nationalism with no
room for the 'unfit' and 'feeble-minded'; the anti-immigrant backlash continued
after the war with the quotas imposed under the Immigration Act and the deportation
drives of 1919 and 1920.
The settlement worker's contribution to the Americanisation process was from the
outset a contradictory one, caught between a desire to steer the immigrant towards a
vaguely conceived 'universal' common culture, a desire to help the immigrant
succeed in American society by assimilating American language, customs and
values, and a desire to preserve and perpetuate the integrity of immigrant cultures.
The contradictory nature of 'Americanisation' is summarised by Mina Carson as "an
ultimately untenable equilibrium between cultural autonomy and social assimilation"
(Carson 1990, 109).
Along with the professionalisation of social work and the exigencies of war, a third
and related factor in the transformation of the settlement movement was the
emergence of social reform as a concern for local and national government. The
emergence of the Progressive party in 1912 represented for Jane Addams, as for
other social reformers, a high point in their hopes for a radical transformation of
American society (Addams 1930, 32 - 41). Even after electoral defeat, the
Progressive platform of social platform influenced the agenda of both the
Republicans under Taft and the Democrats under Wilson. However, the result of
the incorporation of Progressive principles into national politics was not the radical
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transformation of society envisaged by the social reformers (Kolko 1963; Weinstein
1968; Margulies 1963). At the national level reform was undertaken in a
piecemeal, fragmentary fashion, epitomised by the anti-trust legislation begun by
Roosevelt and continued by Wilson (Kolko 1963, 113 - 122; 206 - 208). At the
local level, the settlement movement's wider-ranging commitment to social reform
became attached to a narrower agenda of civic improvement. Addams would later
complain that far-reaching social reform was inhibited by a post-Bolshevik fear of
radicalism and the limited ambitions of local government (Addams 1930, 153 - 154);
political reform was replaced by service provision, for example the establishment of
municipal dental clinics (ibid., 156).
Again the anti-reformist 'backlash' which set in after the war and the superficial
reforms achieved by the Progressive movement merely exposed the political
limitations of the settlement movement's 'neutral' stance. While Addams
complained in 1930 that Progressive reforms lacked any grounding in "social
theory", she herself had twenty years expressed her preference for piecemeal
practical reform over the "abstract notions" and political "enthusiasms" of the
political theorist (Addams 1910, 105 - 116). The settlement workers had, as noted
in the previous section, consistently avoided political analysis and confrontation; the
suspicion of political theory and the attempt to reduce political interests to moral
distinctions, the tendency to solve political conflicts by appealing to personal
character and the refusal to 'take sides' in political conflicts based on a higher
rationality (Roosevelt's 'Rule of Reason') all combined to inhibit a comprehensive
approach to reform. When the Progressive movement applied the same logic to
national politics the results were inevitably ineffective (Mowry 1949, 248 - 249).
The American settlement movement period of retrenchment beginning around 1912
and continuing into the 1920s were thus not simply the result of professionalisation,
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the threat of war or the Progressive ascendancy. These external factors merely
precipitated an internal tendency towards political conservatism and cultural
utilitarianism which had been a part of the settlement movement from the outset.
Traces of the settlement house's inheritance of 'utilitarian', anti-culturalist habits of
thought resurfaced as service delivery replaced social reform and the complex give
and take of 'Americanisation' gave way to a crude regimentation of immigrants
according to 'patriotic' American principles. Meanwhile faith in the saving power
of culture was transferred to an attempt to rescue a few talented individuals by
providing them with specialised training, granting them privileged access to the
brave new world of the cultural elite. These developments were born out of the
'unstable equilibrium' of the settlement house's cultural and social objectives. The
resulting policy shift established the settlement house's identity in the twentieth
century as a social service agency, with a few residual cultural trappings tacked onto
a primary concern with 'comprehensive social services'.
2.7. Contradiction and crisis: the cyclical pattern
In this chapter I have argued that the civilising mission grew out of an internal
contradiction in the nineteenth century middle class attitude to culture. This
contradiction was shaped by two competing traditions of nineteenth century
education. The new generation of graduates who went to work in the settlement
houses and libraries in the last quarter of the century inherited from their liberal arts
education an idealist faith in a 'common culture' as the key to social harmony and
individual character. At the same time they inherited a utilitarian scepticism
concerning the 'uselessness' of culture and sought to channel culturalist ideals into
practical, socially useful vocations. The product of this internal contradiction was
the search for 'useful culture' in the nineteenth century settlement house.
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The libraries, museums and settlement houses of the late nineteenth century were
shaped by a similar set of internal contradictions, between the desire to use culture
to 'improve' individual character and the desire to produce a more productive and
respectful workforce, between the pursuit of collective reform and individual
redemption, between an idealist 'common culture' and a materialist pattern of plural
cultures determined by different ethnic and socioeconomic groups. These competing
internal objectives and beliefs were reflected in a fragile consensus between
competing factions of the middle class mobilised in support of the new institutions,
each attempting to mould institutional policy to suit their own agenda. This pattern
of internal contradiction and faction, contrary to the 'heroic' and `hegemonic'
accounts of singular heroic vision and unified class interest, made the new
institutions inherently unstable and subverted attempts to pursue a coherent, unified
'civilising mission'.
The American settlement house attempted to resolve these internal contradictions by
creating a neutral zone in which the inherited cultural assumptions of the Victorian
middle class settlement worker and the ethnic cultural traditions of her working class
neighbours were magically suspended. The attempt to dissolve political and cultural
attachments was partly a pragmatic attempt to serve the best interests of the ethnic
urban poor by 'Americanising' them, but perhaps more importantly reflected the
'subjective' needs of the alienated settlement resident, casting off the burden of her
cultural inheritance. Consequently the settlement house appealed primarily to those
who, ' like the settlement worker herself, felt themselves alienated from their class,
family and culture, especially to the children of immigrant families. The 'neutrality'
of the settlement house attracted an alienated minority, who like the settlement
workers themselves, sought refuge in the warm glow of a community without
commitments or attachments.
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On the other hand, despite its claimed neutrality, the settlement house still retained
its aura of middle class respectability and cultural distinction. In common with other
'democratising' cultural institutions of the nineteenth century, the settlement house
tended to attract an upwardly mobile lower middle class constituency, instead of the
archetypal working class autodidact for whom they were intended; in 1905, there
were considerably more "artisans and teachers" than local 'neighbours' registered in
Toynbee Hall's various clubs and societies, reflecting what Meacham calls "the self-
directed spirit of lower-middle-class endeavour" (Meacham 1987, 122 - 123). For
this upwardly mobile constituency the settlement house's residual trappings of
middle class culture were part of the attraction. The tendency to attract a
combination of white collar clerical workers and teachers, along with a sprinkling of
working class 'aliens', was exacerbated by the settlement's conscious appeal to the
'upper tenth', the so-called "worthy poor" among its neighbours (Barnett 1888, 48 -
49). Robert Woods saw the settlement as an experiment in social engineering, a
means of "shielding the better grades of labor from the disastrous competition" of
the underclass, while writing off the "residuum" of the extremely poor who were
"characterised by some chronic form of dependence or degeneracy" (Woods 1902,
370 - 372). The idea of rescuing the fortunate individual through culture betrayed
the settlement's origins in traditional university extension and the 'liberal education'
tradition, with its emphasis on the moral effect of culture upon character and
individual perfectibility.
The latent contradictions in settlement policy, between faith in the saving power of
culture and the practical task of 'getting things done for the neighbourhood', were
never fully dissolved. In the next phase of the settlement house's development,
spurred by a series of external pressures, these latent contradictions erupted and the
movement split between a neo-utilitarian function as an instrument of official
immigration policy and a culturalist emphasis on individual artistic training. These
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new policy developments were a grim parody of the old articles of faith; the search
for a 'common culture' became loyalty to the American nation and the moral uplift
of individual friendship became the career opportunity of a specialised artistic
training. Equally they reflected back upon the settlement's contradictory origins in
nineteenth century education, on the one hand the 1830s utilitarian propagation of
'useful knowledge' as a vehicle for social engineering, on the other the eighteenth
century tradition of cultural education for a political elite.
Other educational and cultural institutions went through a similar period of crisis
around the turn of the century. In the public library the educational mission gave
way to a laissez-faire policy of 'self-help' which catered to the new market for
culture; the internal debate over the 'great fiction question' polarised the different
internal factions within the library, the moral improvers, the practical educators, the
cultural idealists. In 1909 the British workers' education movement split between
the 'collaborationist' Workers Educational Association, who sought to retain the old
links with Oxford University, and the secessionist Central Labour College who
demanded a separate 'workers' curriculum, including a course on Marxist
economics; behind the dispute was the clash between R H Tawney's continued faith
in a common culture, and the anti-culturalist opposition, including Ramsay
MacDonald, who warned that the link with Oxford would simply "facilitate the
passage of co-opted proletarians up the ladder and into the bourgeoisie" (Simon
1990; Meacham 1987, 186).
Behind these crises was a recurrence of the 'incurable structural contradiction' from
which the movement for cultural democratisation had started, the merging of idealist
and utilitarian assumptions. Under pressure from professional workers and
responding to the new market for culture, this fragile coalition began to break down.
One set of institutions (the majority of settlement houses) reverted to the old
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philosophy of social utility, replacing artistic activities with an instrumental
commitment to service provision, fulfilling officially sanctioned 'useful' functions
such as the Americanisation of immigrants or the diffusion of marketable skills.
Another set of institutions (the WEA, the library, the chautauqua, specialised
'artistic' settlements) reverted to a philosophy of 'the best for the most', replacing
the ideal of a common culture with a repackaged version of upper middle class art,
literature and music which was sold to a susceptible lower middle class constituency
with the implicit promise of raising their social status to a vaguely conceived
aristocratic ideal.
This repolarisation, between an instrumental cultural policy based on service
delivery and a cultural marketing policy based on a hard sell of middle class culture,
would recur both with the American federal arts projects in the 1930s and with the
British community arts movement of the 1970s and 1980s. While pressure came
from the outside (wartime mobilisation, the new market for culture), the dynamic of
cultural democratisation was internal rather than external, a slow working out of
inherent contradictions within the nineteenth century middle class. These
contradictory forces remained in place even when the democratisation of culture had
apparently broken down in the early twentieth century. This pattern would recur in
later 'moments' revealing new facets and factors behind the 'unstable equilibrium' of
cultural democratisation, a cycle of contradiction, equilibrium and recurrent crisis.
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3. THE FEDERAL ARTS PROJECTS: REPOSITIONING THE ARTIST
3.1	 The Historical Pattern: Towards a Materialist Cultural Policy?
In the previous chapter I explored the contradictions behind the nineteenth century
attempt to 'democratise' culture. This attempt was informed by an idealist theory of
culture as a transcendent, transforming 'general perfection'; at the same time this
cultural idealism was shot through with contradictory traces of utilitarianism and
pragmatism.
In the U.S. federal arts projects of the 1930s this pattern was inverted; a search for
a 'useable' culture, grounded in a materialist theory of culture as the product of
material forces in social and economic life, was contradicted by traces of cultural
idealism. As both artists and government officials sought to 'reposition' art and the
artist in relation to a 'sound general movement', they were consciously reacting
against 'romantic' and 'idealist' theories of culture as a transcendent, transforming
ideal. At the same time, like the idealism of the nineteenth century settlement
house, the materialism of the federal arts projects was compromised by internal
contradictions.
The redefinition of culture in materialist terms, the search for a 'useful' role for
artists and the attempt to link cultural policy to the broader New Deal objectives of
social and economic reconstruction, were eloquently described at the theoretical
level but seldom achieved in practice. In theoretical terms the federal arts projects
sought to reposition themselves in relation to the perceived failures of modernism
and romanticism. The idealist perception of art as a transcendent common good was
replaced by the search for a 'useable' culture, rooted in traditions of folk art and
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engaged with practical tasks and problems, including the economic difficulties facing
the nation; specifically the directors of the arts projects sought to replace an 'artist-
led' policy with a 'community-led' cultural policy. In order to address the actual
economic crisis of the American artist and the perceived aesthetic crisis of American
art, the arts projects sought to broaden the base of artistic production and
consumption. The 'repositioning' of art and artists took place at two levels. First,
the projects sought to redefine the relationship between artists and communities;
instead of pursuing the romantic myth of the artist outside society, artists were
encouraged to relate their work to community concerns, to participate in educational
and community programmes, to seek individual inspiration in collective experience.
Secondly, the projects sought to reform the structural distribution of cultural
production and consumption; the primary aim was to make culture more socially
inclusive or 'democratic', but this general aim was often confused with more
particular attempts at geographical and political decentralisation (cf. Kawashima
1997).
The 'repositioning' of cultural production and consumption was fraught with
difficulties. Some of the complicating factors were historical and circumstantial.
Local and national government officials, politicians, artists and local communities
saw the federal arts projects in terms of their own self-interests. Artists were keen
to exploit their new role of artist-as-worker, while reluctant to abandon the
modernist-romantic role of artist-as-prophet. Within the bureaucracy there were
tensions between regional and federal centres of authority which dated back to the
Civil War and beyond that to conflicts between federal and state rights in the
Constitution. At the political level, the official status of the arts projects was
contested by those who saw the arts projects as a permanent cultural project aiming
to create a new 'democratic' indigenous culture (the federal arts project directorate,
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most artists) and those who saw them as a temporary and expedient solution to the
problem of white collar unemployment (Congress, local VVPA administrators).
It is my contention that, important as these obstacles were, the problems of the
federal arts projects began at the level of policy with an 'incurable structural
contradiction' between the 'new' materialist cultural policy of rooting cultural
production in everyday life and residual traces of cultural idealism. Historically, the
federal arts projects followed the Gramscian pattern of recurring 'eruptions' of
contradictions which are reconciled in an 'unstable equilibrium', only to reemerge in
new forms of 'crisis'. For all its self-conscious newness, New Deal cultural policy
grew out of the nineteenth century traditions it sought to escape; the contradictions
of cultural democracy in the 1930s can thus be seen as the flipside to the
contradictions of cultural democratisation in the 1890s.
The attempt to redefine the artist's relationship with community was flawed by a
'romantic' view of the artist as a kind of community shaman; while artists claimed
to subjugate individual ego to community need, they nevertheless sought a privileged
role as community spokespersons. Ironically this was especially true of those
'committed', so-called 'communist' artists who claimed to be using their art as a
'weapon' in the revolutionary struggle. The artist's role was further complicated
by economic need. In order to qualify for work on the projects, artists had to
demonstrate their 'professional' credentials; the idea that art was a collective,
46 I am referring here firstly to the conception of community as "a mystical union of the self with
the whole" (Blake 1990, 254 - 255; cf. Pells 1973, 165), secondly to the idea of political
commitment as a form of "secular religion"(Aaron 1961, 32). Radical intellectuals of the 1920s and
1930s here echoed the settlement worker's quasi-religious faith in community (Addams 1910, 24), her
"great desire to share the race life" (Addams 1910, 69; cf. O'Connor 1973, 25) and her tendency to
translate objective political commitments into subjective moral judgements (Mowry 1949; Hofstadter
1952, 258 -261; Pells 1973; Blake 1990). As with the 'subjective revolution' of Breton and the
surrealists (Nadeau 1965, 205 - 207), politics acquired a quasi-religious mystique and bestowed a
heroic, romantic aura (Aaron 1961, 39). More pragmatically, the collective programmes of Federal
One and of the American Communist Party boosted the individual self-esteem of the `committed'
artist (Monroe 1975, 64; PeIls 1973, 169; McKinzie 1973, 176).
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community experience was resisted by artists' unions as a threat to their professional
integrity and professional relief requirements reinforced the artist's unique social
status47 . Finally the idea of 'the community' as a basis for artistic production was
based on a nostalgic, sentimentalised view of 'lost' primitive societies and idealised
community consensus; in practice, local elites and bureaucratic power struggles
would obstruct any genuine 'dialogue' between artist and community".
The attempt to 'decentralise' from the traditional centres of artistic production and
consumption was similarly flawed. Initially the projects pursued a policy of
geographical deconcentration, what Kawashima calls 'cultural decentralisation
without political decentralisation' (Kawashima 1997); because they did not trust
local state administrators, the federal directors of the arts projects retained artistic
control and set up an administrative hierarchy independent of the New Deal
administrative machinery. Behind this retention of power was an argument about
the need for 'flexibility' and `standards'; retaining federal control over local
projects betrayed an attempt to retain traditional 'idealist' conceptions of culture,
rooted not in the relativism of local experience and local communities, but in the
absolute values of 'great art', administered by a committee of federal experts.
Again the relief requirements reinforced this culturalist bias; the concentration of
artists in the metropolitan centres of cultural production subverted attempts at
geographical decentralisation, just as the 'professional' relief requirements subverted
attempts to redefine the artist's role. In the second phase of the federal arts projects,
following the abolition of the Federal Theatre Project and the transfer of the
remaining projects to state control" in 1939, the projects pursued a policy of
'cultural decentralisation with political decentralisation' (Kawashima 1997). Here
the problem was that local political administrators and local elites did not necessarily
47 For union resistance to the Federal Theatre Project, see Matthews 1967, 244. For the question
of 'professional' classification, see McDonald 1969, 87 - 98.
48 See sections 3.3 and 3.7 respectively.
49 By state control, I mean control by the separate states of the U.S.
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share the federal arts projects' 'democratising' mission; decentralisation was taken
at face value, as an end in itself, not as a means of broadening the base of American
culture by reaching new audiences and reinvolving communities in the artistic
process. Instead control of cultural policy was merely relayed from a federal
bureaucracy, whose primary concern was in making culture 'democratic', to a local
state bureaucracy, whose primary concern was the instrumental provision of 'useful'
services.
The relative failures of the federal arts projects to achieve the goals of their directors
can be seen as the inevitable consequence of an internal structure riddled by
contradictory goals and competing factions. Congress, the President, the federal
directors of the arts projects, the federal administrator of the WPA and the local
state WPA administrators all had different expectations of the projects. Above all
the projects were broken by a 'fundamental dichotomy' between cultural ambitions
and relief requirements. This 'structural' critique of the arts projects has been well
documented by McDonald (1969), Matthews (1967) and McKinzie (1973). The
projects were also complicated by latent contradictions based not in conscious policy
goals, but in inherited habits of thought. For example, so-called 'communist' artists
and fellow-travellers, despite the rhetoric of 'art as a weapon' and 'art in the service
of the revolution', still clung to a 'romantic' view of the artist as a (revolutionary)
hero; Roosevelt, while nominally committed to the Congress's view of the arts
projects as a localised solution to the problem of unemployment, harboured
ambitions for the arts projects as a national monument to the achievements of the
New Deals°. It is this internal contradiction between overt policy goals and inherited
50 As with the British community arts movement of the 1980s, the 'romantic' tendencies of some
'committed' artists would later meet with bitter recriminations in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
directed against the 'hollow men' and 'fellow travellers' who had sought "the romance of the
revolution without any of its responsibilities" (Aaron 1961, 380 - 382). Roosevelt's 'real' motives in
supporting the arts projects are admittedly rather more difficult to read, given his political adaptability
and "mastery of vague but inspirational generalities" (Lawson 19885, 156). However, several
commentators have noted the ambivalences in Roosevelt's dealings with Federal One (McKinzie
1973; Matthews 1975; McDonald 1969). This ambiguity is reflected in the different roles he played
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'habits of thought' that I want to explore in this chapter. Specifically I want to
analyse the projects' attempt to move away from the idealist-romantic tradition of
culture as the discovery of unchanging truths by great individual artists towards a
materialist conception of culture as the product of material social and economic
circumstances and practices. This shift was obstructed by the 'idealist' habits of
thought inherited by institutions and individuals. The confident directives of the arts
project directors and the declarations of commitment by individual artists ran up
against an inescapable idealist heritage. The arts projects of the 1930s were both a
radical break from and a continuation of the cultural idealism of the nineteenth
century.
This inheritance can be illustrated by the many connections between the 'materialist'
arts projects and the 'idealist' settlement house. Politically, the arts projects, like
the New Deal as a whole, grew out of the pre-1917 Progressive movement, which in
turn had absorbed the social and cultural reform movements led by Jane Addams and
the settlement movement. Despite its occasional 'socialist' rhetoric, the New Deal
owed more to the middle class tradition of charitable 'good works' and the
professional social worker's experiments in 'progressive' social engineering than it
did to Marx. Exemplifying this twin inheritance were college-educated women like
Eleanor Roosevelt, an influential ally of the arts projects in the White House and a
former settlement resident, and professional former social workers like Harry
Hopkins, the WPA director, also an ex-settlement resident. Intellectually, John
Dewey, whose theories of education had influenced (and been influenced by) Jane
Addams' work at Hull House, was to have a similar influence on New Deal
philosophy in general and on Holger Cahill in particular; Dewey's theoretical
in relation to the arts projects: first the patrician patron of the arts approached by Biddle in 1933,
then the compassionate defender of the white collar unemployed in the 1935 address to Congress, then
the strict financial controller alternating with indulgent political patron in his letters to Hopkins in
1937 and, finally, the political survivor who successfully detached himself from the projects' excesses
in 1939.
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balancing act between Marxist collectivism and liberal individualism (Dewey 1930,
1935), was no less influential on New Deal political philosophy than his aesthetic
theory of 'art as experience' (Dewey 1934). Institutionally settlement houses were
the setting for many of the pre-1935 federal experiments in art and community; the
Federal Art Project's community art centre programme was an extension of this
same tradition. Meanwhile Hallie Flanagan's Federal Theatre Project was
influenced by the college-based little theatre movement, which in turn was associated
both with the pre-1917 settlement house theatre (eg. the Hull House Players and the
Neighborhood Playhouse at Henry Street Settlement) and with post-war university
extension (eg. Alfred Arvold's Little Country Theatre in Dakota, Koch's Carolina
Playmakers and George Pierce Baker's English 47 group at Harvard).
In this chapter I am not so much concerned with the external 'structural' clash
between the arts projects and the economic and social policy goals of Congress as
with the internal cultural policy of the federal arts projects. In particular I will focus
on the policies of the Federal Art Project and the Federal Theatre Project, as
expressed by their respective directors, Holger Cahill and Hallie Flanagan, and the
inherited 'habits of thought' they confronted. I will begin by introducing the
'structural' context of the arts projects (3.2). In the next two sections I will review
some of the inherited contradictions of the arts projects, in particular the attitudes to
'community' (3.3) and to the role of the artist (3.4). In section 3.5 I will discuss
how the directors of the federal arts projects succeeded in incorporating these
contradictions within a coherent theoretical ideology, and in the remaining sections
(3.6 - 3.8) will review the attempt to translate this theoretical 'equilibrium' into
achievable policy objectives.
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3.2	 New Deal Cultural Policy in context 1935 - 1939
The cultural policy of the federal arts projects in 1935 grew out of the Keynesian
economic theory of the New Deal. The short term aim was the provision of work
for the unemployed. The long term aim was to regenerate the economy by
broadening the base of production and consumption. However, under a separate
federal directorate, the arts projects grafted onto the materialist logic of New Deal
economics an idealist faith in the transforming agency of art, diverging from the
more limited mandate which had been approved by Congress. Eventually Congress
would reassert its authority, abolishing the Federal Theatre Project in 1939 and
transferring the remainder to state control before closing them down in 1943; this
phase of development is considered in section 3.7. Between 1935 and 1939, the
cultural policy of the federal arts projects was essentially a balancing act between
cultural idealism and materialist economics. This ambivalence was made possible by
the privileged status of the arts projects, reflected in their federal structure and
relatively high unit costs, and grew out of the complexities of 'white collar' relief as
conceived by Roosevelt. The federal arts projects of 1935 also inherited from their
pre-1935 antecedents an amalgam of culturalist and utilitarian assumptions. In this
section I will review these structural anomalies and inherited historical contradictions
before examining the cultural policies of the Federal Art Project and Federal Theatre
Project in more detail.
The Works Progress Administration (WPA) 51 was established by Roosevelt in May
1935 as the coordinating agency for a new public works programme which would
provide jobs for the unemployed. Of the $4 billion initially appropriated for the
51 Following the 1939 reorganisation of the programme, the WPA became the Work Projects
Administration.
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WPA, approximately $27 million was allocated to four 52 federal arts projects, to
cover an initial period of 6 months. These were the Federal Art Project, the Federal
Music Project, the Federal Theatre Project and the Federal Writers Project, known
collectively as 'Federal Project Number One' or 'Federal One'. During its lifetime
Federal One accounted for between 1 and 2% of the total WPA programme budget.
The WPA was conceived as an economic programme; WPA projects were seen in
instrumental terms, as temporary expedient solutions to the problem of
unemployment. Funding of the WPA was determined by successive appropriations
requested by the President and approved by Congress; as McDonald points out, the
WPA did not enjoy the "presumption of permanency" accorded other governmental
agencies which had been established by a "substantive law" (McDonald 1969, 203).
Most WPA projects were initiated locally by a 'sponsor', often an agency of local or
state government, which shared the cost of the project with the federal government.
Typically projects involved large-scale public works in construction or road-
building.
Yet Roosevelt also recognised that unemployment was not just a material problem;
in his January 1935 message to Congress, he stressed the spiritual dimension of
unemployment and the need to restore the "self-respect" of labour as well as
physical nourishment53 . This theme would be echoed on the federal arts projects,
with Hallie Flanagan recognising "another form of hunger" in the cultural starvation
of small town America, beyond the "physical hunger" of unemployed actors
52 The Historical Records Survey was initially a subsection of the Federal Writers Project; from
November 1935 it was constituted as a separate fifth project but continued to be included in 'Federal
One' for administrative and financial purposes.
53 "The lessons of history, confirmed by the evidence immediately before me, show conclusively
that continued dependence upon relief induces a spritual and moral disintegration fundamentally
destructive to the national fibre. To dole out relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a subtle
destroyer of the human spirit. [...] We must preserve not only the bodies of the unemployed from
destitution, but also their self-respect, their self-reliance and courage and determination." (Annual
Message to the Congress, 4th January 1935 in Franklin D Roosevelt (1938), Papers of Franklin D
Roosevelt (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), Vol. 4, pp. 19 - 20.
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(Flanagan 1940, 19). At the individual level, Roosevelt attempted to restore self-
respect by ensuring work programmes were commensurate with the skills of the
unemployed, not just a form of penance for those on 'relief'; he also sought to
boost collective morale by fostering national pride. The federal arts projects were
related to both these aims. When the federal government took direct responsibility
for funding work relief with the passing of the Federal Emergency Relief Act in
1933, a diversification of work relief projects and a corresponding diversification of
wages followed. In particular, Washington began to press for more 'white collar'
employment projects, including arts projects. By March 1935, just before the
creation of the WPA, around 11% of workers on work relief programmes and
around 25% of projects were classified as 'white collar' (McDonald 1969, 85); arts
projects at this stage accounted for a mere 0.7% of the total employment on the
work relief programme (ibid, 86). Harry Hopkins had pioneered the use of white
collar employment projects in New York state between 1932 and 1933 (during
Roosevelt's tenure as state governor), including the use of artists as teachers and
mural painters in settlement houses. In April 1935 Roosevelt appointed Hopkins as
administrator of the WPA. In their treatment of white collar unemployment,
Roosevelt and Hopkins shared the settlement worker's `culturalise belief that
unemployment represented a personal crisis not just an economic one.
The use of wage differentials and the provision of specialised 'white collar'
employment were distinguishing features of Federal One. It cost the WPA around
70% more to hire an artist than to hire a construction worker in 1937 (McKinzie
1973, 87); the average man-month cost of $99.80 for Federal One compared with
the overall WPA average of $59 (McDonald 1969, 232). Unlike other WPA
workers, Federal One workers were paid according to a "prevailing hourly rate",
allowing them to qualify for higher wages by virtue of their 'professional'
classification and their concentration in cities where wages were higher (McDonald
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1969, 177)54. Federal One also employed a higher proportion of 'non-relief'
personnel in supervisory positions. Critics of white collar relief saw the arts projects
in particular as a refuge for `boondogglers' (the 1930s equivalent of 'scroungers' or
'welfare cheats ')55.
The unorthodox status of the federal arts projects was symbolised by their federal
structure. Whereas the WPA aty had effectively reinforced middle class 'cultural
hegemony'. There were three strands to this attack. Firstly Gans suggested that the
nineteenth century settlement house, for all its neutrality, had retained its aura of
middle class cultural privilege and appealed especially to a section of the immigrant
poor who were prepared to "learn how to become middle class"; settlement workers
had been blind to the alternative cultures of the slum-dwellers and had sought to
change them, not to understand them (shington over the issue of white-collar relief,
introduced by the federal government against the wishes of local administrators
between 1933 and 1935 (McDonald 1969, 71 - 82). The federal arts projects were
also identified with the Roosevelt administration's drift towards centralised control
and the imposition of federal authority over the states; political tensions between the
federal executive and the autonomy of the states dated back to the days of British
rule and to the Civil War of the 1860s. These lingering tensions and the pre-1935
administrative hostilities were exacerbated in the first year of operation as large
numbers of Federal One workers were appointed by federal or regional arts
programme directors and added to the payroll of the state WPA, over the heads of
local administrators (McDonald 1969, 146 - 157). Unlike regular WPA projects,
54 In April 1938, 67.3% of all Federal One employees were classified as 'professional and
technical', the highest skill and wage classification available under WPA rules (McDonald 1969,
232). Taking the Federal Art Project as an example, around 70% of FAP workers were based in
major cities over the first two years of the programme, with over half in New York City (McDonald
1969, 389); the proportions were similar on the other federal arts projects.
55 In a 1939 editorial on "WPA and the Arts" the Washington Post attacked "white-collar
projects" as being "ideally suited to serve the purposes of those who are unwilling to perform a day's
work for a day's pay" (Washington Post 3/5/39). A 'boondoggle' was originally a kind of woven
belt which, according to critics, typefied the useless objects produced by those working on the
projects.
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arts projects required no local 'sponsor' (typically the state or municipal
government, contributing to a project's non-labour costs), on the grounds that their
'sponsor' was the federal government; there was thus no obligation to involve local
interests in authorising projects. Federal One directors (national and regional)
continued to insist on their right to authorise projects, leaving the state WPA office
to pick up the administrative pieces, including classifying workers, requisitioning
materials and administering wages (inevitably a source of conflict). The
centralisation of Federal One and the latent hostility of the state WPA staff (and
local political representatives) would later become a major political liability.
The federal structure symbolised the ambivalence in Federal One between the relief
mission, mandated by Congress, and the cultural programme envisaged by the
national directors and, perhaps, by Roosevelt himself. The localised structure of the
WPA reflected its status as a temporary response to local unemployment conditions.
The federal structure of Federal One was justified by Hopkins as a means of
upholding "professional integrity" and "technical standards" across the country
(McDonald 1969, 224 - 226). Clearly the creation of a new national culture was not
to be held accountable to local conditions and administrative rules. In McDonald's
description of the exchanges between Roosevelt, Hopkins and the Bureau of the
Budget over the funding of Federal One, there emerged a struggle between two
opposing concepts of the arts projects (McDonald 1969, 210 - 239). On the one
hand Roosevelt initially refused to authorise 'blanket' expenditure on the arts
projects, demanding "an application for each type of work in each community only
where such projects are justified by existing unemployment conditions" (McDonald
1969, 223 - 224); on the other hand his threats were never carried through and the
arts projects continued to seek precisely that "presumption of permanency" that
Congress had implicitly denied 56 . Roosevelt's direct control over Federal One's
56 These vacillations were partly a reflrction of the faltering economy. The initial exchange of
letters between Hopkins, Roosevelt and Daniel Bell in July 1937 reflected growing anxieties over the
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budget allocations was partly intended to forestall political criticism and publicly
reinforce their status as a temporary relief measure; yet he also protected them from
local scrutiny and provided some of the 'flexibility' sought by Hopkins, allowing
them to function as a semi-independent cultural programme57.
The same conflict between relief requirements and cultural 'standards' was acted out
in the arts projects' recruitment practices. Most WPA projects were created in
response to the availability and skills of unemployed people in a given area. Federal
One worked from the opposite direction, conceiving projects and setting recruitment
criteria in Washington, then attempting to find the 'right' people from the relief
rolls. This led to another anomaly: under WPA rules, 90% of workers on any
project had to be registered on relief, but in December 1935 the relief requirement
for Federal One was reduced to 75% 58 . The 25% non-relief quota allowed arts
projects to recruit expert supervisors from outside the ranks of the unemployed and
to transfer 'talent' between projects, typically from a metropolitan centre such as
New York to a regional project which lacked enough unemployed artists of a
sufficient calibre to operate effectively. This practice of transferring personnel,
while essential to a regionally rooted, national cultural programme, was of course
wholly at odds with Roosevelt's stated emphasis on 'existing unemployment
conditions'.
economic downturn leading to a series of cuts in WPA budgets (cf. William T Leuchtenburg,
Franklin D Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper Row, 1963), pp. 244 - 251).
57 Roosevelt's intentions continued to be ambivalent. Hopkins warned the directors of Federal
One that "the objective of this whole program as laid down by the President, and he has laid it down
over and over again, is the objective of taking 3,500,000 people off relief and putting them to
work..." (McDonald 1969, 32). However, Roosevelt may have protested too much; it was after all
his political patronage which protected Federal One's budget from Congressional scrutiny and
maintained the privileged federal status of the arts projects until he was forced to recognise them as a
political liability. Given these mixed intentions, the decision in 1939 to abolish the Federal Theatre
Project and to downgrade the remaining arts projects appears to have been a pragmatic political
sacrifice, providing Roosevelt's opponents with a minor symbolic victory while allowing the main
WPA programme to continue.
58 The reduction was reversed the following year in November 1936 amid much controversy.
The ambivalent status of Federal One can be traced back to its immediate pre-1935
origins. The privileged federal status of the arts projects drew on the nationalism
and cultural idealism of New Deal public art; encouraged by Roosevelt, early public
art programmes attempted to create a new national culture, a monument to the
values of New Deal. This nationalistic, occasionally propagandist, tradition of
public art would be taken on both by 'the Section' (described below) and by Federal
One. At the same time a more utilitarian tradition of culture developed out of the
less public and less publicised local educational and cultural programmes which
preceded the WPA; some of this work would also continue under Federal One,
most notably in the Federal Art Project's community art centre programme.
In 1933 the artist George Biddle had suggested in a letter to Roosevelt that young
artists express "in a permanent art form" the social ideals of the New Deal (Biddle
1939, 268). This suggestion led to the creation of the Public Works of Art Project
(PWAP) in December 1933 which was succeeded by the Section of Painting and
Sculpture, later the Section of Fine Arts (hereinafter referred to as 'the Section').
The Section was established to provide "interior art" for new federal buildings using
"leftovers from building funds" (McKinzie 1973, 38). The main source of funding
was the Treasury Department; the Section was not primarily concerned with
providing employment or 'relief' and was exempt from WPA relief requirements.
In 1935 the Section was supplemented by the Treasury Relief Art Project (TRAP),
dedicated to the decoration of existing government buildings. TRAP did receive a
relatively small contribution from the WPA but because it employed only a few
artists it could afford to be selective 59 ; selection criteria were controversial, leading
to accusations of favouritism. The competitive awarding of 'commissions' was
based on artistic quality, not the material need for relief; in New York a local
59 By the time it closed in June 1938, the total amount allocated to TRAP over three years was
$771, 521, of which $17,021 remained unused. TRAP employed a maximum of 356 artists at any
one time and completed 85 murals, 39 sculptures and 10,215 easels (McDonald 1969, 371).
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PWAP director informed artists that "need is not in my vocabulary" (McKinzie
1973, 14 - 16). Section administrators were also able to bypass open competition
for mural commissions by selecting artists "on the basis of their sketches", further
flaunting their disregard for conventional 'relief' criteria (Park and Markowitz 1984,
12 - 13).
The Section and TRAP were a throwback to the nineteenth century attempt to solve
the 'problem' of poverty in cultural terms, countering economic depression with
spiritual uplift. Under the leadership of Edward Bruce, artists learned to 'paint
Section', developing a style described by Bruce as 'American Scene'. The
programmes combined to propagate an optimistic, harmonious view of American
society which idealised its subjects using an accessible, heightened form of realism.
The best known product of the Section / TRAP was the post-office mural
programme. Operating outside the WPA rules (which emphasised the needs of the
worker, not the project), the post-office murals followed a culturalist agenda,
seeking to create a new national mythology of future progress rooted in the
iconography of a heroic past. The vision of history in the post-office murals
emphasised consensus and continuity, painting out ethnic and class conflicts. The
Section's pursuit of cultural renewal through a new national mythology reflected the
cultural agenda of Roosevelt's New Deal, described by Alan Lawson as "the fusion
of all segments of society into a cooperative commonwealth" by way of
"Roosevelt's mastery of vague but inspirational generalities" (Lawson 1985, 155 -
156). Roosevelt's support for the Section, together with his own skill as a fireside
propagandist, underlined the extent to which he viewed national renewal as a matter
of cultural and spiritual restoration, not simply as economic reconstruction.
While the PWAP and the Section were federal programmes initiated by the
Treasury, most of the earlier wave of projects providing employment to artists on
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the relief rolls between 1933 and 1935 were initiated at local and state level, funded
either by private committees or local government, with the federal government
confining itself to a coordinating, supportive role. These projects tended to
emphasise recreation and education rather than artistic excellence. Artists were
employed as a catalyst for community cultural activity, as teachers or animateurs.
McDonald describes the pre-1935 arts projects as dominated by "the social
philosophy of the neighborhood house" (McDonald 1969, 100). Many of the
activities, especially adult education, took place within settlement houses and other
neighborhood institutions and extended the settlement house's use of amateur and
recreational cultural activity as a means of promoting group participation. This
strand of 'useful' culture built on the other half of the settlement house inheritance,
the second generation of resolutely practical, professionalised settlement workers
who had emerged from the disaffected culturalism of the settlement pioneers. Again
this tradition would continue as a strand within Federal One, in the Federal Art
Project community art centres and the Federal Theatre Project's social programmes
which in New York included an active children's theatre project, a community
programme taking plays into New York City parks, an education programme in New
York schools and experimental drama therapy projects in Bellevue Hospital and in
prisons. Later these decentralised, self-consciously 'useful', projects would become
increasingly important as the federal arts projects passed from federal to state control
and state administrators began to seek a more 'practical' return on their investment
and then again as the arts projects were bent to serve the war effort. However, these
cultural activities were no more 'typical' of Federal One in its prime than the more
'public', controversial and nationally disseminated products such as the Living
Newspapers or the Section's post-office murals.
The structural and historical context of the federal arts projects points to a
contradiction between a temporary relief programme responding to local
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unemployment conditions and a permanent national cultural programme. While
Congress saw the WPA as a temporary solution to the problem of unemployment,
many of the artists on Federal One, together with most of the federal and regional
directors, aspired to an ongoing cultural programme. Artists, unlike other WPA
workers who saw project work as a temporary surrogate for a 'real' job, apparently
"cherished government patronage and sought to make it permanent" (Monroe 1972,
18). In 1938 the ill-timed Coffee Pepper Bill attempted to establish a permanent
Bureau of Fine Arts on the back of the arts projects, confirming the suspicions of
conservative members of Congress; even as late as 1940, after the Federal Theatre
Project had been abolished, Haffie Flanagan was projecting a governmental
department of art funded out of federal amusement taxes with a budget of $15
million (Flanagan 1940, 328 - 329). In 1939 Congress retaliated decisively against
these 'presumptions of permanence', abolishing the Federal Theatre Project and
drastically curtailing the remaining arts projects which were placed under state
control until their eventual abolition in 1943.
The administrative and structural conflicts surrounding Federal One between the
cultural objectives of those working inside the projects and the narrower economic
objectives of the WPA relief programme mandated by Congress have been
summarised by Matthews as a "fundamental dichotomy between relief and theatre"
(Matthews 1967, 305) This conflict was related to a historical contradiction
between two competing conceptions of culture and cultural policy.
The pre-1935 cultural programmes established a precedent both for the kind of
ambitious national cultural programme Congress evidently feared, and for a more
localised, 'useful' cultural programme rooted in the local community. In fact the
cultural policy of the arts projects (as represented by the Federal Art Project and the
Federal Theatre Project) was a compromise between these two traditions. The idea
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of a 'usable' culture inherited the ambiguities of the old settlement house, caught
between culturalist idealism and utilitarian 'usefulness'. On one side lay the
ambitious `culturalist' agenda pursued by the Section and attacked by later critics as
a form of New Deal nationalist propaganda or insidious cultural hegemony (Kidd
1988, Harris 1987); on the other lay the instrumental, utilitarian tradition
represented by the pre-1935 local cultural programmes and the later period of the
arts projects under state control after 1939. In between, the directors of Federal One
sought to reconcile these extremes while balancing the local and national political
factions which sought to pull them in opposite directions. This balancing act is the
subject of the next section.
3.3	 The 'Usable Past' of the Federal Art Project and the Federal Theatre
Project: progressive nostalgia
Having reviewed the structural and historical context of Federal One, in the
remainder of this chapter I will focus on the contrasting policies of two projects, the
Federal Art Project and the Federal Theatre Project. In this section I am concerned
with the reliance by both projects on idealised and nostalgic models of a coherent,
consensual community as the basis for a new cultural policy.
The Federal Art Project and the Federal Theatre Project, under the leadership of
Holger Cahill and Hallie Flanagan respectively, sought a renewal of American
culture alongside the New Deal's revival of the U.S. economy. They related the
actual economic crisis and the perceived creative crisis of American culture to a
common cause, the disconnection of American artists from American society; by
broadening the creative base of artistic production they would also broaden the base
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of artistic consumption, providing a common platform for artistic creativity and
economic sustainability. Artistic and economic priorities thus converged in an
attempt to reposition the American artist as an integrated, 'useful' member of the
community. The aesthetic and economic arguments for restoring the connection
between artist and community were reinforced by political pragmatism. Both Cahill
and Flanagan recognised that the continuing survival of the projects would depend
on local grassroots support and involvement. Through decentralisation and
democratisation they could in the short term bring electoral pressure on Congress for
the continued funding of the arts projects; in the longer term projects would depend
upon local funding and local control once the 'emergency' federal subsidies dried
up.
This repositioning was presented in historical terms as a reaction against the
perceived failures and indulgences of contemporary American culture and a return to
indigenous cultural traditions. For all the self-conscious newness of the federal arts
projects, they were implicated in a nostalgic attempt to recreate 'lost' traditions.
Both Flanagan and to a lesser extent Cahill belonged to a tradition of community-
based culture outside the boom and bust of 'mainstream' American commercial
culture. Holger Cahill, the director of the Federal Art Project, had become an
expert in folk art through his curatorship of exhibitions at the Newark Museum 6° and
the Museum of Modern Art; he repudiated the corrosive individualism of late
nineteenth and early twentieth century art and the "dislocation" of art from its social
context, arguing that American art had been overly influenced by European trends in
60 At Newark Cahill had served under John Cotton Dana, a former librarian, a vociferous
advocate of the "museum of community service" and a critic of the more old-fashioned 'dead' of
'gazing' museum. Under his direction the Newark Museum aimed to fulfil a civic function,
emphasising the practical or 'useful' arts and exploring the social history and customs of Newark.
Instead of showing European masterpieces, Dana exhibited "practical everyday art for homes,
businesses and schools" (Alexander 1983, 394). He also introduced an education department, crafts
demonstrations, teacher training and a picture loan scheme. Cahill worked at the museum from 1922
to 1932, mounting two exhibitions of folk arts and publishing a book in 1932. Dana was clearly an
influence on Cahill, especially on the community art centre and education programmes of the Federal
Art Project.
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the commercial art market and that a flourishing culture depended on a "sound
general movement", not "the solitary genius" (Cahill 1936). Hallie Flanagan,
director of the Federal Theatre Project, was associated with the 'little theatre
movement' which had grown up in small communities and colleges as an antidote to
commercial theatre; the little theatre movement was a reaction to the escalating
costs and audience numbers of Broadway in the first quarter of the twentieth
century, which had resulted in creative and economic stagnation (MacGowan 1929,
69 - 70). In place of commercialism and individualism, Cahill and Flanagan shared
in a movement to return American culture to its native roots in local communities
and shared experience.
The escape from the cultural and economic bankruptcy of the present into an
idealised 'lost' past of harmony between artist and community and a 'coherent'
society was related by Cahill to "the search for a useable past" (Cahill 1936, 24 -
28; Jones 1971). This usable past was framed by references to lost traditions.
Cahill referred to medieval art and "the era of handicrafts" before the "machine
mode of reproduction" broke the bond between artist and community (O'Connor
1973, 36); Flanagan referred to the 'democratic' theatre of ancient Greece
(Flanagan 1940, 5). Both Cahill and Flanagan drew on a more recent 'revivalist'
tradition: the revival of American folk arts, the regionalist painter's 'return to the
significant subject', the Mexican muralists' revival of a public art based on public
issues, the little theatre movement's roots in local communities. All of these
movements consciously reacted against the perceived economic and aesthetic failures
of contemporary American culture. Cahill suggested that the dislocation of art and
artists had been driven by the machinations of the commercial art market and
patronage (Cahill 1936, 12 - 15; O'Connor 1973, 35); Flanagan traced the
stagnation of American theatre to the influence of the "Broadway formula" and the
"old struggle for stardom, money and prestige" and sought "an entirely new theatre"
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based on a a "common group enterprise" (Flanagan 1940, 160 - 163; 232 - 236).
For Cahill and Flanagan the economic collapse of commercial culture was linked to
its creative sterility; only a massive increase in artistic production and consumption
outside the old metropolitan circles could rescue the American artist from economic
and creative crisis.
I believe that the arts projects' reliance on a 'usable past' was problematic for two
reasons. First of all, both Cahill and Flanagan were required under the WPA relief
criteria to work within the existing structures of the contemporary culture industry;
specifically, they had to provide employment for artists who met the standard
classifications of 'professional' and 'skilled' workers and who expected to return to
their old professions within the commercial arts sector. Many of these artists
resented change and feared that the new communitarian policies would undermine
their professional status. There was also resistance at the managerial level,
especially from old Broadway hands on the Federal Theatre Project, and from local
project managers. All of this internal resistance was in addition to the external
conflicts between Federal One and the political and administrative hierarchy of the
WPA and Congress. Secondly, the 'usable past' which Cahill and Flanagan
attempted to recreate was itself the repository of complex and contradictory
traditions. Within the 'usable past' they sought to revive lay traces of individualism,
reactionary conservatism and the old `culturalist agenda of the late nineteenth
century; nostalgia clouded these tendencies in a progressive, communitarian aura.
According to the Federal Art Project manual, "the aim of the project will be to work
toward an integration of the arts with the daily life of the community, and an
integration of the fine art and the practical arts" (McDonald 1969, 383). Holger
Cahill related this integration between art and community to indigenous 'American'
traditions including the culture of the Pueblo Indians, the Shaker movement, the
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populist American genre painting of the nineteenth century and the Mexican
muralists (O'Connor 1973, 36) 61 . The Index on American Design was Cahill's
attempt to reactivate this cultural heritage. The Index, which was perhaps inevitably
never completed, employed around 400 project artists at a time who painstakingly
reproduced 20,000 examples of decorative and applied arts from across America in
photographs and drawings. Cahill described the Index as "an endeavour to recover a
usable past in the decorative, folk and popular arts of our country" (O'Connor 1973,
42).
Cahill's vision of the future remained rooted in the past. For all his progressive
thinking, there was a conservative cast to Cahill's recreation of bucolic folk
traditions which contrasted with the more contemporary explorations of urban and
industrial folklore undertaken by the Federal Writers Project (McDonald 1969, 709 -
716). Frank O'Connor describes Cahill's 'usable past' as a form of nostalgia, "a
longing for a bucolic, or just plain peaceful, uncluttered past that is now lost"
(O'Connor 1973, 22); this longing may have been influenced by Cahill's former
career as a museum curator. Alfred Haworth Jones relates the search for a usable
past to the New Deal's reliance on 'affirmative history', a vision of the "classless,
inclusive character of the national experience" in the past to legitimise New Deal
policies for the future (Jones 1971, 716 - 718). This sanitised, harmonious version
of history was especially dominant in the post-office murals 62 . Class and racial
conflicts were scrupulously avoided; Native Americans were portrayed signing
treaties with settlers, muscular labourers toiled cheerfully and black people were
either notably absent or blissfully untouched by racial oppression. The murals
reflected "a belief in the ideal rather than the reality of history" (Park and
61 Cahill's enthusiasm for the Pueblos may have been influenced by Ruth Benedict's
anthropological work comparing primitive 'integrated' cultures with the 'disoriented' and 'stratified'
cultures of the West (Benedict 1934, 223 - 250; Lawson 195, 160).
62 The post-office murals were funded by the Section of Painting and Sculpture, later the Section
of Fine Arts. While the Section received some funds from the WPA, it was separate from the Federal
Art Project and the rest of Federal One.
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Markowitz, 43). While the Federal Art Project itself never achieved the
programmatic coherence of the Section's 'American Scene', there were similar
tendencies towards symbolic propaganda in some of the project's public art works
(Harris 1987; 1991, 259 - 60).
The role of community artist was obviously open to exploitation; Cahill's nostalgic
idealisation of the relationship between collective participation and individual
inspiration provided a smokescreen for ambitious local politicians who recognised
the commercial profitability of "regional one-upmanship" and "roadside tourism"
(Kendall 1986, 53 - 57). The revival of 'regionalist' painting in the 1930s
encouraged artists including Grant Wood, John Steuart Curry and Thomas Benton to
return to their 'native' mid-West. There was an element of opportunism in this
migration; "championed by nativist boosters", the artists accepted their roles as
returning prodigals (Kendall 1986, 24 - 26), even posing together in workman's
overalls for the cover of Time Magazine and the Kansas City Star. Yet at first
regional communities were slow to accept the artists as one of their own, suspicious
of their big city reputations; the artists in turn remained true to a personal vision in
their art, ignoring the demands of local committees for suitable subject matter in
civic murals. While civic boosters saw the usable past as a commercial resource,
'regionalist' artists like Benton retreated into nativist chauvinism, lashing out at the
'homosexual' cliques of the art establishment and foreign radicals (Benton 1939, 264
- 266; 1951, 172). Benton shared Cahill's enthusiasm for the Mexican muralists
and his attempt to restore American art to its roots in public meanings and popular
history, as against the formal innovations of 'French salonism' (Benton 1951), even
claiming that he and his fellow regionalists had "sparked" the New Deal art projects
(ibid., 192); however, his trajectory into curmudgeonly egotism and 'Americanise
propaganda demonstrated the latent individualism and conservative nationalism in
Cahill's usable past.
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Hallie Flanagan, like Cahill, drew on past traditions for her vision of the future.
She sought to rediscover a 'democratic' theatre rooted in community life, "an
illustration and a bulwark of the democratic form of government" (Flanagan 1940,
373). In a 1939 article she expanded on "the contribution of the arts to democracy",
describing the arts as "one of the great mediums of understanding"; only through
understanding could the people participate in a democracy (Flanagan 1939). She
associated this public, deliberative form of theatre with the civic theatre of Ancient
Greece and the subsidised 'state' theatres of Europe. Closer to home she related this
tradition to her experiences in college-based 'little theatre' with George Pierce Baker
at Harvard; she saw the regional network of college and community theatres as a
model, "theatres which have possibilities of growing into social institutions in the
communities in which they are located" (Flanagan 1940, 23).
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the little theatre movement reflected a
view of the theatre as a social institution and a cornerstone of civic activity; by the
1930s there were over 1,000 'little theatres' in the U.S. (source: Perry 1933,
McGowan 1929), ranging from touring rural theatre companies, experimental
university-based groups (including Flanagan's own troupe at Vassar) and more
ambitious 'civic' theatres like the semi-professional Cleveland Playhouse. Much of
the impetus of the little theatre movement came from the universities. George
Pierce Baker established his playwriting workshop, 'English 47' at Harvard in 1908
(later transferred to Yale in 1913), Frederick Koch (a former pupil of Baker) became
active in the North Dakota in 1907 before establishing the Carolina Playmakers from
North Carolina University in 1918, Alfred Arvold established his Little Country
Theater in North Dakota in 1914 on the back of the university extension service as a
form of "intellectual rural free delivery" (Arvold 1922, 47). Hallie Flanagan herself
worked with Baker as his assistant before establishing the Vassar Experimental
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Theatre at Vassar College; later she employed E C Mabie from the University of
Illinois and Frederick Koch from North Carolina as regional directors on the Federal
Theatre Project.
For all its democratic, communitarian aspirations, the 'little theatre' was an
unreliable model for Flanagan's 'people's theatre. First of all the little theatres
belonged to the same nineteenth century tradition as university extension and the
settlement house; men and women of culture would act as a catalyst for local
community involvement. There were practical problems with this approach under
WPA regulations; the coupling of professional expertise and amateur involvement
was highly controversial on a work programme, especially with the theatre unions.
More critically, the reliance on charismatic leadership by professional artists carried
a risk of exploitation. While one side of the 'little theatre' tradition, represented by
Alfred Arvold's Little Country Theater in North Dakota, emphasised amateur
involvement and community development, another, represented by Frederick Koch's
Carolina Playmakers, emphasised professional excellence and formal innovation.
Typically Arvold's makeshift productions emphasised participation and self-
expression, treating the completed performance or script as an incidental by-product;
the theatre was "a place to train country-life workers" and to enrich the lives of
local farmers, not a seedbed for new playwrights (Arvold 1922). In contrast, Koch
saw community involvement as a catalyst for the reanimation of the American
theatre, rescuing playwrights from the "superficial and innocuous" artifice of
theatrical convention (Koch 1940). For Arvold, theatre was a vehicle for
community development and involvement; for Koch, community involvement was
the vehicle for theatrical innovation.
The contradictions in a 'democratic' civic theatre were exposed in the Progressive
era pageant. The pageant form derived from the English fashion for Renaissance-
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style pageants in the late nineteenth century; where the English pageant was an
exercise in medievalist nostalgia, American pageants presented episodes from local
history to propagate a message of 'progressive' civic reform. Like the post-office
murals, the pageants presented an idealised 'usable past', submerging real events in
an abstract hymn to civic progress. They also deployed community involvement on
a grand scale; Percy Macicaye's 'Pageant and Masque of Saint Louis in 1914
mobilised a cast of 7,000 and drew nightly audiences of 100,000 (Glassberg 1991,
1). Elements of the progressive pageant, the use of large casts and archetypal
figures, the manipulative staging and traces of wholesome propaganda, were later
incorporated into the Federal Newspaper's Living Newspapers in the 1930s.
For all its appearance of community participation, the pageant was criticised for
failing to involve audiences in its muddled symbolism (Burleigh 1917, 40 - 53);
similarly, while impressive hordes of extras were dragooned by the 'pageant
master', community input into the creative process or didactic content of the pageant
was non-existent. According to Glassberg, "like many of the decade's social and
political movements, which also employed the rhetoric of 'community' and
'tradition', the pageant experience promoted hierarchy, discipline, and rational
organization in the effort to achieve a celebration of democracy, spontaneity, and
lyrical emotion" (Glassberg 1990, 156). The manipulative, undemocratic qualities
of the pageant show through the cracks in Percy Mackaye's advocacy of a 'civic
theatre' (1912), effectively a proposal to translate the principles of the civic pageant
into a Permanent institution. Despite the rhetoric of community, the civic theatre
was to be led by "artists of high standards", not by the untutored public, under the
slogan "leadership by artists: participation by the people" (Macicaye 1912, 259).
Macicaye's advocacy of the pageant and the civic theatre was driven by professional
self-interest; he recognised a new civic role for the playwright as the self-appointed
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voice of the community, passing off his overblown symbolic spectacle as "the drama
of democracy".
As the little theatre movement matured towards institutional and financial stability it
too came to rely on professional leadership; the shift reflected both the audience
demand for a more 'professional' product, growing financial pressures and the
claims of professionals like Mackaye to lead the community to enlightenment. In a
survey of 100 theatres, MacGowan noted a trend "departing from the ideal of a
broad, all-inclusive amateurism" (MacGowan 1929, 93). Professional input
gradually displaced community involvement; the original little theatre's complicity
between amateur actors and audiences was replaced by a more professional
relationship in which the performance's distinctive style and content were no longer
dependent on community input63.
Flanagan's experience of 'little theatre' was based not on the professionalised 'civic'
theatre but on the amateur student theatre at Vassar College. Yet here too the model
was problematic. College theatres provided opportunities for technical experiment
(cf. Flanagan 1928); within the closed community of college life such experiments
could even be popular rather than alienating. According to one alumna, the charmed
circle of college life created "a miniature community which has fostered the germ of
civic unity, and produced a theatre expressing the will of the community itself"
(Burleigh 1917, 85 - 86). However, this heightened sense of community depended
on the 'self-contained homogeneity of the student body. As with the settlement
houses and women's colleges of the nineteenth century, the ideal of a self-contained
63 The definition of 'community theatre' changed during this period. The Cleveland Playhouse,
with a budget of $100,000 was described in 1929 as "still a community theatre, though professional"
(MacGowan 1929, 105). In contrast, for a previous generation, professionalisation was identified
with a loss of democratic control and 'community theatre', by definition, involved direct input from
amateurs (Beagle and Crawford 1916, 7 - 8).
125/
consensual community did not necessarily translate to the culturally diverse urban
'neighborhood' or to the committees and hierarchies of small-town, rural America.
The 'usable past' of the Federal Art Project and the Federal Theatre Project was an
attempt to build a new democratic culture from the base of an indigenous American
tradition. However, this tradition contained a number of nineteenth century
`culturalise assumptions which contradicted the democratic communitarian agenda of
the arts projects.
First, the rhetoric of 'community' in some instances disguised the old cult of the
individual Romantic artist or the Progressive cult of professional expertise. In the
'civic theatre' and the pageant, the best interests of the community were mysteries
known only to a priesthood of professional artists and civic reformers; artistic
control and social engineering cut against local autonomy and collective self-
expression. In the rural touring theatres, Arvold's emphasis on community
development through culture was turned upside down in Koch's emphasis on
'community' involvement as the lifeblood of the playwright; 'community' fed the
artist, instead of artists nurturing communities. In the visual arts, 'regionalism'
became the label for a handful of well-known painters who used a vernacular,
accessible style without ever fully engaging with the rural mid-Western communities
to which they claimed to have returned. The artist was a shaman, not the overall-
clad 'worker' portrayed on the cover of Time magazine. These latent contradictions
between collective creativity and the cult of the individual talent would be tested by
the administrative classification of 'professional' and 'skilled' artists on the projects.
Secondly the rhetoric of 'community' provided an ideological smokescreen for
propagandists and civic boosters. Pageants and murals claiming to represent past
events or present issues served as tourist attractions and celebrations of national and
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civic progress. Instead of empowering communities or initiating a dialogue between
collective aspirations and the individual talent, Progressive era culture bombarded
them with instructions and directions disguised as unquestionable consensus. This
propagandist tendency would reemerge in 1930s in the post-office murals and some
of the later, more obviously didactic 'Living Newspapers'.
Finally, the 'usable past' propagated an idealised harmonious 'community' which
may not have existed outside the imaginations of an alienated middle class. In the
college-based little theatre, the artificial harmony of college life substituted for the
complex relationships of real communities with multiple identities and needs,
echoing the 'common culture' of the university settlement. Cahill compiled his own
usable past of idealised 'cohesive' communities from the folk traditions of the past.
Artists and administrators taught to expect communities to operate through rational
consensus were ill prepared for the controversies and conflicts of interest which
assailed real community arts projects in the 1930s.
3.4 A Marxist Past: 'art as a weapon' and commitment
In the previous section I described traces of a nineteenth century cultural idealism at
odds with the arts projects' communitarian rhetoric. In this section I will review the
other side of the arts projects' inheritance, a 'materialist' conception of culture
derived from the artists' collectives and workers' theatre groups of the 1920s. This
radical 'tradition, allied to the American Communist Party (CPUSA), introduced
elements of cultural utilitarianism, collectivism and propaganda to the arts projects.
While communist rhetoric and ideas were influential on the arts projects, I will argue
that this influence remained contradictory and never resulted in a coherent
'materialist' or 'Marxist' conception of culture or cultural policy.
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Communist theory sought to 'reposition' art and artists in relation to society, making
the 'superstructure' of artistic production secondary to the 'base' of the class
struggle. Theoretically this repositioning was analogous to the anti-individualist
'repositioning' of the artist sought by Flanagan and Cahill. However, according to
the Marxist-Leninist party line, art was a weapon in the revolutionary struggle, a
means and not an end in itself. This instrumental cultural policy had more in
common with the Progressive pageant than with the aims of Flanagan and Cahill;
communist art was answerable not to the 'community' but to an abstract of the
people's will, as interpreted by party officials and 'committed' artists. In sone
instances, 'committed' artists appeared more concerned with the party's promise of
prestige and influence rather than with a desire to make their work 'accountable'.
While the communist party's influence on artists increased quantitatively in the
1930s, it diminished in strength. This ideological dilution was part of the
communist strategy of the 'popular front' introduced in 1935. Seeking to build a
broad coalition of progressive and socialist forces opposed to fascism, the
communist ideologues welcomed 'fellow travellers', especially artists, who were
broadly sympathetic to communist party ideals and language even if they were not as
committed as the first wave of radical artists. In the late 1920s and early 1930s,
'commitment' was paid for in material and ideological sacrifices made by the artist
for the cause; by the mid-1930s this personal tariff was reduced and the rigorous
policing of ideological content was relaxed, allowing a looser and more generalised
'commitment' to the communist cause. The result was a quantitative increase in
supposedly 'committed' artists, combined with a qualitative reduction in the required
level of ideological commitment.
Seen in this context, the ideological traces of communism in the arts projects are less
substantial than their rhetoric, while the correspondence between Marxist cultural
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theory and the communitarian pragmatism of Cahill and Flanagan is at most only a
loose analogy. What emerged in the arts projects in the 1930s was a `culturalise
variant of Marxist cultural theory in which artists reinvented the romantic tradition
of artist as (revolutionary) hero and 'commitment' was a matter of subjective
psychological need rather than objective political alignment.
In the 1920s 'commitment' entailed a degree of self-sacrifice, both materially and
artistically. Early workers' theatre groups demanded a gruelling repertory and a
rigorous lifestyle (McDermott 1965, 1966). According to Cosgrove, the Workers
Laboratory Theatre's Shock Troupe performed over 80 plays to 100,000 workers in
1934 (Cosgrove 1985, 272); rehearsals were supplemented by a heavy schedule of
ideological classes. Wages were minimal and hours were long. Artistically most of
the actors were untrained and ideological commitment mattered more than aptitude
or experience; writing and directing were also controlled by committee.
Communist painters and writers in the 1920s formed the John Reed Clubs, named
after the American intellectual turned revolutionary man of action. The early John
Reed clubs of the 1920s and early 1930s were 'sectional', following the Marxist
collectivist line advocated by the communist party at the time, and aimed to use art
primarily as an instrument of ideological propaganda; artists were discouraged from
individualist tendencies and workers were invited to assess artists' work and correct
ideological "errors" (Monroe 1975, 65). In this context of rigorous self-searching,
'fellow-travellers' were urged to abandon art for art's sake and to "forge a new art
that will be a weapon in the battle for a new and superior world" (ibid.).
Commitment had its compensations. According to Richard Pells, the communist
party "rivalled the New Deal in giving intellectuals a sense of importance, as well a
numerous things to do" (Pells 1973, 168). Party membership offered both
"comradeship and an end to loneliness", encouraging artists "to feel as though they
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had become significant actors on the stage of history" (ibid., 179). The communist
artist's sense of collective participation in a historical movement would later be
transferred into the federal arts projects. Thus according to Monroe, Federal One
"through the collective nature of its art programs, literally created a community of
artists" and allowed the artist to feel "he was moving within the mainstream of
American life" (Monroe 1975, 64).
After 1935, popular front communism's demands on the 'committed' artist were
reduced. 'Fellow travellers', once the object of scorn, were now welcomed; rigid
party control over artistic form and content gave way to a more sophisticated formal
approach. The Group Theatre, founded in 1931, signalled the newly expansive
approach to membership and technique; sympathisers from the legitimate theatre
were invited to produce 'workers' plays' and agitprop workers' theatre groups were
schooled by the Group in Stanislavsldan method. The individual director replaced
the old school of collective self-criticism; agitprop sketches performed by mobile
'shock troupes' were replaced by full length plays in conventional venues64.
Relationships with audiences also began to change; greater professionalism meant
abandoning the old identification between untrained workers on the stage and their
comrades in the audience. Instead, in a throwback to the nineteenth century
tradition of middle class cultural 'improvement' of the supposedly uncultured
working class, "gradually, the masses were seen not as active participants but as a
passive audience attending plays designed for their betterment" (Pells 1973, 254).
In another echo of nineteenth century cultural reform, the audiences for 'workers'
theatre' gradually ceased to consist of 'workers' themselves and came to consist
principally of the urban middle class. This shift was reflected within the League of
64 For the Group's influence on workers' theatre, see Cosgrove (1985, 263 - 264). Several
commentators suggest that the Group represented a 'culturalise shift away from the radical politics of
the old workers' theatre (Kidd 1988, 412 - 414; Williams 1974, 25; Fells 1973, 259); for a
dissenting view, see Cobb 1989. For stylistic changes in the workers' theatre, see McDermott 1966,
119- 120; Fells 1973, 260.
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Workers Theatre Companies by a growing concentration on New York as the
League's centre of operations and an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to compete
with the commercial theatre for a conventional middle-class theatre-going public
(McDermott 1965). Despite a belated attempt to decentralise in 1939, the League
(now trading under the less 'committed' title of the New Theatre League) crumbled
into debt as subscriptions dried up.
By the mid-1930s commercial producers had begun to ape the conventions of
'workers' theatre' on Broadway and in Hollywood in order to attract a fashionable
middle class audience (Pens 1973, 263). According to John Houseman, "workers'
plays" were now "the smart commercial angle" (Federal Theatre Project 1936);
confirming his judgement, in 1938 commercial management took over management
of The Cradle Will Rock, a `political' play first produced by Houseman and Orson
Welles for the Federal Theatre Project. Of the successful 'left wing' plays produced
that year none was produced by a dedicated 'workers' theatre' group (McDermott
1965). Even groups with authentic left wing credentials like the Group Theatre
began to seek cultural or moral solutions to the problems of life under capitalism, in
place of the crude certainties of economic analysis, and presented individual heroic
action as an alternative to collective transformation (Cosgrove 1985, 271; Pells
1973, 259 - 261).
Visual artists were also released from the rigorous commitments of the 1920s. The
John Reed Clubs and the Artist's Union (a 1934 offshoot of the John Reed Clubs
catering for unemployed artists) adopted a 'fraction' structure which allowed a
caucus of artists who were party members to remain in contact with the party
leadership, while the majority of artists were only loosely affiliated to the party
through the club. At a 1935 meeting between the Artist's Union fraction and a
communist party official, artists walked out of a meeting when they were requested
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to "devote more time to party work"; one artist declared that "the distinguished
comrades from the district committee" were "full of shit" (Monroe 1975, 66). The
John Reed Clubs provided the artist with a sense of social 'membership' without the
high ideological price of 'commitment'. The Artists's Union was succeeded by the
American Artists Congress, in which the political commitments of membership were
virtually non-existent. As ideological control slackened, party membership
increased. Among New York artists, communist party membership rose from
around 60 before 1934 to several hundred in the period 1935 to 1939; significantly,
the numbers attending weekly meetings of the Artist's Union was even higher,
especially if artists' interests were at stake (Monroe 1975, 66).
By the mid-1930s, 'commitment' no longer carried the same political charge as it
had in the 1920s. Like the settlement worker, the radical artist sought to be socially
'useful'. 'Commitment', like regionalism, was partly an aesthetic reaction against
the self-involved formalism of pre-war art. At a psychological level, the artist
collectives and theatre ensembles of the 1930s were a product of the same
'subjective necessity' which inspired college women in the 1890s; the alienated
middle class intellectual sought refuge in the warm glow of "beloved community"
(Blake 1990). "Revolution" was, according to Richard Pells, "seen as a form of
therapy in which the intellectual took on an entirely new personality" (Pens 1973,
162). Echoing the self-disgust which inspired the settlement resident to turn her
back on her culture and her class, there was an element of self-destructiveness in the
the ritual immersion of the self in the collective oneness of community. In the
rigorous self-discipline of the 1920s and the more rhetorical commitments of the
1930s, the artist ritually abnegated self and culture, succumbing to the paradoxical
anti-intellectualism of the radical intellectual described by Christopher Lasch (1965).
Such self-denial was not even particularly useful to the party; artists accordingly
laboured under "an unnecessary psychological burden which frequently obstructed
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the other aims they were seeking to achieve" (Pells 1973, 186). Thus, according to
Lasch, American radicalism became a "ritual celebration of radicalism itself" (Lasch
1965, 288), while "commitment and action became ends in themselves" (Pells 1973,
147). Alongside the committed artist's residue of 'subjective' self-disgust and self
denial was a heavy dose of self-deception; the promise of 'oneness' with a different
social class was based on a false identification of the artist's spiritual sense of
alienation with the economic disenfranchisement of the worker. The subjective
quality of 'commitment', based in self-disgust, self-denial and self-deception, lent an
air of unreality to the artist's objective political attachments.
The pervasive influence of communism on the federal arts projects was thus a matter
of aesthetics and psychology as much as politics. On the Federal Theatre Project,
Hallie Flanagan had written enthusiastically of the possibilities of workers' theatre in
1931 and had staged a production bearing the stylistic signature of workers' theatre
at Vassar65 . The great artistic innovation of the Federal Theatre Project, the Living
Newspaper, was probably directly inspired by the 12-minute Newsboy, a piece of
agitprop first presented by the Workers Laboratory Theatre in 1931. The Living
Newspaper, described by one contemporary as "vaudeville with a basic idea"
(Flanagan 1940, 309), explored contemporary social and economic issues through a
collage of documentary information, using short scenes, a large cast, simple staging
and vivid lighting; stylistically it recycled many of the conventions of workers'
theatre (O'Connor 1990). The Living Newspaper also clearly aspired to
'commitment' in the political sense, dedicated, like its agitprop predecessors, to
'educating' the public to discuss important social issues instead of distracting them
with spectacle and sentiment. Yet the living newspapers were more successful
65 In an article on the first conference of the League of Workers' theatre entitled A Theatre is
Born, Flanagan commented that "there are only two theatres in the country today that are clear as to
their aim: one is the commercial theatre which wants to make money, the other is the workers'
theatre which wants to make a new social order" (Flanagan 1931, quoted in Rubinstein 1986, 306).
Flanagan co-wrote and directed Can You Hear Their Voices, an agitprop collage presenting the views
of disaffected dirt-farmers, for the Vassar Experimental Theatre at Vassar College in 1931.
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theatrically than politically. Praised by critics who disapproved of their message
(Vacha 1986, 76), surely the worst fate for the politically committed artist, the
living newspaper failed to develop a working class constituency, marooned instead
within the fashionable left-leaning intelligentsia of the New York theatre audience.
Here the Living Newspaper had more in common with the smart commercial angles
of the new 'workers' theatre' than the shock troupes of the 1920s, reproducing a
style without a political substance for a mostly middle class audience (Vacha 1986,
87; Matthews 1975, 330). More worryingly, the Living Newspaper Unit's high
profile in New York and its sporadic presence in the regions (Chicago's production
of Spirochete being a notable exception), reproduced the League of Workers Theatre
Companies mistake of centralising operations in New York at the expense of
regional development.
Of course there were notable exceptions to the culturalist trend. Communists and
radicals infiltrated the federal arts projects, partly as a result of financial need and
partly following an "unwritten policy of entryism" (Cosgrove 1985, 227). A
handful of Federal Theatre Project productions in New York strayed into outright
political propaganda, such as Revolt of the Beavers, a controversial Marxist parable
produced by the New York Children's Unit. According to John O'Connor (1990),
the later living newspapers also became increasingly manipulative and propagandist;
where earlier productions had presented audiences with complex social problems,
later productions embodied government solutions (O'Connor 1990, 344). This
political closure of content was accompanied by a more didactic form of
presentation; the older discursive, multifaceted format was replaced by bludgeoning
spectacle and the confident authority of a propaganda film (Vacha 1986, 82 - 85). If
the early living newspapers recreated the collective complicity of the workers theatre
(O'Connor 1990, 332 - 337; Cosgrove 1985, 275), the later productions reproduced
the pageant's manipulative use of spectacular effects to enforce a single point of
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view. 66 However these productions were not typical of the Federal Theatre Project
in New York, still less of the work in the country as a whole, as Flanagan
emphasised in her testimony to the Dies Committee. The argument that the Federal
Theatre Project would eventually fall victim to political censorship strains
credibility, especially as the contemporary accusations of political bias were never
officially proved67.
The intense political ferment of the New York units of Federal One may be seen as a
symptom of the committed artist's cultural introversion. Instead of a new union
between artist and society there was unionisation of artists. For all their rhetorical
solidarity with the ordinary blue collar WPA workers, the artists on Federal One
enjoyed a privileged, professional status far removed from the 'plumber's wage'
originally demanded by the artist George Biddle in 1933. The 'commitment' of
most of these artists was primarily cultural, not political; rather than a political
struggle, they pursued an ideal of community, in the 'ferment' of 'association' with
other artists later described by Willem de Kooning, through project meetings and
collective studios (Cahill 1954, 22). Where they did engage with social issues, there
was a tendency to do so in moral or cultural terms, following what Pells describes as
"the decade's tendency to glide over the content of socialist theory, while stressing
its moral and emotional implications for human behavior" (Pells 1973, 143).
66 For the manipulative effects of the Progressive era pageant, see Glassberg (1990). Where the
workers' theatre used minimal props, costumes and rudimentary technique, the pageant deployed a
more overblown theatrical vocabulary which was not always effective (Burleigh 1917, 42 - 43, 50 -
52). The Living Newspaper's alternation of bare stage and 'cinematic' spectacle, of single figure and
mass cast, can perhaps be seen as a hybrid of these two genres. One possible precedent for this cross-
fertilisation was the 'Pageant of the Paterson Strike', staged by John Reed's International Workers of
the World in Madison Square Gardens in 1913 (Glassberg 1990, 127 - 128).
67 The Congressional committees 'investigating' the project in 1938 and 1939 were ill-prepared
and ill-informed; the communist witch-hunt led by Martin Dies, relying mostly on half-baked
testimony of disaffected former employees, was especially unconvincing, with Flanagan at one point
being asked if Christopher Marlowe was a communist. Other committee members raked through the
project's lists for "suggestive and salacious titles". The political mud-slinging was merely a pretext
for a symbolic attack on Roosevelt's political authority; the Federal Theatre Project was singled out
for abolition primarily because it was the most centralised of all the projects and most clearly in
breach of Congress's relief requirements.
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Politically, 'commitment' on the arts projects was of a muted, culturalist variety,
rooted in the intellectual's subjective search for an elusive sense of social
membership, echoing the cultural communitarianism of the settlement house.
Philosophically, the ethos of the arts projects reflected not the Marxist utilitarianism
of 'art as a weapon' but the culturalist commitment to a common culture. In terms
of the 'incurable structural contradiction' between idealist and materialist
conceptions of culture, Federal One never committed itself to the base-superstructure
logic of Marxist cultural theory; while it inherited some of the collectivist trappings
of Marxist 'commitment', individual artists on the projects took their art too
seriously to sacrifice creative control to a party line. As in the nineteenth century,
the crisis of culture grew out of a crisis of faith within the middle class; alienated
artists, intellectuals and left-leaning audiences saw the communion of collective
action as a compensation for the personal, artistic and economic depression after the
false dawn of peace and prosperity. Where social problems were addressed, artists
dealt primarily in the soft rhetoric of culture, not the hard currency of economic and
political analysis. A `culturalise version of Marxism, which privileged art and
artists as agents of social change, was allied with the residual idealism of the
nineteenth century; this 'unstable equilibrium' forms the subject of the next section.
3.5 John Dewey and the Politics of Equilibrium
In this section I will discuss how the historical and theoretical traditions discussed in
the previous two sections were incorporated within a coherent philosophical
framework. This framework drew upon the philosophy of John Dewey and the
'cultural regionalism' being advocated by Lewis Mumford and other social theorists.
What this theoretical framework failed to take into consideration was the specific
historical and administrative context of the federal arts projects.
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Holger Cahill cited "the philosophy of John Dewey" as one of the essential elements
which had made the federal arts projects possible (O'Connor 1973, 38). Dewey's
philosophy was also woven into the cultural radicalism of the 1930s (Pells 1973, 118
- 125). His achievement was to reconcile the individualist tradition of American
liberalism with the collectivist tradition of socialism. Dewey described a dynamic
interaction between individual and collective cultural development and between
individual freedom and state intervention. The idea that individual creativity and
collective organisation were complementary, not antagonistic, lay at the heart of
New Deal cultural policy. Along with other theorists of the period, including Lewis
Mumford, Dewey described a harmonious equilibrium between individual and
collective well-being. Yet the synergy described by Dewey and Mumford proved
difficult to realise in practice.
In Liberalism and Social Action (1935), Dewey criticised old-fashioned
"doctrinaire" liberalism and the belief that there was a "natural opposition between
the individual and organised society". Instead he proposed a "renascent liberalism"
based on the realisation that individual freedom did not just mean freedom from
constraint but active support for individual development, through "institutions that
provide the material basis for the cultural liberation and growth of individuals"
(Dewey 1935, 5; 55)68 . In Individualism Old and New (1930), Dewey embarked on
a similar critique at the psychological level, arguing that "an earlier pioneer
68 Liberalism and Social Action presents a robust defence of state interventionism and social
engineering against the doctrinaire economic liberalism of Locke and Adam Smith. Essential to
Dewey's argument is the assumption that institutions and governments need not be brutal and
coercive, but may be benign and constructive. Here he explicitly argues against Marx's doctrine of
class struggle, entering a liberal plea for cooperation and 'organised intelligence' in place of the
violence of political confrontation: "the measure of civilisation is the degree in which the method of
cooperative intellgence replaces the method of brute conflict" (Dewey 1935, 81). Of course Dewey's
pragmatism is open to the same charges of ineffective and essentially conservative bourgeois
squeamishness that Alinsky levelled against the settlement house (see 2.5, above). Above all
Dewey's pragmatism was based on optimism, a belief, shared with the settlement workers, that social
problems could be scientifically and methodically 'solved'. Revealingly Dewey dedicated Liberalism
and Social Action to the memory of Jane Addams.
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individualism" had been absorbed within "a condition of dominant corporateness".
He suggested that "the balked demand for genuine cooperativeness and reciprocal
solidarity in daily life" had resulted in neurotic forms of aggression, greed,
nationalism and irritation. The solution would be a new individualism based on
social relationships, an "integrated individuality", defined as "the product of definite
social relationships and publicly acknowledged functions" (Dewey 1930, 36; 56 -
61; 53)69.
These political and psychological arguments about the relationship between
individual and collective development fed into Dewey's aesthetic theory. In Art and
Experience (1934), Dewey described the process of artistic creation in terms of a
new relationship between artistic production and consumption. The process of
patterning and reorganising experience was active and continuous, so that the final
product, the work of art, was the culmination of a continuous movement. The act of
viewing the work of art required a similar process of "taking in", described by
Dewey as "a gathering together of details and particulars physically scattered into an
experienced whole" (Dewey 1934, 54). These two phases, the 'artistic' act of
production and the 'aesthetic' act of perception and enjoyment were related (Dewey
1934, 46 - 7). The artist was also a viewer, continually experiencing and redirecting
his work; similarly the viewer had actively to "create" his experience (Dewey
1934, 34). This active interchange between art and experience was what made the
artist's work "artistic" and the viewer's experience "aesthetic". Dewey thus
69Again, in Individualism Old and New Dewey echoes the settlement worker's faith in
cooperative living as a solution to deep-rooted social problems, turning social conflicts into symptoms
of a sick society and, by extension, of sick individuals. Like Freud (whose Civilisation and its
Discontents was published in 1929), Dewey thus converted social and economic problems into moral
and psychological ones; here he belongs to the same idealist tradition of 'reform through culture'
which encompasses Samuel Barnett (1888) and J A Simpson (1976) - see Simpson's description of
socio-cultural animation as "a sort of social vitamin" which can cure "stunted" individuals and a sick
society (Simpson 1975, 8). The metaphor of sickness reveals a culturalist-idealist assumption that
social problems can be 'cured' through individual access to the cultural panacea - precisely the
assumption so mistrusted by the young Beveridge at Toynbee Hall (cf. Briggs and Macartney 1984,
61).
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described a complicity between the individual artist and audiences or viewers as the
necessary condition for artistic creativity and public enjoyment and understanding.
These arguments gave an intellectual focus to Cahill's argument that great art grew
out of a 'sound general movement' not individual acts of genius, and that American
artists needed to rediscover their creative roots in community life.
Mumford's contribution to the politics of equilibrium was to present the interactions
between individual and collective development in terms of regional development
(Mumford 1925, 1928). Mumford's regionalism was based on a series of 'organic'
relationships between humans and their physical environment, between city and
region, between "modes of life" and "fundamental conditions"; these relationships
had been broken down by industrial specialisation and urban concentration, resulting
in "urban hypertrophy and rural debilitation" and the erosion of "vivid creative
life". The solution to this economic imbalance was the reconstruction of regional
cultural identity as the basis for regional economic renewal; only by identifying
"the people, industry, and the land as a single unit" would it be possible to
"promote and stimulate a vivid creative life throughout a whole region".
Mumford's analysis anticipated the regional emphasis of the federal arts projects;
Cahill sought to restore the connections between artists and their native
communities, especially through the community arts centre programme, while
Flanagan sought to ground the Federal Theatre Project in regional units as the basis
for a democratic, participatory culture. For reasons which will be considered in the
next section, these regional aspirations were never realised and the crucial imbalance
between regional and national cultural development remained.
The interlocking relationships described by Dewey and Mumford, between
individual and community and between cultural and social life, provided an elegant
theoretical framework for the federal arts projects' attempt to 'reposition' the artist.
139/
However this framework depended on idealising each component in the relationship,
the artist, the audience and the state.
Both Dewey and Mumford argued that individual artistic creativity was grounded in
collective experience. Instead of being a constraint, the relationship between artist
and community was thus a source of freedom; freed from the constraints of the
marketplace and the distorting influence of the connoisseur, American artists,
according to Cahill, "should not be held in any conventional channel", confident of
at least some following in their 'home' community within a nation of cultural
consumers. Popular taste was likewise not to be stereotyped as a unified stylistic
pattern; echoing Dewey, Cahill argued against "literalism", "false localism" and
"romanticising the past", claiming that true "imaginative realism" meant "a genuine
recovery of emotion" (Cahill 1936, 30 - 35). Contrary to the stereotypical view of
the Federal Art Project as a bastion of regionalism or social realism (a reading based
primarily on the murals division, not on the more numerous and diverse output of
the fine arts and graphics divisions), abstract artists like Stuart Davis also found the
arts projects congenial to their work (McKinzie 1973, 108 - 109). The diversity of
artistic styles was premised upon a diversity of public responses to art; abstract art
was thrown into relief by its social context, as in the recently restored Williamsburg
murals created for Brooklyn's Williamsburg Housing Project in 19367°.
The formula required a massive change in the pattern of cultural consumption, a
freedom from bureaucratic interference at the local level and a leap of faith among
artists themselves. First the traditional concentration of cultural consumption in the
metropolitan elites would need to be replaced by a new diversity of regional publics;
70 Described as the first "nonobjective public murals in the United States", the murals feature the
work of four abstract artists. Their location in a public housing project forced the artists to consider
the context of their work, both in terms of the physical space and the ways in which the space was
used by residents. The murals, newly restored in 1990 after long neglect, are on long-term loan to
the Brooklyn Museum from the New York City Housing Authority.
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at the federal level, this would entail 'decentralising' the arts projects, allowing
regional communities to jettison metropolitan 'standards' if necessary. Secondly,
local administrators would have to resist the temptation to interpose their own
version of 'community' taste, thereby preempting the outcome of the dialogue
between artist and audience or succumbing to a narrower, utilitarian administrative
or political agenda. Finally artists would have to abandon the safety net of
conventional metropolitan 'standards' and appeal to the new 'regional' audiences;
they would also have to expose the private, 'visionary' processes of artistic creation
to public scrutiny.
At each level these leaps of faith were not made. The ancient antagonism between
federal and state government complicated attempts to decentralise artistic production
and consumption. Federal directors were not prepared to surrender political control
of the projects to local administrators whom they suspected of elitism and self-
interest. Local sponsors in turn impressed upon project artists their preferences for
"realistically portrayed landscapes and flowers" which finished their days
languishing in Washington warehouses (McKinzie 1973, 114); local theatre projects
mimicked Broadway conventions and production values. Federal and local
administrators sniped at each other; Karal Ann Marling (1982) describes the
"procedural chaos" of conflicting bureaucratic instructions for artists working on the
Section's post office murals. Abstract artists such as Isamu Noguchi struggled not
so much with the real interests and tastes of the public as with bureaucratic codes
based On narrow definitions of accessibility and usefulness. Finally artists subjected
themselves to their own internalised perceptions of public taste; O'Connor notes a
degree of personal guilt among artists pursuing a personal aesthetic which they felt
to be "out of step with the dominant utilitarian notion that only what is useful can be
considered beautiful" (O'Connor 1973, 23). This guilt was reinforced by bullying
from local administrators and political interests, and by the artist's own desire to
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'belong' in a broad artistic movement (the 'conventional channel' described by
Cahill) instead of exploring the backwaters of local and regional taste.
Artists clung to their role as privileged outsiders, reinforced by their 'professional'
economic status within the WPA. Administrators remained trapped in sectional
disputes between the states and federal government and used the arts projects to
support local political objectives and national cultural ambitions. Above all the arts
projects were tied to a government relief mission which reinforced the specialised
professional status of artists and the metropolitan bias of cultural consumption
against the ideals of democratisation and decentralisation. These constraints form
the subject of the next section.
3.6 Democratisation and Decentralisation
Cultural democratisation and decentralisation represented the strategic key to the
new relationships between art and society outlined by Dewey and Mumford.
However, as Nobuko Kawashima points out, 'decentralisation' does not necessarily
refer simply to the provision of 'culture for all', this is what Kawashima calls
'cultural decentralisation' (Kawashima 1997). Decentralisation can also refer to
rearrangements of geographical distribution and political structure. These different
versions of decentralisation are in turn associated by Kawashima with a variety of
policy positions, not just the policy of 'cultural democratisation' or 'culture for all'.
In this section I will consider how the arts projects pursued different 'cultural',
'geographical' and 'political' versions of 'decentralisation' simultaneously. In the
end these policies worked against each other, undermining the more important and
overriding policy goal of 'cultural democratisation'.
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Both Holger Cahill and Hallie Flanagan saw cultural decentralisation as the route to
a new indigenous American culture, rooted in local communities. Here 'cultural
decentralisation' was virtually synonymous with 'cultural democratisation', directed
at the 'repositioning' of art and artists away from the traditional centres of artistic
production and consumption, the discovery of new 'non-traditional' audiences and
the broadening of community participation in cultural activities, rather than at any
geographical shift in resources or decision-making. This objective overlapped with a
more straightforward goal of geographical deconcentration, aimed at building up
regional constituencies of support outside the metropolitan north east; this objective
was a pragmatic response to political criticism from the Congress and a recognition
that the long-term viability of the projects would depend on local and state funding
taking up the slack once the federal 'emergency' funding was terminated.
To some extent these two versions of 'decentralisation' worked against each other;
geographical deconcentration and political devolution of decision-making to the
states did not necessarily guarantee a change in the balance of cultural participation.
Deconcentration was not democratisation. When the remnants of the federal arts
projects were eventually transferred to state control in 1939, the effect was to
recentralise control of the projects in local bureaucracy, not to open up new channels
of communication between artists and communities. Holger Cahill and Hallie
Flanagan adopted different approaches to cultural decentralisation. Flanagan used
central control to challenge local bureaucracy, local elites and local concentrations of
cultural resources and political power. Cahill allowed much greater autonomy to
local administrators. Politically Cahill's approach was the more durable; without
necessarily achieving a more 'democratic' distribution of cultural opportunities and
resources, the Federal Art Project succeeded where the Federal Theatre Project
failed, in building up a local profile in the south and west of the country. The
perceived 'centralisation' of the Federal Theatre Project was a primary reason for its
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early abolition; the geographical deconcentration of the Federal Art Project allowed
it to make the transition to local state control from 1939 to 1943 discussed in the
next section.
The problems of democratisation and decentralisation were complicated by the
political antagonism between federal and state administrators and by the relief
requirements. WPA relief regulations dictated that local projects had to be set up in
response to the number of qualified unemployed people in the area. For the same
reason, they also prevented the transfer of personnel outside the state where they had
originally been registered for relief. The federal arts projects were thus bound to be
concentrated in areas of previously high artistic employment; New York City,
suffering the fall-out from Broadway's commercial failures and long a magnet for
artists of all disciplines, many of whom were now 'unemployed', was one such
centre of concentration. For the Federal Art Project, New York City accounted for
approximately 45% of the total workforce in 1937; 75% were concentrated in just
25 cities which contained only 20% of the total population (McKinzie 1973, 93;
McDonald 1969, 388). For the Federal Theatre Project, the equivalent figures were
somewhat higher, confirming its reputation as the most centralised of all the federal
arts projects (McDonald 1969, 282).
As already noted, the relief requirements also worked against attempts to reposition
the artist in relation to the community. Professional classification, which focused on
creative ability as the primary selection criterion, perpetuated traditional roles and
encouraged a perception that the community and educational activities which had
featured strongly before 1935 were 'second-class' activities. Professional actors
resented being delegated to educational projects (McDonald 1969, 565), while
administrators (including Cahill) saw the 'non-creative' projects as a convenient
means of absorbing "less gifted" artists (McKinzie 1973, 141; Matthews 1967,
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184). The labour unions were suspicious of amateur activity at a time of widespread
professional unemployment (Matthews 1967, 192); Equity warned of an influx into
the profession of "stage-struck high school seniors or frustrated housewives"
(Matthews 1967, 244). WPA administrators objected to community and educational
activities on the same grounds. Not surprisingly artists remained concentrated in the
traditional areas of activity, in the 'creative' arts, not in the new roles of animateurs
and educators. It is worth remembering that the Federal Art Project's heralded
community art centre employed only 10% of FAP staff in 1936 (rising to 25% under
state control in 1939), as compared with the approximately 50% who continued to
be employed in "the production of works of art" by the mural, easel, sculpture and
graphics divisions (McKinzie 1973, 105; McDonald 1969, 422).
Hallie Flanagan regarded decentralisation of resources as a prerequisite for
democratisation; only a regionally based, local theatre could build a relationship
with audiences and become integrated into community life as a 'social institution'.
The argument that cultural democracy depended on local cultural institutions was
directly inspired by the little theatre movement (Flanagan 1940, 23). According to
Kenneth MacGowan, the little theatre movement "savors of the democracy of
Thomas Jefferson as surely as Broadway is a dramatization of federalism and
centralization. The local theatre is the aesthetic expression of states' rights."
(MacGowan 1929, 20). Frederick Koch had projected a "people's theatre" (a
phrase often invoked by Flanagan) as "an imaginative, a spiritual expression of our
tradition of democracy" (Koch 1940, 64). At the same time Flanagan sought to
retain central control over policy; local cultural resources did not mean local
political control. Thus she proposed a national structure with regional roots, a
"federation of theatres" in which "the general policy and programme would be
outlined in Washington, but the carrying out with modifications dictated by local
conditions would rest with the states" (Flanagan 1940, 23).
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As a result of the WPA relief requirements referred to above, Flanagan's original
regional plan could not be implemented and activities were overwhelmingly
concentrated in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, with a plethora of smaller,
weaker units scattered in smaller towns and cities across the countries. As Jane De
Hart Matthews notes, "the foundation stones for a regionally centered national
theatre had, in short, been dumped in three large piles with a few pebbles scattered
about elsewhere" (Matthews 1967, 60). Meanwhile the political and financial
pressure for geographical deconcentration increased. As a result of its controversial
productions and militant staff, the New York City Unit rapidly established a
prominent reputation within the project, provoking counter-measures from the WPA
in Washington. First, in November 1936, the WPA reduced the numbers of non-
relief personnel allowed to the arts projects, bringing Federal One into line with
other VVPA programmes; the measure was apparently aimed at the top-heavy New
York City units, criticised by the WPA for their high supervisory costs. Then in
July 1937 the WPA announced across the board cuts to Federal One for the next
financial year. The arts projects were now increasingly dependent on local
contributions, especially to cover non-labour costs; a higher proportion of
decentralised, community-based activities in order to appeal to local 'sponsors' thus
became "a present necessity" (Matthews 1967, 141).
In response to these pressures, Flanagan embarked on a belated and somewhat
desperate decentralisation drive through 1937 and 1938, while still attempting to
retain central control over policy direction. Firstly Flanagan attempted to introduce
touring companies to take work outside the major cities into smaller communities.
Secondly she attempted to assign "a nucleus of qualified professionals" to form
"competent producing units" for a community programme; this followed the
successful model in North Carolina where professional directors had been working
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with eighteen amateur 'community' groups. The touring plan was foiled mainly by
the WPA regulations on transferring personnel and local resistance from WPA
administrators at the state and city level, following a now familiar pattern (Matthews
1967, 181 - 5). In early 1938 a Chicago plan to distribute productions from the
metropolitan 'hub' to outlying districts (Matthews 1967, 188 - 91) was foiled by a
WPA ruling banning any touring activity without prior approval from Washington,
based on a desire to maintain financial controls over the project (McDonald 1969,
576). Following these administrative blockages, the 'Big Three' of New York,
Chicago and Los Angeles continued to dominate in what was to be the final year of
the Federal Theatre Project's life.
While Flanagan recognised the need to counter New York's dominance on the
project, geographical deconcentration was not her primary concern. Significantly
her various decentralisation plans worked through a 'top-down' model, with
expertise and influence being deployed from the centre (usually New York)
outwards. Her insistence on decentralising resources and centralising political
control stemmed from her desire to circumvent localised centres of cultural
dominance, where the old habits of theatre professionals and the legacy of Broadway
stood in the way of the 'democratic', participatory theatre to which Flanagan
aspired. These centres of resistance were to be found in the regions as well as in
New York City.
Senior Federal Theatre Project staff in New York, mostly old Broadway hands, were
reluctant to abandon the old habits of commercial management. At a production
conference in 1936, they tabled plans for 79 productions, using 177 sets and 2672
costumes over 6 months (Federal Theatre Project 1936). Later Flanagan would
lament New York's "provincialism" and the "lack of any sense of the theatre we
were trying to build" (Flanagan 1940, 119). Broadway's influence extended into the
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regions. In Chicago Flanagan commented that the Chicago unit was "at its best
when it was itself and at its worst when it imitated anything including its own stock-
company past" (Flanagan 1940, 137). In Connecticut the local Federal Theatre unit
recycled the Broadway formula, and "fashionable first night crowds led the public to
believe the plays were social, not theatre events" (Flanagan 1940, 232 - 6). In
Seattle, where the local WPA had vetoed a black production of Lysistrata, the
Washington State Director informed Flanagan of his preference for "the usual type
of theatre-goers because an audience that looks poor is apt to give an impression of
being radical" (Flanagan 1940, 308).
Flanagan and the regional project staff had radically different objectives in seeking
to 'decentralise' the Federal Theatre Project. For Flanagan the objective was to
challenge the conventions of Broadway-bound commercial theatre management and
reach new audiences; 'decentralisation' meant shifting the project's centre of gravity
from conventional plays and fashionable first night crowds to a broader 'popular'
audience. Thus she disparaged "the wealthy theatre patrons who might attend the
occasional high-priced road show" and "the university audience, which was
geographically remote and busy with social and academic affairs" as "useless"
(Flanagan 1940, 307 - 308); such tactics were merely repeating "the sort of thing
that landed several thousand people in the lap of the United States government"
(Flanagan 1940, 240). The regional units saw decentralisation in terms of building
up local constituencies of support. Thus according to Elizabeth Cavendish, directors
of the Connecticut unit "vainly courted social influentials" instead of cultivating
their "natural allies in labour and ethnic organizations" (Cavendish 1986, 155).
These two versions of decentralisation cancelled each other out, caught between the
regional attempt to `recentralise' the project around local centres of political and
economic power, and Flanagan's attempt to circumvent localised centres of
excellence in order to reach 'the people'. In Connecticut the result was "a failure to
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win the unquestioned support of any significant group or class in the communities in
which it operated" (Cavendish 1986, 155).
For Flanagan, decentralisation was an attempt to challenge American theatre's
fixation on the symbolic centre of 'Broadway'. In 1936 she launched a central
Audience Research Department, aiming to challenge the commercial theatre's
received wisdom of mass-marketing of Broadway 'product'. In 1937, as part of a
reorganisation of the New York units of Federal One, Flanagan herself took over
direct responsibility for the running of the New York City unit alongside her duties
as national director and moved her office from Washington to New York. While her
move was partly intended to restore administrative and financial controls, it also
allowed her to tackle the influence of commercial theatre managers on the project at
source. In 1937 she combined the Play Policy Board and the National Play Board
into a new National Service Bureau, the primary function of which was to screen out
plays the director's office deemed inappropriate. Disingenuously, Flanagan justified
the move as a form of administrative streamlining and claimed she did not intend to
"dictate individual plays", only to provide a "suggestion of emphasis" (Flanagan
1940, 45). The Bureau also provided a resource for equipment, ideas and expertise;
in 1938 a Federal Summer Theatre was introduced to provide an injection of new
ideas, particularly for the smaller, more isolated units of the Project.
Flanagan's 'decentralisation' strategy had from the start depended on a centralisation
of political authority first in Washington, then in New York. McDonald suggests
that Flanagan was a centrist who did not understand "local conditions" and
attempted to impose avant-garde theatre on regional audiences. On the contrary,
Flanagan was all too aware of local conditions. Central direction was a necessary
evil, aimed firstly at challenging metropolitan conventions at source, and secondly at
persuading local theatres to develop their own independent programming and
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marketing strategies instead of mimicking Broadway standards and chasing fictional
metropolitan audiences in small-town America. The other side of Flanagan's
decentralisation plan, a deployment of resources and expertise from the centre to the
regions, was effectively curtailed by WPA regulations forbidding the transfer of
personnel (including touring companies) across regional lines, and by a series of
punitive funding cuts instituted by the WPA in 1937, 1938 and 1939. Intended to
rein in central administrative overheads, these sanctions also succeeded in stopping
Flanagan's belated decentralisation drive in its tracks (Matthews 1967, 245).
The Federal Theatre Project remained the most centralised of all the federal arts
projects, with activities overwhelmingly concentrated in New York, Chicago and
Los Angeles. Even at its peak in 1936, activity was notably thin in the south and
west of the country, while in seven of the southern states there was no presence of
any kind (McDonald 1969, 523). Thus the Federal Theatre Project was vulnerable
in the political heartland of Roosevelt's opponents, especially following Republican
gains in the November 1938 elections. The failure to decentralise geographically
and to build local constituencies of support was the decisive factor in the Federal
Theatre Project's premature death in 1939.
The Federal Art Project was considerably more successful than the Federal Theatre
Project in building support in the regions. The key to the Federal Art Project's
decentralisation strategy was the 'community art centre' which gave the project a
strong 'symbolic presence in the south and west of the country, where the Federal
Theatre Project was especially weak; Florida, for example, contained ten
community art centres (White 1987, 170 - 175). The Federal Art Project was
nevertheless subject to the same restrictions as the rest of Federal One; artists were
still prevented from transferring across state lines by differing state relief
requirements, residency qualifications for relief and the reluctance by state WPA
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officials to take on the public charges of another state (McKinzie 1973, 93 - 94).
Overall, project activities remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the metropolitan
north-east. Seen in this context, the community art centres were an ingenious
solution to Federal One's in-built metropolitan bias and provided a bridge-head for
the period of state control beginning in 1939.
The first of the Federal Art Project's community art centres was established in
Raleigh, North Carolina in December 1935. According to John F White, a total of
53 centres and 37 'extension galleries' operated between 1935 and 1941 (White
1987, 170 - 175); McKinzie's figures are rather higher, reaching a peak of 103
centres in 1941, but the pattern of steady expansion is the same (McKinzie 1973,
142 - 3; cf. Harris 1991). The typical community art centre divided its programme
between participation (classes for children and adults) and appreciation (exhibitions,
lectures and discussions). Classes avoided a prescriptive, classical approach to
instruction and were extremely diverse; alongside painting, drawing and pottery,
approximately 30 - 40% of classes were in handicrafts and some centres even
offered musical instruction (McKinzie 1973, 144). Exhibitions included national
and regional touring programmes of work by project artists but also included work
produced within the centre; for example in Jacksonville's Negro Art Gallery,
student exhibitions outnumbered official WPA touring exhibitions by approximately
four to one (O'Connor 1973, 217). Centres attempted to fulfil a 'useful' civic
function, in the tradition of Dana's Newark museum 71 , involving themselves in
local Concerns such as town planning, home decoration and public art (O'Connor
1973, 43); the Walker Art Center in Minnesota included an 'Everyday Gallery',
featuring 'useful gifts', principles of industrial design and new home appliances
(White 1987, 24 - 25). Other innovations included a touring 'art caravan', a
precursor of the 'art bus' of the 1970s (O'Connor 1973, 252 - 253).
71 For Dana's influence on Cahill and the FAP, see footnote at the beginning of section 3.3.
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Statistics for the new centres were impressive, sometimes improbably sOn • Jonathan
Harris estimates that in 1940 the 84 community art centres together attracted
between 12 and 15 million people over the year, and involved approximately
350,000 people per month in some form of artistic activity (Harris 1991, 253). The
Jacksonville Negro Art Gallery claimed to have been attended by 40,000 people over
three years, including over 35,000 'Negroes'; this amounted to half of the town's
Negro population and one third of the city's total population (O'Connor 1973, 216).
The Harlem Arts Center, one of the most successful centres under the direction of
Gwendolyn Bennett, claimed 4,000 attendances per month (O'Connor 1973, 214).
The community art centres were supplemented by other free standing educational
programmes. According to McKinzie (1973, 130), the FAP employed 465 art
teachers in New York City in summer 1936; teachers worked through various social
agencies, including settlement houses and a travelling workshop, reaching a total of
50,000 adults and children each week. Cuts in New York reduced the programme's
reach to around 30,000 in 1938 and around 10,000 in 1940; at the same time the
curriculum expanded to cover 23 subjects and the proportion of adults to children
rose from 20% in 1936 to 35% in 1940. According to WPA statistics, FAP
education programmes reached a total of 2 million people in 160 different locations,
including half a million in New York City (McKinzie 1973, 130).
Behind the statistics, the community art centres attempted to combine two forms of
decentralisation. At one level, they were an attempt to 'reposition' the artist from
the 'conventional channel' of the north eastern metropolis into mainstream
community life, in line with Cahill's nostalgic attempt to reconnect artists with "a
fresh poetry of the soil" (Cahill 1936, 36). At the same time they represented a
72 The FAP tended to use official reports and statistics as a promotional tool (McKinzie 1973,
182). In some cases `official' attendance figures for community art centres exceeded the entire town
population (O'Connor 1973, 209).
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shrewd political concession to the project's opponents in the south, granting
'extension galleries' to 'social influentials' who might return the favour when WPA
appropriations came to the vote in Congress. As with the Federal Theatre Project,
there was a tendency for these objectives to cancel each other out; concessions of
political power to local elites undermined the 'democratising' intentions of the
community art centre.
Unlike the Federal Theatre Project, the community art centre represented a policy of
'cultural decentralisation with political decentralisation' (Kawashima 1997); Cahill
was less inclined to invoke the central authority of Washington against local
concentrations of power. He actively encouraged local political 'ownership' of the
community art centres by inviting 'cooperating sponsors' to contribute money and
support in kind to local projects. This was a break with Federal One policy which,
as already noted, made the federal government the sole 'sponsor' of local projects,
replacing the local sponsor required by other WPA projects. While the official
statistics showed that local contributions to the community art centre programme had
reached a modest total of $850,000 by 1941 (McKinzie 1973, 143) and the centres
remained overwhelmingly dependent on federal funds, the local input (usually
amounting to between $1500 and $2000 per centre towards building and
maintenance costs) was impressive in the middle of a depression and reinforced the
sense of local involvement and ownership. The fundraising strategy was based on
multiple small contributions, encouraging a broad spread of symbolic ownership; in
Spokane, for example, the largest single donation in a total of $3840.54 raised over
3 months was $200, with many families contributing less than a dollar and schools
running 'penny drives' (White 1987, 100 - 101).
However, once the initial "small-town barn-raising atmosphere" dissipated, political
and financial authority tended to gravitate back to local elites; only 8% of
153/
Spokane's 1938 contributors resubscribed in 1941. The illusion of 'community'
ownership proved difficult to sustain. Elite patronage reclaimed the community arts
centre through the local chamber of commerce and 'society' fundraising events.
The reconcentration of political power and financial control at the local level
undermined the 'democratising' mission of the federal directorate in Washington.
Local administrators, local chambers of commerce and local art societies tended to
see the community art centre as a means of making local people more 'art
conscious', the first step towards a permanent municipal art gallery or museum.
Meanwhile Washington resolutely emphasised that 'participation' was the only route
to a real, broad-based appreciation of art. The conflict between 'appreciation' and
'participation in the community art centre betrayed a conflict in the decentralising
mission, recalling the rows between Flanagan and local theatre project administrators
in Connecticut and Washington state. While classes emphasised community
creativity and participation, touring exhibitions imported the cultural 'standards' of
New York to Main Street. 'Art appreciation' was increasingly used to bolster the
cultural leadership of the local elite, with curators preferring 'traditional' work over
the more 'modern' artists supplied by Washington. In Oklahoma Washington
officials rebuked the centre director for using the word 'museum' instead of 'centre'
in official memos and for using the 'Society' pages of the local paper to publicise
gallery events. In Phoenix conservative board members objected to the provision of
free classes for 'underprivileged children' because of their unseemly appearance. In
Chicago local high society closed ranks to exclude artists from dedication
ceremonies in 1941. In Spokane city officials complained that "present exhibitions
appeal only to those interested in the fine arts and have a limited appeal".
73 See Nicholas A Calcagno and Barbara K Scott, "The Federal Gallery System in Oklahoma: a
successful experiment" (White 1987, 37 - 78); Daniel A Hall, "A WPA Art Center in Phoenix 1937
- 40" (White 1987, 114 - 130); Margaret Goss Burroughs, "Chicago's South Side Community Art
Center: a personal recollection" (White 1987, 131 - 144); Sue Ann Kendall, "The Spokane Art
Center" (White 1987, 98 - 113).
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Instead of contributing to democratisation, 'decentralisation' became a battle for
political control between Washington and the states. Flanagan and Cahill sought to
'reposition' the artist in relation to an idealised community, free from the tyrannies
of middle class taste and conventional 'standards'; however, as Thomas Benton
discovered in Missouri, provincial elites were just as prone to artistic snobbery and
imported aristocratic 'taste' as their New York counterparts74. Cahill conceded
political authority to the states in pursuit of an idealised, inclusive version of
community which turned a blind eye to localised concentrations of political and
economic power. Flanagan retained central political authority in order to confront
these local concentrations of power. Neither strategy was successful in relation to
the overall aim of democratisation. However, Cahill did succeed where Flanagan
failed in achieving a degree of geographical deconcentration and in making symbolic
concessions to local state autonomy. The longer term consequences of these policies
will be considered in the next section.
3.7	 State Rights and Utilitarianism 1939 - 1943
Under state control, the federal arts projects experienced a radical and
comprehensive 'decentralisation', which included the complete destruction of the
Federal Theatre Project (perceived as the most centralised of the projects) and the
surrender of federal authority over the remaining projects. This geographical and
political decentralisation, as I have already implied, did not amount to the cultural
decentralisation and democratisation sought by Cahill and Flanagan. In this section I
will consider the period of state control as a new form of hegemony in which the
'unstable equilibrium' between competing policy objectives on the arts projects tilted
decisively in favour of instrumentalism and local service provision.
74 "Those who affect art with a big 'A' do so with their eyes on Europe just as they do in New
York" (Benton 1939, 274).
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In June 1939 Congress retaliated decisively against the presumptions of the arts
projects in a drastic reorganisation of the WPA and Federal One. The Federal
Theatre Project was abolished and the remaining arts projects were placed under the
control of the states; all arts projects were further required to receive a minimum of
25% of their overall costs from the states, bringing them into line with other WPA
projects. The federal directorates were reduced to a consultative role and only
Holger Cahill remained of the original four federal project directors. Employment
on projects was limited to a maximum of eighteen months, further reinforcing the
temporary status of the projects and weeding out the more experienced staff.
Administrative costs and non-relief funding were cut, removing the possibility of
strategic planning. With their ambitions now effectively curtailed, the arts projects
continued to exist primarily as service providers to the states until their eventual
abolition in 1943.
The enforced decentralisation of the 1939 reorganisation took the earlier emphasis on
community accountability and 'social usefulness' to its logical conclusion. From
January 1940 the WPA designated the remaining arts projects as 'community service
projects'. 'Applied arts' enjoyed a resurgence; according to Richard McKinzie,
whereas the emphasis before 1939 had been on 'creative arts', by 1940 over 4,100
of the 5,818 remaining WPA workers were employed in the 'practical arts'
(McKinzie 1973, 129). Following Pearl Harbour in 1941 the arts projects were
absorbed within the WPA War Services Sub-Division and committed to the war
effort; 'useful' activities were stepped up, including the production of propaganda
and information posters, contour maps, furnishing and decorating military facilities,
providing training aids and classes on subjects such as camouflage. The new
regulations played to the community art centres' strengths; their number continued
to grow, from 66 centres in June 1939 to "over a hundred art centers and
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extensions" by 1943 (McDonald 1969, 416). As other visual arts programmes were
cut back, the proportion of WPA artists employed by the community arts centre and
education programmes combined rose from less than 10% in 1935 to 25% in 1939
(McDonald 1969, 422).
Instead of the 'repositioning' of art and artists sought by Cahill and Flanagan,
political decentralisation resulted in a shift in the balance of political power from
national to state control. In turn the reduction of the federal directorate to a merely
consultative role and the replacement of a central source of 'discretionary' funding
by the new dependence on sponsorship by the states produced a new utilitarianism.
According to Richard McKinzie, "federal emphasis on creative production, skill
maintenance and rehabilitation gave way, under state direction, to 'service' to
sponsors" (McKinzie 1973, 164).
This new utilitarianism was a product not of 'community' control or accountability
but of political expediency. Instead of forging a new relationship between artist and
community, the post-1939 arts projects vested power in the local state bureaucracies,
which bent the projects to their own 'useful' purposes. Local administrators
imposed a stereotypical idea of 'usefulness' on the artist and implemented a crude
instrumental cultural policy which bypassed the kind of 'community' input sought by
Cahill and Flanagan. Crucially the output of the projects, for example a morale-
boosting exhibition of military equipment and uniforms in a community art centre or
the design of a government information leaflet, did not grow out of any dynamic
interaction between artist and community. The objectives were dictated by
administrators and politicians according to their view of the public's best interests;
the products were predictable and stereotypical, designed to meet the sponsor's
brief. Nor did such work have any long term value; it was a disposable product
designed to meet a specific need of the moment, not to further dialogue and debate.
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The new utilitarianism also capitalised on certain internal tendencies within the
projects. First of all the surrender of artistic autonomy to bureaucratic controls
followed the 'committed' artist's instinct for self-sacrifice. The "highly utilitarian
and formalist bias" of socialist realism propagated by the John Reed Clubs in the late
1920s and early 1930s had taught artists the joys of artistic self-denial. The War
Services Sub-Division also capitalised on earlier tendencies towards mass
manipulation and propaganda; these tendencies have been noted in the Federal
Theatre Project's later Living Newspapers such as Power75 together with their
earlier roots in the Progressive era pageant. Finally, the self-serving agenda of local
politicians had emerged as a consistent obstacle for the federal arts projects in their
efforts to decentralise artistic production and distribution to 'community' control.
Where Flanagan had attempted to bypass local interest groups by combining
decentralisation of production with centralisation of policy, Cahill's uncensorious,
non-interventionist approach had allowed local sponsors to exert a disproportionate
influence on local projects (McKinzie 1973, 110 - 112).
The 'regionalism' of the federal arts projects depended on a system of checks and
balances between national and local tiers of government. Both Cahill and Flanagan
saw cultural regionalism as the key to a new national culture; thus according to
Alan Lawson, "the concept of a culturally unified nation of distinctive local groups
was a close analogue to the cooperative commonwealth that the New Deal sought"
(Lawson 1985, 160). The balance between individual development and regional and
75 Power was a resounding vindication of government energy policy at a time when the
government was pushing through a controversial policy to take the utilities into public ownership;
this was precisely the method used by the Progressive era pageant in relation to civic reform twenty
years earlier. Whereas earlier Living Newspapers had examined issues from all sides without
endorsing any specific policy (cf. O'Connor 1990, 343 - 344), Power used manipulative stagecraft
including verbatim quotations from senators opposed to public ownership to endorse the New Deal
party line (Vacha 1986, 79 - 80; McDonald 1969, 533 - 535). According to Matthews, both Hallie
Flanagan and Harry Hopkins apparently failed to recognise a pro-New Deal viewpoint as party
political (Matthews 1967, 78)
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national institutions was the essence of Mumford's 'organic' regionalism and the
'new individualism' of John Dewey, which provided the theoretical framework for
the cultural policies of Flanagan and Cahill. However, this idealised 'politics of
equilibrium' was threatened by the long-standing political tensions between federal
authority and 'states' rights', which were aggravated by the structural anomalies of
the federal arts projects.
While Mumford and other sociologists (eg. Odum and Moore 1938) argued for a
'cultural', 'organic' regionalism based on a balance between between regional and
national institutions, the southern agrarians argued for a 'sectionalist' regionalism,
rooted in a rural reaction against metropolitan dominance and in political divisions
which dated back to the American Civil War (Davidson 1938; Davidson et al.,
1930). For Davidson, the political challenge for regionalism (or 'sectionalism') was
to liberate the regions (especially in the South and the West) from the overbearing
power of federal government, 'the leviathan state'. This power was concentrated in
the North Eastern cities. He regarded the 'national' culture of the United States as a
myth disguising the interests of the old Yankee metropolis. Roosevelt's gestures
towards regional culture and regional autonomy (for example the Tennessee Valley
Authority) were accordingly viewed as "sectional imperialism.., operating under the
Federal mask" (Davidson 1938, 27). The sectionalists occasionally seemed to be
refighting the battles of the Civil War, as when Davidson demanded "the power for
the South to preserve its bi-racial social system" without being "sniped at with
weapons of Federal legality" (ibid., 126); in the 1930 manifesto for the southern
agrarian movement, I'll Take My Stand, 'sectionalist' arguments shaded into
demands for segregation and secession.
Seen in this context, the decentralisation strategies of Cahill and Flanagan carried a
strong political charge. The Federal Theatre Project's perceived bias towards New
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York culture and Washington political control fuelled 'sectionalist' criticism of the
arts projects, especially in the south. On the other hand, Cahill's programme of
political decentralisation, in particular the community art centres, occasionally meant
conceding political ground to 'sectionalist' interests; for example, the Federal Art
Project was forced to comply with segregationist policies in the southern states,
resulting in a separate system of 'Negro Art Centers' in the south (Harris 1991,
256).
For the 'cultural regionalists' the ultimate goal was not 'states' rights' but individual
rights, liberated from national and local concentrations of power. 'Cultural
regionalism' thus attempted to counterbalance federal and state authority in order to
realise the 'universal' aspirations of the people (Odum and Moore 1938, 3 - 34);
according to Felix Frankfurter and J M Landis, the region was a means of
overcoming "the false antithesis embodied in the shibboleths 'States' Rights' and
'National Supremacy'" (Odum and Moore 1938, 27). 'Cultural regionalism' was
thus integral to the 'democratising' objectives of Cahill and Flanagan, a means of
releasing popular cultural aspirations from national and local 'centres of excellence'
and of basing cultural pluralism on regional diversity, 'a nation of regions'. Where
cultural regionalism was based on reconciliation, political regionalism or
'sectionalism' was based on strident confrontation in the defence of 'states' rights'.
In 1939, the 'equilibrium' sought by the federal arts projects, even if it had only
rarely been achieved, was finally surrendered to the 'sectionalist' claims of the
states.
Much of the stereotypical criticism of the federal arts projects refers primarily to the
period beginning in 1939 when they had ceased to be federally controlled. The
`hegemonic' critique of the arts projects (Harris 1987; Kidd 1988) belongs strictly
to this period of their existence. A notable feature of the Federal Art Project before
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1939 (in contrast with the Section) was its inclusiveness in style and content and its
failure to impose or construct a coherent collective ideology from the work of
individual artists and separate regional cultures. When Harris (1987) claims that the
Federal Art Project represented a hegemonic discourse, he is referring primarily to
murals in prisons and hospitals created after 1939. Harris suggests that the Federal
Art Project opposed modernist individualism and sought to use art as the
instrumental embodiment of the will of the State; the murals were "as much
concerned with 'civilising' the artist.., as with the return of the anti-social offender
to the National Community" (Harris 1987, 39). Thus "art becomes both a therapy
and a police tactic" (ibid., 42). However, this instrumentalism took place at the
local level after 1939, when state administrators could enjoy free rein over artists
without the counterbalancing influence of an effective federal directorate.
The repolarisation of the arts projects after 1939 into instruments of local
government policy, and the resurgence of anti-individualism, utilitarianism and
'states' rights' in New Deal cultural policy, followed a familiar hegemonic pattern.
The fundamental contradiction between culturalist / idealist and Marxist / utilitarian
conceptions of culture which had produced the federal arts projects in the first place
eventually re-erupted to destroy them. Where Flanagan and Cahill had sought an
'unstable equilibrium' between national and regional cultural identities and between
individual and collective expression, they had initially struggled against the
structural centralisation of Federal One and the ingrained individualism of their
colleagues. In time the balance of political power swung back from Washington to
the states, and the arts projects were swamped by the collective demands of state
governments and the utilitarian requirements of the war effort. In the end,
hegemony was based not on 'the Will of the State' but the wills of the states.
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3.8	 Crisis and equilibrium
Reviewing the material discussed in this chapter, it is possible to trace the
underlying pattern of contradiction, crisis and equilibrium noted in the introduction.
In concluding this chapter, I will review this historical pattern in relation to
Gramsci's theory of hegemony. I will also link the policies of the arts projects to
their contradictory origins in nineteenth century idealism and utilitarianism and to
the underlying contradiction between idealist and materialist conceptions of culture
which forms the theme of this study.
Holger Cahill and Hallie Flanagan recognised a moment of crisis in U.S. culture and
cultural policy which reflected the national economic crisis. The old system of
cultural production, in which an elite of individual artistic talents was brokered by
commercial entrepreneurs to a minority of middle class patrons, had failed both
economically and aesthetically. Accordingly Cahill and Flanagan sought a new
system of cultural production in which artists and communities worked together to
construct a grass-roots, indigenous American culture where both creativity and
consumption were rooted in collective experience.
In support of this vision, they invoked a 'usable past' of 'coherent' democratic
societies and harmonious, 'healthy' relationships between artist and community.
While Flanagan compared the intimacy and immediacy of the little theatre
movement and the workers' theatre with Broadway's boom and bust, Cahill
contrasted the Mexican muralist's 'art of native social meaning' and the 'unity' of
Pueblo culture, American folk art and Shaker craftsmanship with the American
artist's meretricious individualism and the American patron's 'hero-worship' of
imported masterpieces. Relating this tradition to the present 'crisis', Cahill
described "a turn towards a more democratic point of view". Over the past three
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hundred years art had "depended far more upon individual talent than upon tradition
or group activity", resulting in "an inclination towards extreme subjectivism and
over-personalised expression" in "the modern period". However this had changed
"in the last few years" (i.e. since the creation of the federal arts projects in 1935).
The solitary genius' monopoly on artistic production and the connoisseur's
monopoly on artistic consumption were now being challenged by a "broad
democratic participation in the creative experience" (O'Connor 1973, 35 - 36).
Fuelled by their vision of a 'usable past', Cahill and Flanagan anticipated and
idealised a new equilibrium between artist and community. They had inherited some
of the settlement worker's faith in the cohesiveness and rationality of 'community',
overlooking the vested interests and short term goals advanced by self-appointed
'representatives' and competing factions. They also trusted in the artist's
willingness to cooperate in the new experiment by surrendering a measure of control
over their work. Their optimism on both counts was challenged by the broader
political and ideological context of the arts projects, which ensured that the
equilibrium sought by Cahill and Flanagan would remain the stuff of nostalgia.
Politically, the arts projects were part of a federal work programme mandated to
employ accredited professionals from the relief rolls. This mandate reinforced the
professional status of the artist and undermined attempts to involve amateurs and
community groups; it also exacerbated the problem of metropolitan dominance and
rural under-provision, since projects were required to respond to local
unemployment conditions and the majority of unemployed artists were concentrated
in the major eastern cities, especially in New York. Administratively, the arts
projects had inherited the historic antagonism between Washington federalism and
militant state 'sectionalism'. While this antagonism dated back to the days of
colonial rule and the civil war, it had been exacerbated by Roosevelt's use of
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Presidential powers to push through New Deal reforms. Within the WPA,
Washington had encroached upon the authority of state administrators during the
introduction of white collar relief in the early 1930s and again with the appointment
of a separate federal directorate to the arts projects.
Ideologically, the arts projects had inherited two distinct cultural traditions from the
cultural and educational reformers of the nineteenth century. The first was the
artist-led `culturalist' tradition, in which artists were the unacknowledged and
unaccountable legislators of the community and great art was capable of
transcending social divisions and social problems, either by dissolving them in a
moment of 'uplift' or, more cynically, by excluding them from the canvas. This
was the tradition with which the majority of project artists and local project
managers were most familiar, schooled in the starry irrelevancies of Broadway
theatre and the 'art for art's sake' of the Old Masters. Ironically even some of the
avowedly 'committed' artists and 'Marxist' fellow-travellers belonged in this camp;
while they were attracted by the arts projects' warm glow of community and a
collective sense of political purpose, their primary concern was with their own
artistic vision and they resented the demands on their work made by party
spokespersons on behalf of 'the people'.
The other tradition inherited by the arts projects was the utilitarian tradition in which
art was no longer valued for it's own sake but as the means to a 'practical' end.
Among state administrators and local politicians the urgency of immediate social and
economic problems outweighed the artist's claim to a free hand. Thus instead of
encouraging artists to engage with communities, many administrators saw the arts
projects' 'usefulness' more pragmatically, as an opportunity to plug gaps in local
service provision. Anyone familiar with contemporary local government arts policy
will surely recognise this tendency. Local 'sponsors' and state politicians were
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abetted by the committed artist's instinct for self-sacrifice; the alienated
intellectual's self-destructive search for social usefulness in the 1930s replicated the
'subjective necessity' and the self-disgusted anti-cultmism of the nineteenth century
settlement worker.
Ideologically, the arts projects were forced to work through a contradiction between
cultural idealism and cultural utilitarianism inherited from nineteenth century
cultural institutions such as the settlement house. Politically they were constrained
by their status as a relief programme, the conflicting agendas of artists,
administrators, politicians and the public, and continuing tensions between
Washington and the states. Inevitably, the harmonious 'equilibrium' sought by
Cahill and Flanagan broke down in the face of these fundamental contradictions and
confrontations. The projects eventually reverted to the incurable contradiction with
which they had begun, between the complacent culturalism of unaccountable artists
and middle class patrons who continued to pursue their solitary visions even as the
surrounding edifice collapsed about them, and the crude utilitarianism of the state-
run 'community projects'. This repolarisation was played out in the respective
'decentralisation' policies of the Federal Theatre Project and the Federal Art Project.
'Cultural decentralisation' for both Flanagan and Cahill was concerned with
circumventing elite 'centres' of artistic production and consumption, in order to
release community creativity; like the `cultural regionalists' of the 1930s, they
sought a balance between regional and national cultural authority, not just a
redistribution of resources or of political decision-making. `Cultural
decentralisation' or 'regionalism' were only the means to the end of
'democratisation'. However, the federal arts projects were also forced to implement
political and geographical forms of decentralisation in order to defuse criticisms of
the cultural and political powers concentrated in New York and Washington. The
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Federal Theatre Project attempted (unsuccessfully) to decentralise resources while
retaining central political authority. The Federal Art Project attempted to
decentralise both resources and political authority to the states.
In both cases, the outcome undermined the broader policy objective of
democratisation, resulting in a reconcentration of cultural and political authority.
For the Federal Theatre Project, political centralisation reinforced the cultural
hegemony of the New York City Unit where a handful of producers ignored
Flanagan's search for new audiences in favour of their own ambitious production
plans (cf. Federal Theatre 1936). Instead they resolutely pursued a `culturalist'
agenda in which faith in the theatre outweighed Flanagan's insistence that "we are
part of the economic life of America, that we are one with the worker on the stage
and in the audience" and that "we are not a group of commercial managers but the
representatives of a People's Theatre" (Federal Theatre Project 1936). The attitudes
of the commercial theatre spread out from Broadway into the regions, reinforced by
the glamorous controversy of the New York City Unit.
For the Federal Art Project, political decentralisation through the 'cooperating
sponsor' strategy devolved authority to local politicians and administrators. After
1939 these political satellites spun out of federal control. Local sponsorship
provided leverage for board members and local politicians to impose their own ideas
and tastes on the projects, cutting out any possibility for interaction between artists
and communities. Under state control from 1939 to 1943, the federal leviathan was
replaced by the local machinery of self-serving politicians, businessmen and middle
class board members; unaccountable artists were replaced by accountability to
utilitarian bureaucrats and civic boosters.
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The polarisation between a New York based cultural leadership, refusing Flanagan's
demands for accountability, and a localised political leadership which replaced
Cahill's vague communitarianism with local service delivery, is reflected in two
stereotypical views of the arts projects' legacy. On one side, the period of state
control from 1939 has come to symbolise the suppression of individual talents
beneath crude utilitarianism and political expediency (eg. Harris 1995, Kidd 1988);
fears of political censorship and State control, rooted in the 1930s, would repeatedly
impede subsequent attempts to introduce federal arts funding in the U.S. (Larson
1983). On the other side the controversial productions of the New York City Unit
of the Federal Theatre Project represent the glamorous irresponsibility of great art,
flying in the face of incompetent political censors and crass administrators who fret
over equity, access, and production budgets; this was the stereotype of 'artistic
freedom' brokered by post-war U.S cultural diplomacy (Cockroft 1974). However
influential these stereotypes may have been on subsequent cultural policy, this
polarisation does not represent the real achievement of the arts projects.
What the arts projects achieved, if only fleetingly, was a recognition that individual
artistic freedom and collective accountability might not be for ever incompatible.
Between utilitarianism and culturalism, they opened the possibility of a third way, a
conception of culture neither wholly the product of individual inspiration, nor
wholly at the mercy of 'material forces', but the result of a continuing negotiation
between artists and communities. The conception depended on a delicate balance of
power between artists, administrators and audiences based on mutual trust and
mutual risk. In the face of by escalating political, ideological and administrative
confrontations, this balance would prove untenable and the projects would revert to
`culturalist' and 'utilitarian' stereotypes.
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In Gramsci's terms, the arts projects represented a moment of 'unstable
equilibrium', a temporary recasting of an incurable contradiction before old factions
and prejudices solidified into a new dialectic. As such they followed the same
process of contradiction, equilibrium and repolarisation as later experiments in
cultural democracy, from Britain in the 1970s to France in the early 1980s.
Inevitably the equilibrium sought by Cahill and Flanagan was not a permanent
structure but a continuing process, providing a fleeting glimpse of future
possibilities, a moment of crisis linking the contradictions of nineteenth century
cultural policy with the twentieth century search for cultural democracy.
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4. MEDIA ACCESS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: THE MOMENT OF
MEDIA REFORM 1965 - 1990
In the last two chapters I considered two historical 'moments' of contradiction crisis
in cultural policy. In this chapter I am returning to more recent dilemmas in cultural
policy and to the theoretical debates outlined in the introduction, now transferred to
the battleground of contemporary media studies. Having viewed the contradictions
between idealist and materialist conceptions of culture from both sides in the
previous two chapters, I will now attempt to move towards some form of synthesis.
In the nineteenth century settlement house, an initially `culturalist' attempt to reform
individual 'character' through exposure to Arnoldian culture was contradicted by
residual utilitarian tendencies and internalised 'subjective' conflicts. In the federal
arts projects, a 'materialist' attempt to base cultural policy on the collective
experience of 'community' was contradicted by residual culturalist 'habits of
thought' and administrative structures. In recent media policy and media theory,
elements of these patterns are repeated. What is new is an attempt to reconcile
competing conceptions of 'culture' and 'community' within a new framework,
drawing on Habermas's concept of the 'public sphere' and on 'public interest'
models of media access. I will suggest that the 'public sphere' offers a more precise
and more flexible means of accommodating competing idealist and materialist
conceptions than the vocabulary of 'culture' and 'community'. Perhaps inevitably
this reconciliation is initially more convincing on a theoretical than on a practical
level, but I will close with some tentative suggestions of possible implications of this
new theoretical framework for media policy and practice.
169/
4.1 Hegemony and Contradiction
The media access movement, like the British community arts movement, was closely
linked to the theoretical critique of 'cultural hegemony' undertaken by the left in the
late 1960s. To summarise the arguments discussed in chapter 1, the method of the
tegemonic critique' deployed by the activists was to apply a 'materialist' view of
culture (culture as determined by material economic interests and social forces) to an
'idealist' cultural policy or institution (culture as a collective aspiration to a general
perfection or 'common good'). This tegemonic critique' was based on a simplistic
distortion of Gramscian theory, 'reducing Gramsci's 'unstable equilibrium' of
competing and contradictory social forces to a monolithic 'bloc' representing the
class interests of the dominant or ruling class.
Out of this tegemonic critique' emerged a strategy which confused ends with
means, concentrating on the reform of media structures (dismantling the 'power
bloc' of monopoly / duopoly broadcasting) without considering the longer term
problem of its replacement. The strategy was based on the revolutionary optimism
of Marxist determinism; once structures of domination were somehow 'abolished',
the liberalisation of the media and the liberation of the people would automatically
follow. Of course neither Gramsci nor the majority of Marxists (including Marx?)
would subscribe to such a straightforward analysis. The problem of hegemony,
according to Gramsci, was more complex. The failure of media reform to deliver
the promised liberalisation and liberation was proof of that resilient complexity
Gramsci had expounded in relation to previous revolutionary 'failures'.
Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is rooted in contradiction. The apparently
monolithic structure of British and U.S. broadcasting in the late 1950s and early
1960s was the product of an internal contradiction between conflicting ideas about
170/
the purpose of broadcasting and of broadcasting policy. It was this internal
contradiction which the opponents of the BBC and the networks set out to exploit, in
a classic counter-hegemonic strategy. However, their own agenda was fraught with
precisely the same contradictions; accordingly they did not resolve these
contradictions, they simply rearranged them in a different form. Behind the mutual
name-calling, the established broadcasters and their reformist adversaries shared a
similar problem of reconciling contradictory 'idealist' and 'Marxist' conceptions of
culture and cultural policy.
In Europe the tendency of broadcasting reform in the 1970s and early 1980s was
towards liberalisation, decentralisation and deregulation. The tendency in the 1980s
and 1990s has been towards reregulation, transnational protectionism and a
rearguard defence of previously discredited state interventionism, now translated
from the national level to trans-frontier directives and conventions or local
government initiatives. The terms of the media access debate have shifted once
again from private rights to the public interest. However, the 'fundamental
contradiction' between two versions of access, two versions of broadcasting policy
and two conceptions of culture remains.
In this chapter I will begin by considering the underlying contradictions of media
access. These contradictions can be traced back to some of the dilemmas noted in
previous 'moments' of cultural reform, including the 'democratising' cultural
institutions of the nineteenth century and the New Deal. First I will briefly chart the
'determinist' and `culturalist' strands of media studies which provide the theoretical
background to the media access debate. I will argue that these two intellectual
traditions can be related to two opposing traditions of broadcasting policy, and that
these two traditions can be traced as an underlying contradiction in British and U.S.
broadcasting policy. The same contradiction has also informed the media access
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movement; I will argue that the argument for media access takes two principal
forms, one based on 'private rights' and derived from an eighteenth century
Enlightenment / liberal tradition, the other based on 'public good', drawing on a
tradition of nineteenth century institutional paternalism. Finally I will consider how
these competing arguments might be applied to contemporary problems of
democracy and media policy, especially to the 1990s model for media access, the
creation of a 'public sphere'.
4.2 Theoretical Background: Bringing the Audience Back In
This section, in reviewing the recent history of media studies, traces conflicts
between `culturalist' and 'determinist' schools of thought similar to those noted in
the introduction. I will argue that `culturalist' assumptions have emerged as the
dominant paradigm in recent media studies, resulting in a dangerously complacent
attitude to the ideological effects and political economy of the media industry.
Theories of media effects can be divided into two broad categories (Morley 1989,
Katz 1987, Fejes 1984). One tradition has been concerned with the ideological
effects of the mass media on society, and in turn with the effects of social and
economic forces on the media. Researchers working within this tradition have
emphasised to varying degrees the causal relationships between conditions of
production, distribution and reception of media messages; this tradition, variously
labelled as the '(ideological) effects', 'critical' or 'mass media' school, has been
likened to a 'hypodermic' model of media influence (Morley 1989, 16). The terms
of analysis are generic, with media producers and consumers treated as generalised
categories within a structural pattern, not as isolated phenomena. This level of
abstraction and the emphasis on 'determination' are the product of more or less
sophisticated variants on the Marxist theory of 'base' and `superstructure'; in most
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cases, the researcher is more interested in the economic, social and ideological
dimensions of media effects than in the detail of particular case studies.
The other school of media researchers has taken the particular effects of programmes
on individual viewers or listeners as its starting point, beginning with the
behaviourist research into the effects of media campaigns on voting behaviour
conducted by Paul Lazardsfeld in the U.S. in the 1940s; researchers in this tradition
have tended to focus on the reception of media messages rather than the means of
production. In discovering the multitudinous ways in which the media are 'used' or
'negotiated' by consumers, researchers have suggested that the media have only
'limited effects' on audience behaviour. Researchers associated with this view have
been variously categorised as belonging to 'the uses and gratifications school', the
'model of limited effects' or the 'behaviourist' tradition.
In the 1920s Walter Lippmann (1922) led the polemical attack on the new electronic
'mass media' and their damaging effect on public opinion. Historically, the first
wave of media research in the 1940s and 1950s set out to challenge these predictions
using techniques of market research. According to Lazardsfeld's 'two-step flow'
model of media effects, the influence of local networks and opinion leaders was
more significant than media campaigns in the formation of public opinion (Katz
1987, 25 - 27; Peters 1989, 214 - 215). From the 1960s onwards 'critical'
researchers, drawing on a European tradition of 'critical thinking' influenced by
Adorn°, Marx and Gramsci, challenged what had come to be known in the U.S. as
the 'dominant paradigm'; in particular they charged that Lazardsfeld's research had
resulted in a dangerously complacent view of powerful media institutions, stemming
from a methodology which focussed on the micro-effects of consumer choice, which
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in turn reflected a convergence between corporate-funded 'administrative research'
and the marketing needs of the industry (Gitlin 1978)76.
By the late 1970s the new 'critical' tradition had replaced the 'model of limited
effects' as the dominant theoretical paradigm (Fejes 1984); the pattern was
consistent with the previously noted theoretical emphasis on 'hegemony' in cultural
studies during the same period. Here media institutions were placed in the broader
context of social power structures. Instead of studying the micro-effects of
programmes and campaigns on individual viewers, 'critical' researchers pointed to
the containing framework of the media, especially in the reporting of news on
television (Gitlin 1980; Kellner 1990); the macro-effect of the media was towards
ideological containment and control within a framework flexible enough to
accommodate smaller cross-currents of dissent and diversity. Some internalised
resistance was in fact a welcome component of media hegemony since it gave the
impression of high-minded neutrality (Kellner 1990, 96); however, other forms of
dissent, those which genuinely threatened radical social change, remained beyond
the pale and could only be accommodated once they had been neutralised and
reassembled according to the professional and political codes of the media
institutions (Gitlin 1980, 249 - 282). The focus on the 'framing' devices of
television news in the new media criticism highlighted the media's agenda-setting
function. In Elihu Katz's neat summary, the critical school described media effects
in terms of their inertia rather than their dynamic (and therefore measurable)
impacts; instead of telling us what to think, the media tell us "what not to think or
what not to think about" (Katz 1987, 31).
76 Some of these limitations were acknowledged by Lazardsfeld and Katz in their original
research; however, these concessions were mostly consigned to their footnotes (Gitlin 1978, 211 -
212).
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In fact the new 'critical' tradition was capable of a more subtle, nuanced reading of
media effects than was acknowledged by some of its opponents; this was not simply
a return to the old simplicities of 'mass society' and the Orwellian nightmare of the
mass media. Nor did the new tradition simply paste in the word 'society' and
'media' into Marx's theory of 'base' and 'superstructure'. In perhaps the most
definitive statement of the new direction in media studies, Stuart Hall (1980a)
described the processes of 'encoding' and 'decoding' which connected the social
structure (Hall's "social and economic relations") to the production of media
messages, their circulation by media institutions, their use by audiences
('distribution and consumption') and their 'reproduction' in the experience of the
viewer / listener. Hall described these four stages as 'relatively autonomous'; in
other words, there was no direct correlation between each component, but nor were
they entirely disconnected. The ideas of the audience were not 'determined' by the
media, nor were the media 'determined' by structures of dominance in society;
however, there was a 'preferred reading' contained in the text which reflected a
'dominant social order' and which in turn would be reflected in "significant
clusterings" in the ways audiences decoded media messages, across the individual
variants. This 'preferred reading', Hall implied, was related to social class.
What Hall achieved here, as he had done in cultural studies (Hall 1980b), was a
skilful balancing act between Marxist and non-Marxist forms of analysis. Into the
pattern of 'determinate moments', Hall introduced the idea of `polysemy', a concept
drawn from linguistics; language contained literal meanings ('denotations') and
associative aspects ('connotations'), such that language became a site of struggle
over contested meanings. However, Hall insisted that `polysemy' in this case did
not mean `pluralism'; some meanings were more equal than others, and in this way
certain 'privileged' messages could be channelled through the media. By loosening
the limits of Marxist 'determination' without breaking them, Hall was able to
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rehabilitate the discredited Marxist categories of class in the lexicon of media
studies, but at a price. Just as he had in cultural studies, by emphasising the
'relative autonomy' of language, ideas and culture, Hall opened a Pandora's box of
new theoretical terms; the new critical theory would polarise between those who felt
Hall had not gone far enough towards a `semiological' model and those who still
clung to the certainties of determinate effects and the stable categories of class.
Within the 'critical' tradition of media studies a new split would emerge between the
groups I have previously referred to as 'new determinists' and 'new culturalists'.
According to his critics there were two problems with the 'encoding' side of Hall's
model (Wren-Lewis 1983). Firstly, 'encoding' implies a faceless elite exploiting the
media and the media audience to serve its own interests; yet the nature of these
interests remains abstract and indistinct and the intentions of 'dominant elites' are
not adequately explained. Secondly the model is based on a "prestructural
meaning" which exists outside the text and is channelled through television as a
'preferred reading'; the reduction of television to a secondary, instrumental agency
ignores the range of meanings made available to the audience by television itself and
by the unpredictable relationship between programmes, viewers and their individual
experience. The 'preferred reading' might not exist outside the mind of the critic.
Instead of basing media studies on the 'real' world of class relations existing outside
the text, 'audience theory' pursued meanings embedded in the text or 'discourse' of
television. For the audience, these meanings were no less real because they did not
conform to the structure of Hall's 'preferred reading'. Accordingly attention moved
from 'encoding' to 'decoding'. Here the new media studies divided between the
camps of the new determinists and the new culturalists. Both referred to television
programming as a self-sufficient text or discourse, to be analysed using terms
derived from literary theory; both were unashamedly 'post-Marxist'.
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The new determinists drew on structuralist and psychoanalytic theory to describe the
"positioning of the subject by the text" (Morley 1989, 19 - 22). The viewer's
experience was indeed determined, not in the Marxist sense of base determining
superstructure, but in the Althusserian sense of an ideological state apparatus
inscribed in language which `interpellates the subject', assigning roles and meanings
(Althusser 1970). This method of analysis was closely related to the development of
film theory associated with Screen in the late 1970s and 1980s. As Morley points
out, the new determinists did not take into account the socially specific situations of
audiences; for television audiences, the circumstances of viewing were even more
various and unpredictable than in the relatively controlled environment of the
cinema. Moreover the analysis was pitched at a level of abstraction which disguised
its roots in crude determinism. Determinism had now cut loose from Hall's residual
Marxism and the `intentionalist fallacy'; audiences were being 'determined' or
`interpellatecl' but it was not clear by whom or for what purpose. The new
determinists revived the 'hypodermic' model of media effects but nobody was
holding the syringe.
The new culturalists moved in the opposite direction. Again the television text was
cut loose from the authorial intentions of its 'encoders'. This time the emphasis was
on the multifarious 'uses' of television by audiences and the infinite variety of
readings negotiated between audience and text. Whereas the Screen critics had used
a closed form of textual analysis, the new culturalist criticism stressed the openness
of television texts. This openness was partly a property of the text itself and partly
in the experience of television viewing. Finding against entrenched fears of
American cultural imperialism in their study of the American soap opera Dallas,
Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz (1990) stressed the open-ended quality of U.S. popular
culture; the success of Dallas, they argued, lay not in its recreation of a mythical
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American dreamworld but in its ability to strike a chord of recognition with very
different audiences using familiar, archetypal narrative structures and devices.
Accordingly the different focus groups they interviewed had very different
interpretations of the programme, based on their own ethnic and familial traditions;
the use of focus groups was itself a signal of the new research's emphasis on the
details and differences of audience perception. David Morley would concur with the
'open' version of U.S. popular culture described by Liebes and Katz, suggesting that
it provides "a space in which oppositional meanings (in relation to dominant
traditions of British culture) could be negotiated and expressed" (Morley 1989, 33);
for British audiences, part of the liberating 'openness' of U.S. popular culture may
have derived not so much from its archetypal 'universality' as from its exotic
foreignness and the absence of familiar norms.
Other culturalist critics pointed to the 'messy' experience of television viewing as a
means whereby audiences could 'subvert' the dominant messages of the media.
Television viewing, according to Ten Ang (1991), cannot be separated from the
"social world of actual audiences" which includes not only different social contexts
but also the different activities which accompany or distract from television viewing,
different levels of involvement and interest and different social roles played by the
viewer. The very idea of a 'television audience' may be a misnomer, so entangled
is the experience of television viewing with other activities and experiences. Media
research must accordingly move towards an "ethnographic" perspective which uses a
far more sophisticated and complex set of categories, beyond the relative certainties
of class and culture (Ang 1991, 164).
The culturalist slant on media studies was partly a result of 'critical' researchers of
the early 1980s beginning to channel their abstract structural analysis of media
effects into specific audience studies. Again the emphasis on open-ended texts and
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audience contexts was influenced by literary theory; Stanley Fish's description of
'interpretive communities' (Fish 1980) revived Lazardsfeld's 'two-step flow' model,
emphasising horizontal connections between readers / viewers and individual
elements within a literary or media 'text'. These horizontal connections subverted
the top-down vertical flow of messages from mass broadcaster to mass audience.
For some critics, associated with Hall and the Birmingham Centre for Cultural
Studies, the interpretive community was a post-Marxist reflection of the traditional
Marxist categories of class; thus working class television viewers and other
oppressed groups could create 'oppositional' readings which subverted the dominant
codes inscribed in the text by dominant institutions and elite groups (Willis 1990,
Hebdige 1979, Morley 1989). By the late 1980s and 1990s, the residual Marxist
language had been laid to rest and replaced by the more fluid categories of
'ethnography' (Ang 1991, 155 - 165; Silverstone 1990, 178 - 186); it is significant
that Liebes and Katz (1990) based their study of audience readings of 'Dallas' on
ethnic, gender and family roles rather than setting up 'class' based focus groups as
Morley had done with British television viewers ten years earlier. The new studies
also tended to be more concerned with the range of audience responses to television
fiction rather than the more overtly political effects of television news.
A further strand in the new `culturalise media studies was the emphasis on the new
technological possibilities for audience autonomy. Use of such devices as the VCR
for time-delayed viewing and fast-forwarding and the remote control for 'zapping'
and 'surfing', together with the expansion of available television channels, appeared
to give viewers greater control over how they watched, even though what they
watched was still framed by the choices made available to them by broadcasters. As
Ang indicates, for broadcasters, programmers and advertisers, these new
technological tactics of television viewing resulted in a crisis of control, played out
in increasingly desperate attempts to monitor and measure audience behaviour in the
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early 1980s (Ang 1991, 68 - 77). Viewing figures had been reduced to comforting
statistics which bore little relation to the reality of audience attention; since U.S.
broadcasting depended on the sale of audiences to advertisers, the inability to
measure this commodity accurately was profoundly worrying. Ang's suggestion that
'television audience' is an essentially 'fictive' construction (i.e. not fictional in the
sense of 'made up' but disconnected from any known or knowable reality) also
threatens the whole basis of media policy (Ang 1991, 167 - 169).
By the 1990s the audience, left out of the 'critical' school of media studies in the
early 1980s according to Fred Fejes, has emphatically taken centre stage. For the
new determinists, while television 'texts' impose structural limitations on audience
response, the boundaries are in the mind of the viewer, not in the 'codes' of
broadcasters or the social structure. For the new culturalists, audiences have
effectively been liberated from 'media effects'; according to a few like Paul Willis
and John Fiske, they have also cut loose from the residual categories and structural
determinations of social class, free to play multiple roles and to manufacture
meanings out of thin air. Taken to its postmodernist extreme, the new culturalism
sees television consumption as a liberating experience, a kind of psychodrama in
which viewers can switch roles as easily as they switch channels, creating their own
subversive subcultures out of the messy convergence between television and
everyday life.
While an older generation of commentators continues to emphasise the 'political
economy' of the television industry (Bagdildan, Schiller, Hermann & Chomslcy), the
'new determinists' have tended to cast doubt on any direct correlation between the
political interests of media owners and the 'encoding' of media messages 77 . In what
77 Of course the 'hypodermic' model of media effects is not dead; aside from Marxist academic
commentators, the model continues to be popular with politicians and religious groups, as illustrated
in the recent debate over the 1996 Communications Decency Act in the U.S.. However, if it is
possible to describe changes in fashion in academic circles, then I would argue that the 'hypodermic'
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is left of the older 'critical' tradition of media studies, the maintenance of hegemony
has been reduced to a vague agenda-setting function which operates through self-
censorship and hidden boundaries; 'encoding' is virtually undetectable and the
boundaries of the media 'frame' are so broad and accommodating it seems churlish
to complain of 'dominant social structures' and the interests of 'dominant elites'.
Most academic and industry commentators in any case appear more interested in
audience decoding than in the encoding of class interests, focussing on conditions of
consumption rather than conditions of production. In discussions of media
consumption references to the unfashionable topic of social class are relatively
unusual, a fading residue of the old critical tradition (Murdock & Golding 1989;
Garnham 1983, 17 - 20). Broadcasting policy-makers likewise tend to avoid
discussions of class; the industry myth of 'consumer sovereignty' echoes the
technological optimism of Paul Willis and the 'audience liberation' theory of John
Fiske, portraying consumers as classless individuals making choices in an ever-
expanding global supermarket.
Clearly there is a danger here of complacency. If television viewers have really
been liberated from media effects it does not matter greatly what they watch;
questions of quality and diversity in broadcasting policy no longer apply because
these categories can be created by audiences themselves out of the most unpromising
materials through a variety of 'playful' practices and 'subversive' readings. At this
point we can now turn to consider the broader implications of these theoretical ideas
about media effects and audience liberation for broadcasting policy.
model is decidedly unfashionable while the discourse of structuralist, postmodernist and post-Marxist
analysis is academically 'hip'. Such changes in fashion are of course related to other trends outside
academia - the rise of consumerism, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and, not least, the
pervasive influence of market-based, deregulated media.
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4.3	 Broadcasting policy in Britain and the U.S. 1925 - 1965: two paradigms
In the previous section two theoretical traditions were traced in media studies. The
'determinist' tradition has followed a line from the 'mass society' critics such as
Walter Lippmann in the 1920s through the 'critical' tradition of the 1960s and 1970s
to the new determinists of Screen and the critics of the 'political economy' of media
ownership and class inequalities among audiences in the 1980s and 1990s. In
varying degrees this tradition insists that the media have determinate effects on
audiences and that these effects are inscribed in the dominant social structure of
economic relations between classes. The `culturalist' tradition began with the model
of 'limited effects' and the behaviourist emphasis in U.S. media research in the
1940s and 1950s, then was temporarily displaced by the critical tradition in the
1960s and 1970s before regaining the ascendancy in the late 1980s with the growing
emphasis on audience theory and the `postmodernist' celebration of cultural
consumption. This tradition minimises the cause and effect of media institutions,
concentrating on the radical possibilities for audience 'resistance', 'symbolic
creativity' and 'consumer sovereignty'. In this section, these two critical traditions
will be related to two opposing paradigms in broadcasting policy.
The 'determinist' tradition implies that the public is extremely vulnerable to the
power of the media, and that the media are extremely vulnerable to the economic
imperatives of capitalism. Accordingly, the best way to defend the public from
pervasive 'media effects' is to establish a protected system of public broadcasting in
which non-economic, cultural objectives can be promoted, safe from the imperatives
of economic materialism which form the 'base' of Marxist analysis. This is the
position persuasively argued by Nicholas Garnham (1983), justifying the need for a
public service broadcasting system on the basis of a Marxist analysis of the cultural
industries; unfortunately, as Garnham readily admits, the existing British system of
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public broadcasting has failed to meet this need, becoming itself part of the
'dominant structure' from which it was intended to be a protection. This failure
begs the question of the possibility of removing broadcasting from the determinate
conditions of capitalist economics; I will return to this question below.
The `culturalist' tradition meanwhile implies that the public is perfectly able to look
after itself in the media marketplace. The only condition here is that there should be
a sufficient variety of material which is sufficiently 'open' to allow all the
possibilities of consumer choice, 'oppositional' readings and playful negotiation of
meanings to come into play. This is the model of the 'marketplace for ideas' in
which culture is treated as a commodity like any other; the system is driven by
consumer choice, provided of course that the consumers (not the advertisers, the
media owners or a powerful minority of consumers) are in a position to make those
choices. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the American economist Ronald Coase,
such a perfect market has yet to be created, and the current system routinely fails to
meet consumer demand (Coase 1974).
Superficially these two 'ideal types' of broadcasting system appear to correspond
with the broadcasting systems of the British BBC and the U.S. 'free market'
respectively. However, the critiques of the 'public service' and 'market of ideas'
model advanced by Garnham and Coase respectively indicate that theoretical
possibilities have not been translated into institutional reality; for all practical
purposes, neither the 'public service' model nor the 'free market of ideas' actually
exists. Both models rest upon a particular ideal of the audience which does not
correspond with what Ien Ang calls 'the social world of actual audiences'.
According to Ang, where commercial broadcasters have constructed 'the audience-
as-market', public service broadcasters have constructed 'the audience-as-public';
Ang suggests that both these categories are simplistic aggregates designed to foster
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an 'institutional point of view' of the television audience as an objectified category
to be controlled and 'conquered', smoothing out ('streamlining') the unpredictable
patterns of actual audience behaviour into a "fictional abstraction" (Ang 1991, 26 -
41).
If we apply this theory to the historical development of broadcasting policy in
Britain and the United States, we can see the respective 'ideal types' of broadcasting
and audience in each country being counterposed and compromised. Within each
country there has been a continuing tension between different views of the audience,
pulling broadcasting policy in opposite directions; the tension between the
broadcaster's idealised 'construction' of the audience described by Ang and the
realpolitik of broadcasting policy in response to conflicting demands is the source of
a fundamental contradiction, between the theory or rhetoric of broadcasters and their
practice. When stretched too far, this contradiction opened out into overt conflict,
allowing a point of entry for the radical media reformers of the 1970s and 1980s.
British broadcasting policy was initially premised on a 'collective' model of a
unitary, national audience. The primary justification for the BBC's broadcasting
monopoly, aside from initial concerns with economic protectionism and technical
efficiency, was the maintenance of a unified, 'comprehensive' service across the
whole country. The collectivisation of the audience corresponded with a cultural
idealism in programming. The BBC continued the nineteenth century traditions of
cultural idealism and liberal education described in chapter 2, running through
Oxford and Cambridge university extension, the public libraries, the settlement
house and the adult and worker education movements. This tradition was best
represented by John Reith, whose concern with 'improving' popular taste and
striving towards a general perfection based on best selves ('needs', rather than
'wants') marked him as the intellectual descendent of Matthew Arnold. However,
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like earlier cultural institutions, the BBC was also pulled in the opposite direction
both by external competition and by other more utilitarian factions within the
institutional hierarchy (especially politicians and their appointees), who saw the
objectives of the BBC in more instrumental terms, as for example the maintenance
of social stability, the defence of national economic interests or the upholding of
national morale in wartime.
From the outset, the BBC was forced to contend with external competition; foreign
commercial broadcasters, supported by British sponsors, began beaming English
language programming from France in the late 1920s, and the relay exchange
operators of the 1930s in turn wired these non-BBC programmes to local audiences,
challenging the BBC programming monopoly (Coase 1950, 69 - 123). This
combination of foreign and domestic competition intensified with the licensing of
independent television in 1955 and independent commercial radio in 1973, followed
by the inexorable rise of satellite and cable broadcasting in the late 1970s and 1980s
and, more recently, the enhanced communications made possible through telephony
and computing. However, competition in some form has been a factor in BBC
policy from the start.
Internally, Reith's high-minded vision of a common national interest was challenged
by political conflict and consumer demand. During the General Strike of 1926,
despite Reith's refusal to turn the BBC into an instrument of government
propaganda, the BBC's 'neutrality' was nevertheless perceived by the trade union
movement as a form of pro-government bias (Briggs 1985, 96 - 106). In the 1930s,
the BBC's version of a common national culture was criticised for imposing middle-
class, metropolitan 'standards' on an audience who, according to the audience
surveys, wanted that 'culture' extended to include more popular programming
including jazz, dance music and comedy.
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The BBC responded to conflicting internal demands and external competition by
diversifying its services. At first diversification was seen as a purely geographical
issue, with the creation of secondary 'regional' services in the 1930s. The BBC's
'Regional Scheme', offered listeners a choice between national and regional
programmes; however, regional broadcasters remained the poor relations of the
national service and were in turn a poor substitute for genuine local broadcasting,
eliding local interests and aspirations into crude regional aggregates (`the North',
`Scotland'). Unlike Peter Eckersley, the architect of the regional scheme, Reith saw
regional broadcasting as an inferior supplement to the national programme (Briggs
1985, 131 - 138). Successive broadcasting committee reports (Beveridge 1949 157 -
161; Pilldngton 1962, 224 - 231; Annan 1977, 205 - 210) convey the impression
that the BBC was dragged reluctantly towards a limited devolution and
decentralisation of services while doing its best to maintain the central control on
which the principles of universal, comprehensive service depended.
The next stage in diversification away from Reith's 'universal' standard was the
development of separate programming strands with the introduction of the Light and
Third programmes in 1945 and 1946 respectively. The move from a single
'national' service to a three tier service (Home, Third, Light) was famously
justified by Reith's successor, William Haley, as a "cultural pyramid slowly aspiring
upwards" (Ang 1991, 113), with audiences graduating from easy listening to
highbrow culture; of course this residual idealism disguised an important
concession, acknowledging the class-based stratifications and differences of taste
within what had previously been constructed as a unitary national audience. For this
reason, according to Paddy Scannell, the new structure represented a "fundamental
betrayal" of Reith (Scannell 1989, 138). Other concessions confirmed the shift
away from cultural idealism to a more instrumental form of 'public service'. In the
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early 1960s, Hugh Greene (BBC Director-General from 1960 to 1969) redefined
'public service' to mean a reflection of social diversity, not the aspiration to lead
different publics towards a single 'common culture' (Ang 1991, 115 - 118);
Greene's 'mirror' held up to the audience had replaced Reith's concept of the BBC
as a national 'church'. With the establishment of BBC2 and Radio 1 in the 1960s,
the BBC's old tradition of cultural idealism was tempered by a new pragmatism.
Like the movement towards decentralisation, diversification appeared to be a gradual
sequence of concessions driven by external competition, rather than a direct
recognition of the diversity and complexity of audience demand; to the BBC's
critics, some of the concessions appeared merely tactical or cosmetic. Moreover,
despite the collapse of 'universal' programming and the unitary audience, some of
the aspirational, educational ethos of cultural idealism has survived78.
The changing definition of 'public service' from Reith to Greene reflects the move
from a 'normative', idealist view of the the audience towards a pragmatic acceptance
of pluralism. Even before Reith's departure in 1938, missionary cultural idealism
was tempered by forays into populist programming, politically expedient
subservience to government and a (strictly limited) devolution of power to the
regions. As in the cultural institutions of the nineteenth century, the idealist mission
was challenged by external competition and internal dissent; institutional policy was
based on a coalition of interests, despite Reith's personal charisma and will. Thus
Reith's Arnoldian concept of broadcasting as a common good which would satisfy
the aspirations of all but the tastes of only an educated few (Reith's 'minorities' or
Arnold's 'aliens') was challenged by a materialist concept of culture as growing out
of everyday life. During the war this materialist, populist approach gained the
ascendancy as the BBC, along with other cultural institutions (ENSA, Workers'
78 The Reithian attempt to lead and test the limits of popular taste survives not just in Radio 3's
uncompromising classical music schedule or BBC programming for schools, but in Radio l's mix of
mainstream pop culture with more 'serious' talk-based programming and 'challenging' alternative
music offerings.
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Playtime), sacrificed high moral seriousness to the immediate need to entertain the
troops and boost civilian morale; the Forces Programme of 1940 (as popular with
the civilian population as it was with the Forces) was the direct antecedent of the
Light Programme of 1945. While this materialist, 'representative' definition of the
'public interest' as the product of consumer demand gained ground through the
1950s and 1960s, it worth reiterating that Reith's cultural idealism was from the
beginning necessarily compromised. Within the BBC, the meaning of 'public
interest' broadcasting was always a contested issue; idealist and materialist
conceptions of culture overlapped and interlocked.
In the U.S., broadcasting policy moved in the opposite direction, sacrificing its
founding principles of pluralism for a collective view of the 'mass' audience and
mass broadcasting, based on the commercial imperatives of mass marketing on the
one hand and the moral protectionism of government regulation on the other. If
BBC paternalism can be traced back to nineteenth century theories of moral
education, based on controlling and manipulating the 'improving' and 'antisocial'
influences on individual 'character', U.S. broadcasting policy had its origins in
eighteenth century ideals of citizenship and press freedom, rooted in the mythology
of the American Revolution. Central to this mythology was the idea that American
democracy was born out of a free-thinking citizenry sustained by a libertarian 'free
press' (Buel 1980). U.S. broadcasting policy in the 1920s was essentially a
nostalgic and romantic attempt to recreate the 'marketplace for ideas' which had
supposedly grown out of the expansion of the 'free' printing press in the eighteenth
century. The historical and theoretical inconsistencies of this 'free press' mythology
will be considered in the next section. At this stage I want to examine how the U.S.
system of broadcasting, like the BBC, began with a particular, idealised construction
of its audience, only to compromise that model in the opposite direction in response
to external and internal pressures.
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While the 1927 Radio Act and the subsequent jurisprudence emphasised the primacy
of 'the public interest, convenience and necessity' in U.S. broadcasting policy79 , the
system was premised on a belief that the public interest was best served through
private competition. Accordingly, the primary objective in U.S. broadcasting policy
has been to ensure that the 'marketplace for ideas' operates in a way that is free and
fair. Producers and consumers have individual rights and responsibilities which can
be tested in the courts; a large part of U.S. broadcasting policy has thus been
handed down in rulings by the Supreme and Federal Courts, rather than in the often
vague legislation passed by Congress or the often ineffective regulations issued by
the Federal Communications Commission. The model of the 'marketplace of ideas'
makes a number of questionable assumptions about the interchangeability of material
and cultural goods, the inevitable triumph of 'truth' in a 'free and fair encounter'
and the correspondence between competing private interests and the greater public
good. Above all it is premised on a highly individualised contract between
producers (broadcasters) and consumers (audiences) and on the 'rationality' of
consumer choice.
The 'marketplace of ideas' assumes firstly that the broadcasting contract is made
between individual 'sovereign' consumers and producers. Secondly it assumes that
consumers are able and permitted to make rational choices from a variety of
competing services. Both these assumptions were called into question by the
economics of commercial broadcasting in the U.S. and the politics of federal
79 In sections 301 and 309 of the 1934 Communications Act the Federal Communications
Commission ( in the 1927 Act, the Federal Radio Commission) is mandated to regulate and license
broadcasting according to "the public interest, convenience and necessity" (Kahn 1973, pp. 64, 73).
In the absence of any clear guidance from Congress, the FRC / FCC opted for an expansive
interpretation of this phrase which encompassed not merely technical considerations, but also the
'common good' of the listening public. This expanded brief was upheld in a series of landmark court
cases in 1928 and 1929 (Kahn 1973, 127 - 129), confirming that 'public interest' referred to the
public information rights of the listener, not the public speech rights of the broadcaster. This
'affirmative' interpretation formed the legal framework for future broadcast regulation and for legal
challenges against broadcast licensees in the 1960s.
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regulation. Because commercial broadcasting is financially dependent on selling
audiences to advertisers, U.S. broadcasters were forced to accept the advertiser's
aggregation of individual consumers as collective markets. According to this
perspective, individual consumer choice is less important than collective market
demand and certain demographic groups are more valuable than others; as
Bagdilcian notes, there remains a large 'unwanted American population' which falls
outside the advertisers' prime demographic, including in 1984 70% of all black
families and 64% of all Hispanic families in the U.S. (Bagdikian 1990, 199 - 200).
It can be assumed that the 'consumer sovereignty' of these particular consumers is
strictly limited.
In the formative years of U.S. broadcasting during the 1930s and 1940s, growth of
the industry was linked with the expansion of 'mass' advertising and the boom in
mass produced 'generic' products such as soap, bleach and medicines (Bagdikian
1990, 141 - 148). These products were not designed to fill a niche market or to
meet specific consumer needs, and profitability depended on aggressive mass
marketing and nationwide distribution. Accordingly broadcasting, with its larger
audience reach and simultaneous reception, offered substantial advantages for
advertisers over more localised press advertising. Interrupted by the depression of
the 1930s and the second world war, the symbiotic relationship between commercial
broadcasting chains and the expanding national market for generic consumer goods
continued into broadcasting's 'golden age' in the 1950s. Early U.S. broadcasters
were thus encouraged to abandon specialised, distinctive programmes for generic
programming and to replace local communities of interest with regional advertising
markets.
The trend towards `massification' was also driven by the high capital costs for new
entrants to the broadcasting industry. In what would later become standard industry
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practice in the deregulated European broadcasting market of the 1980s, local stations
joined forces in order to share costs, technical and programming resources, and
combined to maximise advertiser income from the more lucrative regional and
national markets. Thus began the aggressive corporate empire-building known as
network 'affiliation', making a mockery of the nominally 'local', 'pluralistic'
structure of U.S. broadcasting. Between 1927 and 1931 the percentage of NBC
and CBS affiliated stations rose from 6% to 30%; taking into account hours and
level of power, the actual percentage of broadcasting controlled by the networks was
somewhere between 50 and 70% (Engelman 1996, 25; Leduc 1982, 166).
Television would later develop along the same trajectory, with 95% of 'local'
television stations affiliated to the networks by 1957. What had begun in the 1920s
as an individualised model of producers and consumers, the mythical 'marketplace
of ideas', had instead combined individual radio stations as network affiliates and
aggregated individual listeners, local communities and special interests groups as
mass advertising markets.
There is a danger in describing these economic pressures towards centralisation and
`massification' that we neglect the influence of official policy; such an
interpretation succumbs to a crude (Marxist) economic determinism. A number of
recent commentaries have noted the complicity of federal regulators in the expansion
of the commercial broadcasting networks in the late 1920s and 1930s (Rowland
1986; Engelman 1996; Leduc 1982; Kellner 1990); far from protecting the
independence and autonomy of local and 'special interest' broadcasters, the
introduction of federal regulation appears to have been welcomed by the networks as
a means of reinforcing their dominance.
U.S broadcast regulation since 1912 had followed an officially neutral 'traffic cop'
model, designed to clear up frequency congestion and address the problem of
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spectrum 'scarcity'. However, the 1927 Radio Act extended beyond merely
technical regulation of the 'free' market. In effect the Act discriminated in favour of
a 'chosen instrument', the network affiliate, and against the localised 'special
interest' broadcaster in three related ways. First of all the 1927 Radio Act
established a competitive, commercial framework while at the same time protecting
each frequency from local competition; this protectionist market established a series
of local monopolies and favoured the established broadcaster over new entrants.
Secondly, the Act's combination of economic deregulation and political regulation
minimised the possibilities for local government or other non-commercial funding,
leaving advertising as the only viable means of finance available. The spiralling
commercialism noted above and the 'inevitable' rise of network affiliation grew out
of the regulators' initial suspicion of non-commercial (religious, political,
educational) broadcasters. Thirdly, the 1927 Act created a three-tier hierarchy of
'weak' and 'strong' radio stations (Engelman 1996, 19 - 22). The high-powered
'clear channel' frequencies were assigned to commercial broadcasters. Meanwhile,
ignoring the success of the already established educational broadcasters (Blakely
1979, 53 - 54), the Federal Radio Commission designated non-commercial
broadcasters, including educational, labour and religious organisations, as 'special
interest groups', assigning them to weaker frequencies, often split on a time-share
basis with other broadcasters. The rise of the networks mirrored educational
broadcasting's fall. Between 1927 and 1931 the number of educational broadcasters
declined by approximately 50% (Engelman 1996, 24; Blakely 1979, 55 - 60).
Subsequent frequency allocations, on the FM radio band in 1938 and on the UHF
television band in 1952, have continued to marginalise educational broadcasters,
assigning them 'experimental' channels which most conventional equipment could
not pick up (Rowland 1986, 254 - 6).
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Why did U.S. broadcasting policy in the 1930s apparently discriminate against
'special interest' broadcasters in favour of the more homogeneous network
oligopoly? I believe the explanation lay in the FCC's attempt to define the 'public
interest' in terms of a unitary, collective radio audience. Behind this logic lay a
string of assumptions: that the audience can be characterised by a collective,
common interest, not a series of separate 'special interests'; that a single
broadcaster, or in this case the CBS - NBC duopoly, is the best means of framing
that common interest; that specialised information is best contained within a flow of
'mainstream' programming and special interest groups ought to be integrated within
a collective 'community'; that the public good is an aggregate of private consumer
demands.
In the context of commercial broadcasting, this political attempt to define a
collective, unitary audience converges nicely with the commercial imperative of
maximising audience share and advertising revenue. This convergence between
commercial logic and official policy formed the basis of the U.S. broadcasting
policy of 'trusteeship', whereby the 'public interest' was entrusted to the private
interests of the commercial broadcaster. A good example of the merging of political
arguments and economic interests was the so-called 'cooperation doctrine' which
emerged out of the debate over educational broadcasting in the 1930s (Engelman
1996, 26 - 40; Blakely 1979, 64 - 69; Rowland 1986, 253 - 4).
In the lead up to the 1934 Communications Act, a nascent broadcast reform
movement, led by the National Committee on Education by Radio (NCER),
protested against the U.S. networks' virtual monopoly control of broadcasting and
their failure to meet the public service obligations somewhat vaguely referred to in
the 1927 legislation. They were supported by two senators in a proposed
amendment to the 1934 Communications Act (the Wagner-Hatfield Bill), which
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would have reserved 25% of broadcast frequencies for educational use. Given the
'trust-busting' rhetoric of the New Deal administration, the bill's chances of success
must have appeared favourable.
The reformers were opposed by those who argued that broadcasters and educators
should 'cooperate' in order to realise the educational potential of radio as a public
service. This position, the 'cooperation doctrine', was advanced not just by the
commercial networks (CBS and NBC) but by the 'collaborationist' National
Advisory Council on Radio in Education (NACRE). A `hegemonic' coalition of
commercial broadcasters, educators and politicians was thus mobilised to defend the
status quo. The Wagner-Hatfield amendment was defeated and the 1934
Communications Act simply endorsed the existing regulatory framework from the
1927 Radio Act. NACRE subsequently collapsed in 1938, followed by NCER in
1941. By the 1940s the educational output of the networks had failed to win a
substantial audience and was gradually phased out.
The success of the cooperation doctrine was undoubtedly influenced by the lobbying
muscle of broadcasters and advertisers defending their commercial interests against
encroachment. It also depended on the support of educators and politicians who saw
cooperation as a means of defending a unitary, comprehensive system of
broadcasting as the best means of reaching a unitary 'mass' audience; 'special
interests' should not be separated out but embedded in the flow of accessible,
commercially sponsored programming. The alliance between commercial self-
interest and the unitary idea of a common 'public interest' resulted in a centralising,
'mainstreaming' tendency in U.S. broadcasting. This tendency was at odds with the
nominal commitment to pluralism and local community control. It also subverted
the individual contract between consumer and producer which forms the basis for the
'marketplace of ideas'.
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The 'marketplace of ideas' assumes that individual citizens go shopping in the
marketplace for political and cultural ideas. What it does not allow for is that the
sellers in the marketplace (politicians touting ideology, advertisers and broadcasters
trading in audience shares), are motivated by different intentions and dealing in
different currencies. A number of commentators have noted this inconsistency.
Robert Entman (1989) suggests that we need to recognise an imperfect match
between three distinct markets, an economic market, a political market and an 'idea
market', which correspond with the respective needs of media owners, politicians,
and audiences / citizens. Monroe Price distinguishes between the 'market for ideas'
and the 'market for loyalties' (approximating to Entman's 'political market'), within
which competing factions attempt to win support for their own version of the
national identity and interest (Price 1995, 60 - 80). Ronald Coase (1974) notes that
the lack of any clear correlation between the different actors (elites, broadcasters,
advertisers, consumers, audiences) in the marketplace negates any unified dynamic
of supply and demand. Perhaps most damning of all for the 'market' metaphor was
Reith's famous distinction between 'needs' and `wants' 80 ; a market based on wants
will operate differently from a market based on needs. If we attempt to fudge
together these different markets, with their different currencies, actors and
motivations, into a single metaphorical 'marketplace of ideas', we ignore these
essential differences; the central weakness of the 'marketplace of ideas' stems from
the attempt to construct a system of supply and demand out of conflicting, often
contradictory needs.
If we consider the 'market' of U.S. broadcasting in the 1930s, it becomes possible
to differentiate between the actors in the 'marketplace of ideas' and their different
80 "It is occasionally indicated to us that we are apparently setting out to give the public what we
think they need - and not what they want... but few know what they want and very few what they
need... In any case it is better to overestimate the mentality of the public than to underestimate it"
(from Reith's 1924 manifesto / autobiography, "Broadcast Over Britain", quoted in Briggs 1985, 55).
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currencies of 'needs' and 'wants'. On the supply side, broadcasters, advertisers and
regulators in the 'marketplace of ideas' were not dealing in individual transactions
between consumer and producer, but trading in abstract commodities which
packaged listeners as collective aggregates. The commercial broadcasters bundled
audiences into demographic packages which could then be sold on to the advertiser;
in the early days of broadcasting these packages consisted of relatively crude
aggregations designed for the marketing of mass-advertised, generic retail products,
rather than the more specialised clusterings necessary for 'niche' marketing. The
federal regulators were meanwhile seeking to define a common 'public interest',
regarding separate 'special interests' with suspicion. These crude categorisations
could not accommodate the individual needs and wants of listeners, nor were they
designed to do so. On the side of consumer demand, consumers were replaced by
their shadowy simulacra, a series of 'fictive' abstractions in the minds of
broadcasters, advertisers and regulators (cf. Ang 1991). U.S. broadcasting policy,
having begun with the ideals of pluralism, diversity and rational consumer choice
(the prerequisites for an efficient 'marketplace' according to classic free market
liberalism), was thus driven by commercial interests and federal regulation towards
what Ang describes as a 'streamlined' media system and a 'mainstream', collective
audience, based on classic 'pubic interest' assumptions.
Returning to the opposition between two 'ideal types' of broadcasting which was
introduced at the start of this section, we can draw two preliminary conclusions.
First, both the British and the U.S. systems of broadcasting were forced to
compromise from their initial starting positions, in response to competing external
and internal factions pursuing different economic, political and moral agendas.
Within the 'public interest' model espoused by the BBC, there has been a continuing
tension between a centripetal version of the public interest as a collective common
good represented by a single coherent organisation (the BBC of Reith) and a
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centrifugal version of the public interest as an aggregation of separate special
interests represented by a pluralistic, decentralised 'accountable' broadcasting system
(the BBC of Greene, or the 'public service' of Channel Four). In the U.S. there has
been a similar tension within the 'marketplace of ideas' between a libertarian view of
a disinterested, pluralistic market delivering a diversity of goods and services to a
diversity of consumers, and the 'mainstreaming' of audiences as collective
aggregations of needs, driven by the FCC's notion of a collective 'public interest'
and the advertisers' need for viable demographic categories.
Secondly we can trace a remarkable convergence between British and U.S.
broadcasting towards a common system of 'monopoly broadcasting', the British
ITV-BBC duopoly and the U.S. 'one network in triplicate' (Bagdikian 1990, 132).
Trailing remnants of contradictory tendencies and theories as noted above, the two
systems converged from apparently opposite ends of the spectrum towards a
consensus based on a collective idea of their audience and audience needs, to be
served through a unitary system of broadcasting. Monopoly broadcasting was tilted
towards the theoretical traditions of 'cultural pessimism' and 'ideological effects'
which dominated media research in the 1960s and 1970s; broadcasting was a
dangerously powerful medium to which the public were dangerously susceptible,
requiring a comprehensive, controlled system of broadcasting rooted in a collective
common 'public interest'.
Summarising these two conclusions, the British and U.S. systems of broadcasting
were simultaneously both 'monopolistic' and 'hegemonic'. They were
'monopolistic' in so far as they represented a unified system of control based on an
institutional view of the audience as a unitary 'mass'. They were tegemonic'
because they incorporated their own critique; while they represented the audience as
a collective, unitary category they also claimed to provide a pluralistic 'market of
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ideas'. This 'hegemony' incorporated the two rationales noted at the beginning of
this section. According to a materialist conception of culture, a system of
broadcasting will grow out of the needs and wants of its audiences, which in turn
mirror the determining patterns of class, community and 'structures of feeling'.
According to an idealist conception of culture, broadcasting is seen as a powerful
medium to be controlled, feared and exploited while audiences are unpredictable,
autonomous, diverse and individualistic. In a tegemonic' system of broadcasting,
these contradictory rationales converged in a single unified system of control.
This hegemonic structure allowed broadcasters to preempt and deflect criticisms, as
with the networks' 'cooperation doctrine' in the 1930s, or the BBC's partial and
tokenistic concessions to regional autonomy and popular taste in the 1930s and
1940s. The same structure of internal contradictions also made the established
broadcasters increasingly vulnerable to the renewed attack on their hegemony which
was launched by the media access movement in the late 1960s.
4.4 Two versions of media access
In the previous section I offered a summary of the development of broadcasting in
Britain and the U.S., based on a 'fundamental contradiction' between two models of
broadcasting policy, 'public interest' broadcasting and 'the marketplace of ideas',
based on a view of the audience as 'determined' or 'self-determining' respectively.
I suggested that by the 1960s both countries had tilted towards a monopolistic system
of control based on a 'public interest' rationale which viewed audiences as a
collective entity to be served by a unitary system of broadcasting. The evolution of
this system was influenced by a number of economic and political factors (in
Gramsci's terms, 'conjunctures') but the ideological paradigm, in particular the
positioning of the audience as a unitary 'mass' whose collective interest needed to be
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protected, was paramount. The broadcasting system in both countries was
`hegemonic' in that it incorporated contradictory rationales and theories; in this
sense it also contained the seeds of its own potential destruction. In this section I
will introduce the 'counter-hegemonic' strategies of the media access movement.
Like the system of 'monopoly broadcasting' they opposed, arguments for 'media
access' in the 1960s grew out of a similarly contradictory set of motives and
ideological positions. Where the broadcasting systems at the time were tilted
towards the 'public interest' model, the first wave of media access was tilted towards
a 'marketplace of ideas' ideology. However, as with the broadcasters they attacked,
the position of access advocates was not clear-cut; the marketplace rationale
contained unacknowledged assumptions of a collective 'public interest'. Two
consequences arose from this contradictory intellectual position. First, the media
access movement, like the movement towards 'cultural access' in the late nineteenth
century, drew together a diverse coalition of opportunists and idealists with different
political and economic interests. In time this coalition was placed under strain and
the subsequent direction of media reform satisfied some factions (the economic
opportunists) while disappointing others (the cultural idealists). Secondly, the
unacknowledged contradictions within the media access movement resulted in a
partial approach to media reform; only when the inadequacies of a 'marketplace of
ideas' approach to media access had been cruelly exposed did the underlying 'public
interest' dimensions of media access receive belated recognition.
As with the direction of official media policy, the movement for media access was
also driven by `conjunctural' factors, including the availability of new technology,
the political sensibility of the 1960s 'counter-culture' and the economic shift towards
an information-based economy. However, these contingent factors were the catalyst
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for an ideological shift which drew on the deep-rooted contradictions and broken
promises of the 'public interest' and 'marketplace of ideas' models of broadcasting.
In this section I will begin by outlining two models of media access. I have chosen
to draw primarily on the U.S. experience because here the arguments for media
access gained clarity by being articulated within a definite legal framework. This
framework consisted of the U.S. Constitution, in particular the First Amendment,
and broadcasting law, in particular the contested notion of 'fairness' which was
developed through the FCC and the courts. Despite the absence of a comparable
legalistic machinery, British models of media access (often directly imported from
the U.S. and Canada) followed a similar pattern. In the next section I will trace the
drift towards one of these two models, and explain why I believe this version of
media access, based on a 'marketplace of ideas'rationale, was ultimately ineffective.
Arguments for media access in the U.S. in the late 1960s took two principal forms.
The first argument centred on the private rights of individuals and communities to
broadcast their views through the mass media. This position was linked with an
'absolutist' or 'libertarian' reading of the First Amendment. Taken to its absolutist
extreme, the rights-based model meant that everyone (including existing
broadcasters) had an equal right to airtime; problems of media scarcity, defined not
merely by the old limits on spectrum availability, but also by the limited attention of
what remained a finite audience, were conveniently overlooked. One access
advocate even attempted to introduce a law requiring newspapers to publish all
'letters to the editor' which touched on "a vital community public issue" (Barron
1973, 44 - 52). Aside from the problem of overloading the available outlets and
available audiences, the absolutist position also ignored the danger of reproducing
social inequalities if media access became literally a free-for-all; the fact that Spiro
Agnew was already demanding a right of access for the President of the United
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States in 1969 suggested that simply opening up the marketplace of ideas to all
corners would tend to favour the politically and economically powerful. Subsequent
experience of broadcast deregulation, considered below, would later confirm this
assumption.
The second argument for access to the media centred not on the private speech rights
of the 'broadcasters', but on the public information rights of audiences. If the
desired outcome of the 'marketplace of ideas' was an informed electorate as the
cornerstone of a democratic society, media access needed to be channelled in a
particular direction. As in the 'public interest' model of broadcasting policy,
broadcasting was here conceived as a public activity which carried certain public
obligations, in particular supplying audiences with a diversity of information and
ideas on matters of 'public interest'. According to this model, access should be
regulated according to a normative view of the public's best interests; the model
shared the assumptions of 'public interest' broadcasting that a common, collective
interest does indeed exist, and raised the problem of how and by whom this 'public
interest' could or should be defined.
Advocates of media access have tended to treat these two arguments as if they were
one; an increase in the number of voices allowed onto the airwaves will increase the
diversity of information available to the public. The contradictions behind this
comforting assumption began to unravel in the dilemmas over programme content
and selection and audience 'choice', as media access passed from theory into
practice in the 1970s.
The two versions of media access described here can be traced back to the First
Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press...". In the sphere of broadcasting policy, this
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phrase has come to mean one of two things. At a literal level, the amendment is
understood in a libertarian sense to enshrine the right of 'free speech', meaning that
every citizen (and every broadcaster) has an absolute right not only to speak but to
'publish' their views over the airwaves without interference from the federal
government. The second interpretation claims to read the spirit behind the letter of
the First Amendment and locates free speech in the context of self-government;
'freedom of speech' means the free circulation of information among the people in a
democracy so that they control the government, not vice versa. In this instance
there is an 'affirmative' obligation upon the broadcaster not only to protect but to
promote free speech. Here 'free speech' is understood in a communitarian sense to
refer to the U.S. public's right of access to diverse sources of information,
unabridged by direct or indirect censorship from public bodies like the Federal
Communications Commission, or from monopolistic and self-interested
broadcasters. Free speech is further qualified by reference to 'issues of public
importance', the implication being that certain other forms of 'private' speech may
fall into a separate 'unprotected' category outside the scope of the First Amendment.
The precedent for this qualification was the distinction between *private' and
'public' forms of writing in the eighteenth century (Warner 1990, 38 - 43).
The latter 'affirmative' interpretation of the First Amendment accorded with the
Federal Communication Commission's 'expansive' definition of the 'public interest'
as referring primarily to the rights of the listening public, not the broadcaster 81 . The
former, more literal (and according to critics like Jerome Barron, more 'romantic')
interpretation, was oriented towards the private rights of broadcasters; thus
broadcasters argued that the imposition of 'public interest' obligations by the FCC
infringed their private rights as 'citizens' (Barron 1967, 1641).
81 "The emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and the necessity of
the listening public, and not on the interest, convenience, or necessity of the individual broadcaster or
the advertiser" (Federal Radio Commission Programming Policy 23rd August 1928, quoted in Kahn
1973, 133).
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Historically, unconditional freedom of speech under the First Amendment appears to
have been a comparatively recent invention; David Yasslcy traces First Amendment
absolutism to the 1930s, when the Supreme Court sought to give individual citizens
political leverage against the unprecedented executive powers of central government
under Roosevelt (Yassky 1991, 1734 - 1777). In the Revolutionary period, 'liberty
of the press' had an affirmative meaning, referring to alignment with the cause of
liberty against British tyranny. A free press was expected to make common cause
with the U.S. government and people; use of the press to attack the patriot cause
amounted to a seditious abuse of privilege (Buel 1980, 59 - 62). For printers in the
revolutionary period, 'neutrality' was a political liability and the 'liberty of the
press' became a codified shorthand, signalling support for the patriotic cause (Botein
1980). The political context of the Revolutionary period thus tends to support an
affirmative, communitarian interpretation of First Amendment rights in terms of a
common 'public interest', aligned with a patriotic sense of obligation, at odds with
the libertarian interpretation applied to private speech rights in a marketplace of
ideas.
The Federal Communications Commission provided an entry point for both the
libertarian and communitarian readings of the First Amendment in its 'Fairness
Doctrine'. The Fairness Doctrine evolved in the 1950s as a clarification of existing
principles rather than a new set of regulations, and was endorsed by Congress in
1959. Its application became more widespread with the publication of the 'Fairness
Primer' in 1964 and the issuing of specific rules in 1967, coinciding with growing
pressure for greater access and accountability in broadcasting in the mid-1960s.
The Fairness Doctrine had two parts. The first part, reflecting the 'public interest'
principle of the public's right to be informed, required the broadcaster to devote "a
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reasonable percentage of... broadcast time to the coverage of public issues"
(Simmons 1978, 9). This part of the fairness doctrine was expounded at length in
the 1949 Report on Editorialising, which reiterated the principle that "it is this right
of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government,
any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own
particular views on any matter, which is the foundation stone of the American
system of broadcasting" (Kahn 1973, 384). The second part referred to the private
rights of individuals and groups other than the broadcaster to a share of the
broadcaster's airtime; the broadcaster's coverage of 'public' issues should be 'fair'
in so far as it provided "an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of
view" (Simmons 1978, 9). The Fairness Doctrine thus contained both 'affirmative'
demands that broadcasters provide a diversity of information on 'public' or
'controversial' issues (the formula was vague), and a 'negative' function of
cancelling out bias where it was detected. It was this latter half of the formula, 'part
2' of the original Fairness Doctrine, which was given emphasis in the 1964 Fairness
Primer and 1974 Fairness Report issued to broadcasters, governing the 'right of
reply' in personal attacks and 'equal time rules' in political advertising.
Consequently the overwhelming majority of citizen complaints and official FCC
station inquiries involving 'fairness' referred exclusively to Part 2 of the Fairness
Doctrine (Simmons 1978, 146).
Taken on its own, without reference to the 'affirmative' obligations of the
broadcaster to provide diverse sources of information, the 'negative' FCC rules
governing right of reply and equal time were highly problematic. Firstly the rules
depended on the activism of the aggrieved parties in demanding a right of reply;
given the lengthy court delays and the minuscule chances of success (about one in
one thousand between 1973 and 1976), the rules were more attractive to political
parties and lobbyists than to individual citizens. Secondly the rules had a "bipolar
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orientation" (Simmons 1978, 190 - 192) which encouraged a tit-for-tat spiral of
mutual name-calling rather than 'contrasting points of view'; unless the listener or
viewer had chanced to hear the original broadcast, the fairness doctrine merely
offered two chances to be misinformed for the price of one. Thirdly, the rules gave
no entry point for third party views or for new opinions outside the original
discussion; the right of reply did not include the right to put new questions. Finally
the fairness obligations under part 2 of the Fairness Doctrine were a major financial
disincentive to broadcast controversial issues of public importance, as required under
part 1; the real costs of legal and editorial checking and the potential costs of
providing free airtime to a complainant, together with the unlikely threat of an
official FCC inquiry and the still more unlikely sanction of revoking the
broadcaster's licence, all combined to have a 'chilling effect' on the broadcasting of
controversial, political material.
The fairness doctrine, with its judicial emphasis on part 2 'rights to reply' over part
1 'affirmative obligations', exposed the weaknesses of a theory of free speech which
set individual rights of speakers above collective rights of audiences; perhaps if this
emphasis had been reversed and part 1 obligations to cover 'controversial issues of
public importance' had been enforced more vigorously, the fairness doctrine might
have served a useful purpose. As it was, the broadcasters' argument that legal and
financial accountability had a 'chilling effect' eventually resulted in the repeal of the
fairness doctrine in 1987.
In this section I have argued that theoretical rationales for media access in the United
States have drawn on two competing traditions of free speech, rooted in the First
Amendment and U.S. broadcasting law. The media access movement of the 1960s
was thus heir to a historical contradiction. On one side there was a libertarian
argument, drawing on an absolutist (and ahistorical) reading of the First Amendment
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and based on the speech rights of the broadcaster, individual citizen or collective
'community' to 'publish' their views; seeking a model of broadcasting based on the
free and uninhibited 'marketplace of ideas', this argument ignored the economic and
political interests which superimposed upon this 'free' market their own block
transactions of collective consumer 'needs'. On the other side there was a
communitarian argument which drew on a historical interpretation of the intentions
behind the First Amendment as an attempt to promote the information rights of
voters and citizens in a fledgling democracy; this view, which placed the emphasis
on the rights of the listener rather than the broadcaster, received significant support
both from the FCC in its 'fairness' rules and in Supreme Court rulings on First
Amendment cases involving the FCC in the 1960s. The communitarian argument,
based in turn on a 'public interest' model of broadcasting, emphasised the
obligations of broadcasters within the existing system to provide a diversity of
information and culture, while the libertarian argument demanded new rights for
broadcasters and the replacement of the existing broadcasting oligarchy by a newly
deregulated 'marketplace of ideas'. The models of media access which evolved in
the next twenty years would reflect the contradictions and confusions between these
two sets of arguments.
4.5 The moment of media reform: culturalism, access and the market
Given the contradictory inheritance described above, it is striking that the media
access movement of the 1960s and 1970s was tilted towards a 'marketplace of ideas'
model of broadcasting, based on Part 2 of the Fairness Doctrine and a 'libertarian'
reading of the First Amendment. Early arguments for media access referred
primarily to private speech rights, not public information rights. The logic in the
early manifestos for media access (Barron 1967, Shamberg 1971) was resolutely
grounded in `culturalist optimism' and the arguments contained the same cluster of
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assumptions already noted in the theoretical literature and in 'official' broadcasting
policy. Audiences were seen as dynamic participants, not passive recipients. The
technological means of broadcasting (part of the Marxist 'superstructure), especially
the relatively new possibilities of portable video and cable distribution, were seen as
inherently empowering, while the determining effects of structural social inequalities
(the Marxist 'base') were to be 'solved' by cultural and technological means, not by
political organisation. Thus media activists sought "post-political solutions to
cultural problems" (Shamberg 1971). In this section I will review some of the
factors behind this resolutely culturalist emphasis and some of the implications for
broadcasting policy.
The culturalist emphasis within the media access movement was driven by external
`conjunctural' factors in the 1960s, firstly by the availability of new media
technologies, secondly by the political consciousness of the counter-culture and the
civil rights movement, thirdly by the free market mythology of 'consumer
sovereignty'. The consequence of this culturalist tendency was an emphasis on the
means rather than the ends of media access, based on an optimistic faith in audiences
as 'citizens' in the Enlightenment tradition of free press theory. Based on this
positioning of the audience, early media access initiatives reverted to the 'neutral
resource model' of cultural provision first developed in the settlement house and
other late nineteenth century cultural institutions. As in the earlier institutions,
'neutrality' was problematic to sustain and ultimately ineffective. The logic of
culturalist optimism meshed with classic free market liberalism, and the primary
beneficiaries of the movement for media reform would eventually be the new media
entrepreneurs; in turn many of the 'new media' were tied back in to the 'old
media', with industrial ownership and capital becoming more concentrated even as
technologies and forms of distribution became more diverse. The political economy
of the broadcasting industry thus reverted to a familiar pattern of oligopolistic
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control and 'streamlined' programming for a 'mass' audience. I will now consider
these developments in more detail.
The first community television experiments in the late 1960s and early 1970s
benefited from the availability of new portable video equipment and the new
potential of cable television distribution. Sony's `portapak' system became available
in 1968, making possible a new form of home-made television at relatively little
cost. The possibilities for a new, decentralised, locally owned media system
encouraged a rush of technological fetishism; Shamberg claimed that portable video
was "subversive" because it allowed young people to "be their own authorities"
(Shamberg 1971, 21 - 22).
Community television also benefited from new technologies of distribution,
especially the growth of cable networks. Again, technology encouraged culturalist
optimism, based on the promise of a new 'abundance' of media leading to greater
cultural diversity, participation and access (Sloan 1971, Shamberg 1971, Pool
1983). In Canada, which pioneered community television in the late 1960s and
early 1970s with support from the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, cable penetration had reached 25% by 1968. In
Britain and the U.S., cable systems had begun as a technological means of
improving the reach of conventional 'over air' broadcasting; with improvements in
transmission equipment, this supplementary distributive technology was largely
unnecessary and the first experiments in 'community' television in the 1970s took
advantage of newly redundant cable capacity. In the U.S. several cities including
Boston and New York introduced 'public access' channels in the early 1970s, often
attached to local public broadcasting stations; in 1972 the Federal Communications
Commission required all cable operators to make available at least three channels,
one for educational use, one for use by government, one for open public access.
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These requirements were eventually lifted82
 ; by 1990 only 17% of cable operators
provided public access, mostly in the major metropolitan areas, 13% provided
educational access, and 11% government access (Engelman 1996, 257; Aufderheide
1992, 58). In Britain, also in 1972, five 'experimental' cable television experiments
were licensed for an initial four year period (later extended to 1979); of these only
two (Swindon and Greenwich) survived into the next franchise period. Two further
rounds of franchises were awarded in 1981 and 1983. Several of the U.S. public
access centres and British community television stations (including Swindon
Viewpoint and the Alternate Media Center in New York) imported community
television expertise from Canada.
Taken together these new technological developments inspired a new optimism about
the possibility of 'democratising' television through a combination of local
community control and media 'abundance'. The faith in 'democratic' media was
premised on the technological utopianism of Marshall Mcluhan (1964); Shamberg's
'meta-manual' (1971) combined Mcluhanite rhetoric ("electronic media have
become looped-in to our neural networks") with the apolitical anti-establishment
stance of the drug culture. Later the same cocktail of techno-fetishism and
psychedelic mysticism would fuel the 'revolutionary' claims made for the internet,
with Timothy Leary and Jean Baudrillard filling in for Mcluhan (Woolley 1994;
Rheingold 1994; Helsel and Roth 1991). The problem with these claims lay in their
`culturalist' focus on the narrowly technical processes of media production and
distribution, which excluded the broader framework of 'materialist' or Marxist
analysis.
82 In 1979 the constitutionality of the FCC's rules requiring 'PEG' channels (for public,
educational and government use) was successfully challenged in the Supreme Court. In 1984 the
Cable Communications Policy Act the rules were overturned, leaving the matter at the discretion of
local governments who negotiated franchise agreements with cable operators.
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Just as Raymond Williams criticised Mcluhan's technological determinism for
ignoring the political decision-making which gives technology a shape and direction,
so the myth of media abundance and techno-democracy was vulnerable to a Marxist
critique. The utopian belief in the liberating potential of 'community video' ignored
the economic and social positioning of the video workers and their clients.
Community video's infatuation with technology was criticised in Marxist terms as a
mere `culturalist illusion', implying that technology could somehow "bypass the
effects of productive relationships on the social body", especially the effects of class
inequality (Mattelart and Piemme 1980, 326 - 327). From a less theoretical,
empirical perspective, community video ignored the educational and social
inequalities which formed a barrier for many working class participants.
Accordingly projects tended to serve "sectional interests in the middle class" and the
prime beneficiaries of the projects were the the video workers themselves, the
"semi-professionals of counter-information systems" (Laulan 1977, 24 - 25); thus
Michael Shamberg, having sown his radical wild oats, went to work in Hollywood.
The radical possibilities of cable distribution and the new media abundance were
vulnerable to a similar anti-culturalist, Marxist critique. Public access channels and
community television stations were embedded in the political economy of the nascent
cable industry. In the U.S. the promise of media abundance and public access,
emphasised in the 1971 Sloan Commission report on the cable industry, was
instrumental in allowing the cable industry to develop with only minimal federal
regulation. In Britain, Nicholas Garnham warned that community television could
play a similar role at the leading edge of industry expansion, paving the way for the
dismantling of public service television and "the expansion of privately operated
cable financed by Pay Television" (Garnham 1978).
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While from a purely technological viewpoint, cable communications made possible
an increase in consumer choice (through the provision of more channels),
narrowcasting to small, local communities and communities of interest, even two-
way communications and 'tele-voting' through fibre-optic cables, seen from an
economic perspective the cable industry was moving in an altogether different
direction. The political economy of the cable industry was based on the relatively
unfettered expansion of an entrepreneurial industry. The short-term goal of
attracting private investment into the building of the cable infrastructure encouraged
regulators and government to defer formal requirements for programme content,
local control or accountability beyond a minimal framework. In the U.S. the cable
industry received preferential treatment from the FCC, over the protests of the
networks, because the long-term viability of the industry seemed to be uncertain.
Britain would adopt a similar strategy following the 1982 ITAP (Information
Technology Advisory Panel) report, entrusting the building of the industry to private
investors. Because of the high initial costs of installing the cable network, British
and U.S. regulation subsequently adopted a 'light touch' in order to ensure existing
and potential investors were not discouraged from supporting a fledgling industry.
When seen in the industrial context of precarious investments and the pressure to
reimburse shareholders, the democratic promise and potential of the cable industry
would recede into the background. Cynically, we might assume that the
'experiments' of the 1970s were merely a marketing ploy to sell the new industry's
potential to governments and regulators; even if industry concessions to 'access' and
'community' requirements were not this calculated, Garnham's 'materialist' analysis
of the industry offered a more realistic estimate of the industry's future direction in
the 1980s than the `culturalise utopianism of media access.
Along with the technological availability of new forms of production and
distribution, the other `conjunctural' catalyst for the community television
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movement, particularly in the U.S., was the political consciousness of the 1960s
counter-culture. The broad anti-hegemonic, anti-institutional mood of the 'New
Left' in the U.S. and in Britain during the 1960s was noted in the introduction. In
the U.S. protests against the Vietnam war provided a focus for New Left activism
(cf. Gitlin 1980). In turn this emphasis on protest led into demands for access to the
mainstream broadcast media, in place of the ineffective 'media' of violent street
demonstrations and leaflets (Barron 1973, 94 - 116). Of the legal cases discussed in
Barron's survey of the origins of media access, the majority involved anti-
establishment protests from the 'New Left', in opposition to government policy in
Vietnam, corporate exploitation or right wing demagoguery. Through the New
Left, the media access movement was also linked with the civil rights movement's
assertion of individual rights against oppression by majorities (or by powerful
minorities), and the defence of these rights in the courts. Accordingly, what Barron
calls the "access hit parade" of the 1960s (Barron 1973, 160 - 172) became
entangled with the 'rights culture' based on the rights of individuals or citizens'
groups to speak, rather than the rights of the public to be better informed.
The consequence of this association between political protest, civil rights and media
access was an assumption of widespread public activism and a `rights-based'
legalistic machinery. The construction of the public as highly politicised and
aggressively proactive was a welcome counterpoint to the 'narcotised' audience in
the theory of mass media effects; the assumption of activism was a return to the
enlightenment theory of free-thinking individual citizens at the heart of eighteenth
century American democracy and free press theory. However, there is no evidence
that this activism applied outside a small minority, and the fiction of an 'activist
public' provided a convenient mandate for those who claimed to represent their best
interests; 'rights of reply' thus tended to be abrogated by the politically powerful.
Similarly the legal machinery of the courts short-circuited the FCC's concern with
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the context and content of broadcasting, the ecology of competing stations and
viewpoints, substituting a narrow focus on single issues and the 'rights' of particular
viewpoints and interests. These developments are illustrated by the exploitation of
political 'right of reply' rules and the mobilisation of organised lobbying in the late
1960s and 1970s.
In 1967 anti-smoking groups demanded and were awarded a 'right of reply' to
cigarette advertisements under FCC 'fairness' rules; there followed a spate of
similar cases, in which advocacy groups demanded a 'right of reply' to
advertisements for cars or military recruitment. By 1969, Spiro Agnew was
demanding airtime for the President and using the 'fairness' and 'equal time' rules to
harass broadcasters who criticised government policy (Emery and Smythe 1974. 497
- 512). The 'right of reply' favoured official political representatives, skewing
coverage towards a succession of "preferred speakers" instead of expanding the
range of public issues open to debate (Price 1995, 195 - 203).
In 1964 the United Church of Christ set another precedent for rights-based media
access, taking a racist southern radio station to court for failing to represent the
interests of the local black community; in 1969, over the heads of the FCC, the
Supreme Court revoked the station's licence (Barron 1973, 194 - 198). The success
of 'citizens' groups' in overturning station licence applications in the courts
demonstrated the vulnerability of broadcasters to legal sanctions and organised
lobbying. By threatening stations either with a 'petition to deny' their licence,
addressed to the FCC, or with a direct challenge in the courts, citizens' groups
succeeded in negotiating informal private contracts with local broadcasters for the
coverage of particular issues and viewpoints (Barron 1973, 232 - 248; Jencks
1971). In the 1980s and 1990s citizens' groups have been replaced by professional
political lobbyists, such as AIM (Accuracy in Media) and the Christian Coalition on
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the political right, or Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) on the political
left, all claiming to 'represent' some organised section of public opinion; the aim
here is not so much to ensure a fair representation of local issues as to promote a
particular political viewpoint.
Ironically these early victories in the public access campaigns of the 1960s and
1970s provided an opportunity for single issue campaigners, operating outside the
accountability of public regulation, to close down debate and dialogue. Instead of
increasing dialogue on matters of public importance, the new political watchdogs
encouraged a mixture of political demagoguery and cautious evasion. Of course the
United Church of Christ could not have anticipated that they would pave the way for
Christian fundamentalists demanding consumer boycotts of advertisers supporting
'immoral' television shows in the 1990s 83 . However, by concentrating on the
machinery of media reform and emphasising a 'rights' culture in which any citizen
could hold the broadcasters to account, the media access advocates of the 1960s and
1970s bought into the individualist, rights-based version of media access, turning a
blind eye to the broader 'structural' contexts of media consumption and production.
In the halcyon days of the 1960s New Left, it was assumed that activism was
universal; all that was needed was to provide a legal opening. However, social
inequalities made it unlikely that the benefits of media access would be evenly
spread; the new technology and the legal machinery provided an entry point for the
educated, the middle class and the politically active. Over time the media reforms
first initiated in the late 1960s benefited a privileged minority, while the overall
diversity of programming, of political views and of cultural and political information
available to the general public did not significantly improve. Trusting in the
activism of the general public, community television activists and public access
83 The most recent example of religious lobbying was the threat by religious groups to boycott
advertisers on ABC's 'Ellen' sitcom in May 1997, following the 'outing' of the main character,
played by a real-life lesbian. Three months earlier a southern senator objected to nudity in the
holocaust drama, `Schindler's List', broadcast on NBC.
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channels concentrated on opening up 'forums' and 'resources' for public use. When
that policy yielded a familiar collection of private opinions instead of a reanimation
of public opinion, the activists were predictably disappointed.
Both the technological fetishists and the political protesters shared a particular
construction of the public as a collection of individuals with virtually limitless
potential once given access to the necessary equipment and legal rights. What they
generally lacked was a classic Marxist perspective on the material conditions which
constrained this potential, in particular the social inequalities and the collective
categories of social class and the political economy of broadcasting as a capitalist
industry. This construction of the audience as unconstrained individuals meshed
perfectly with the myth of consumer sovereignty; free agency in the marketplace of
ideas was analogous with free agency in the economic marketplace of goods and
services.
The movement for media access thus found itself aligned with the movement for
economic deregulation against their common enemy, the monopoly broadcaster.
However, experience elsewhere suggests that an open economic market does not
translate into a free flowing market of ideas. In France and Italy, deregulation of
broadcasting in the 1970s and 1980s followed a pattern of explosive diversification
of outlets followed by rapid reconcentration of ownership; instead of democratising
the media, grassroots political activists of the 1970s merely cleared a path for the
media entrepreneurs of the 1980s84.
In Britain and the U.S. the promise of 'community' broadcasting and media
'abundance' through cable television was similarly short-lived. The industry
gradually retreated from its initial promises of local programming and local access,
84 See Miller (1992) and Lafrance & Simon (1992) for the story of the liberation and
privatisation of French radio.
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abetted by 'light touch' or non-existent programming requirements in Britain's 1984
Cable and Broadcasting Act and the U.S. 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act
(Wilson 1994, 35 - 36; Aufderheide 1992). The idea that increased channels
would mean increased diversity of content proved equally illusory. The cable
industry followed the same pattern of concentration of ownership as conventional
broadcasting. In the U.S. for example, just four 'multiple system operators'
delivered programming to 47% of subscribers in 1992 (Aufderheide 1992, 55); in
turn the cable operators and the networks (or their parent companies) had a stake in
many of the new cable channels. Pursuing a short term return on their investments,
cable operators resorted to an equally familiar 'low risk' programming strategy,
directed at a mass audience demographic to attract maximum subscriber and
advertising income; in Britain, where the cable market is dominated by U.S.
telecommunications companies, television programming is only a minor part of a
marketing mix based primarily on telephony (Goodwin 1995, 680; Wilson 1994,
156). The new increase in channels has not delivered ideological competition, only
a new way of recycling familiar material; in fact, given the intersecting ties of
cross-ownership, diversity of outlets has not even delivered economic competition.
Too late, the alliance between community broadcasters and cable operators broke
down, with local programming and local accountability consigned to the late-night
freak-shows of Manhattan Cable and a handful of 'local origination' programmes85
or on the broadcast channels such novelties as the BBC's 'Video Diaries' or the
globally franchised 'America's Funniest Home Videos'.
The public access and community television movement was sucked into a culturalist
'marketplace of ideas' strategy, encouraged by technological, political and economic
opportunism. The eventual failure to enhance real consumer choice and real public
85 Local origination programmes, made by the cable company to reflect local community interests
and issues, represent a 'safe' alternative to local access programmes, which are produced
independently by the community themselves.
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participation was inscribed in the political economy of the industry and in the
structural limits of consumer choice, imposed by education, class and ingrained
habit. Before considering alternative models of media access based on a 'public
interest' rationale, I want to consider the reasons for the failure of the 'marketplace
of ideas' model in more detail.
4.6	 The culturalist model: from neutral resource to common carrier
In this section I will draw on specific examples of 'public access' and 'community
television' experiments in Britain and the U.S. in the early 1970s to illustrate the
problematic `culturalist' assumptions behind the 'marketplace of ideas' model of
public access. In Britain, culturalist assumptions about users of community
television resulted in a failure to address the 'structural' problem of social class. In
the U.S. the open door policy of public access channels placed the private interests
of users before the public interest of audiences. Public access experiments in the
1970s helped to build the momentum of the cable industry in the 1980s, encouraging
a rhetoric of neutrality, choice and consumer sovereignty, and resulting in a formal
diversification of outlets and a qualitative erosion of the public sphere of political
dialogue and debate. In both countries policies of deregulation and privatisation
aspired to a 'common carrier' model of broadcasting which ran counter to industrial
trends towards horizontal and vertical integration.
Swindon Viewpoint was part of the first wave of British 'community television'
experiments, one of five stations licensed by the Home Office in 1972. When the
station began operating in 1973 it adopted a resolutely neutral, non-interventionist
approach, described alternately as the "neutral resource model" (Halloran 1976, 28)
or the "resource centre" model (Croll and Husband 1975, 27). In the spirit of
culturalist optimism, the problem of access was to be addressed in purely technical
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terms and 'structural' barriers of class and economic inequality were ignored.
Inspired by the 'hit parade' of 1960s US media access, the British model assumed a
near-universal spread of competence and activism, once the purely technical
problems of equipment and training had been solved. In fact in the first 8 months of
operation, 65% of those initiating programmes were categorised as 'middle-class'
despite a majority of cable subscribers described as 'working class' (Croll &
Husband 1975, 31). This middle class dominance was part of a broader pattern of
middle class voluntarism. A subsequent community television experiment in
Dumbartonshire was one of a series of experiments exploring the impact of leisure
activities on 'quality of life' (Bennett 1977; Leisure 1977); the official report into
these experiments found that increased provision and outreach had failed to have any
significant impact on the "social structure of participation in leisure activities"
(Leisure 1977, 163). The new 'leisure' facilities were used mostly by middle class
individuals and voluntary associations, partly because they were better connected and
better informed, partly because they tended to predominate in the local voluntary
sector.
Community television's tendency to attract mostly middle class users was
exacerbated by the reliance on 'representative' local groups as channels for
community involvement. Swindon Viewpoint answered to the 'Swindon Community
Television Association', described by the researchers as a "professional oligarchy"
(Croll and Husband 1975, 26). The Dumbartonshire project was similarly reliant
on preexisting 'community' contacts made through the 'Quality of Life' programme.
The problem with such established channels of community involvement is that many
'representative' groups (eg. Tenants' Associations, Parent Teacher Associations)
typically lack the financial resources or constitutional muscle to be truly
'representative', relying instead on self-selecting volunteers. The open door policy
of community television also attracted media literate individuals and activists, who
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again tended to be predominantly middle class participants often with eccentric,
'unrepresentative' views. As a result of the failure to develop any more proactive
approach to community outreach, the 'neutral resource' of community television was
thus largely appropriated by preexisting interest groups, self-appointed community
'representatives' and middle class individuals. This reproduced the pattern of
increased 'community' provision across a range of services in Dumbartonshire,
tending merely to reinforce existing patterns of involvement and local power
structures; in the case of Swindon Viewpoint, the external research team noted that
neutrality "was in some cases counter-productive" (Croll and Husband 1975, 36).
The failure to reach beyond these unrepresentative minority interests resulted in a
disappointingly trivial and parochial programme content. Programming centred not
on the broader concerns of local politics but on the problem of dog faeces on
pavements86 . When a controversial issue was eventually raised, passive attempts to
stimulate discussion, for example the policy of 'outward referral' in Swindon and
the 'right of reply' in Dumbartonshire, fell flat, apparently due to community
apathy. Of course these disappointments would not matter if such parochialism
genuinely reflected the needs and interests of the audience; however, a survey of
viewers in Swindon pointed to a preference for hard information and features
(especially local politics and services) over community 'viewpoints' (Croll and
Husband 1975, 11 - 12). The 'open door' policy at Swindon failed to address public
information needs, providing instead an outlet for separate individual 'viewpoints'
and interest groups, all too disconnected from the real concerns of the majority of
viewers.
The 'neutral resource' tactic, as with the nineteenth century settlement house,
reflected a self-effacing ethic on the part of the professional animateur. At
86 This anecdote from an informal interview with Oliver Bennett, former director of Vale
Television in Dumbartonshire.
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Swindon, the project director was anxious to avoid exploiting the community by
imposing either his own political views (playing 'Robin Hood') or the management
team's technical proficiency (Dunn 1977, 33); in Dumbartonshire, team members
found themselves consciously holding back from intervening in community decision-
making (Bennett 1977, 7). This reticence may reflect not just a theoretical neutrality
but a recurrence of the self-abnegating guilt of the nineteenth century settlement
resident. The problem with such an approach or 'non-policy' (Bennett, ibid.), is
that it comes perilously close to 'laissez-faire', leaving novices to learn from
unnecessary mistakes and closing down the framework of opportunities when their
real interests may have been better served by a professional presentation of their
views, rather than an amateur experiment with the means of communication. A
more active production role for station staff would have diluted community
involvement in process but might have allowed greater community control over
product; Swindon Viewpoint eventually found that a substantial percentage of users
preferred initiating programmes over participation, while others valued post-
production (editing) over producing material from scratch (Croll and Husband 1975,
32). Despite the animateurs' attempts to 'demythologise' the production process,
researchers found that "part of the value to participant groups was precisely this
'myth' of television" (Croll and Husband 1975, 39).
In the U.S., public access channels were shaped by the same logic as their British
imitators. In Manhattan, where the public access experiment was most fully
developed in the early 1970s, production centres operated on a 'first come, first
served' basis. There was resistance to formal organisation of access facilities and
channels, following the liberal / libertarian assumption that the random, chaotic
quality of public access represented an asset, not a liability (Othmer 1973, 53). As
in Britain, the access channels tended to be dominated by a handful of regular users,
supplemented by eccentric fringe groups (ibid., 57).
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The rights-based orientation of public access channels resulted in an increasingly
introverted, self-indulgent output, described by its critics as "vanity video" and "a
pathetic, homemade version of entertainment" (Engelman 1996, 259; Aufderheide
1992, 58). Increasingly 'narrowcasting' on the public access channels referred to an
introverted conversation which seldom reached beyond the closed circle of
participants. A 1972 audience survey of cable viewers in Manhattan indicated that a
higher percentage wished to participate than admitted to viewing the channels
regularly (7% and 5% respectively) (Othmer 1973, 23); the implication here was
that participants (or would-be participants) outnumbered the viewers. By the 1980s
the public access centres had moved from an oppositional ethos grounded in
community involvement towards an emphasis on individual expression and career
advancement; in Manhattan, New York University's pioneering Alternate Media
Center was reborn as the 'Interactive Telecommunications Program', the move from
community resource to media training centre reflecting the policy trend (Engelman
1996, 257 - 261). Critics complained that the oppositional, community-building
potential of public access had been defeated by industry neglect and underfunding,
and by the individualistic tenor of programme-makers (Aufderheide 1992, 58 - 62).
In the context of proliferating 'special interest' cable channels and the growing
professionalisation of the public access channels, the new generation of public access
programmes often appeared little more than an underfunded, eccentric parody of
'legitimate' broadcasting.
The failure of public access channels to provide a genuine alternative to commercial
broadcasting stemmed from their individualist, rights-based version of free speech.
Discarding the eighteenth century distinction between 'private' and 'public' forms of
speech, public access channels failed to connect with the general concerns of
audiences; in some instances programmes were perhaps only comprehensible or
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meaningful to the individuals who produced them. Where many of the earlier
programmes had claimed to 'represent' a community of interest to a wider public,
later offerings operated within a closed circuit of arcane references or showcased
individual egos; instead of building a public forum for dialogue, public access thus
consisted of a string of disconnected monologues which further heightened the
privatisation of the public sphere. The difference lay not so much in content as in
orientation; for many public access programmes the audience might as well not
have existed". Public access users were ready to assert their individual rights to
free speech but were rarely prepared to answer the "much bigger question" posed by
free speech scholar Zechariah Chafee: "freedom for what?" (Chafee 1956, 328).
By focussing on the private rights of the speaker instead of the public information
needs of the listener, public access had become part of the 'marketplace of ideas'
tradition in U.S. broadcasting; in the 1980s public access channels were integrated
into a wider pattern of proliferation without diversity. This proliferation provided a
formal spectacle of diversity (more outlets, more speakers, more 'noise') without
delivering a substantial diversity of content (different opinions, different world
views, public debate). The disconnected, unreal quality of public access television
spilled into the newly abundant media of the 1970s and 1980s, especially the
structure of television news. The spectacle of diversity allowed a quantitative
increase in available information without necessarily making that information
comprehensible or accessible. 'Spectacular', non-analytical presentation made
television news especially difficult for audiences to assimilate. Douglas Kellner has
described the effect of narrative closure, 'objectivity' and other screening devices
which contribute to the "greying of reality" in news programmes (Kellner 1990, 112
- 117). Similarly Todd Gitlin (1980) has described the effects of extensive media
87 As Othmer notes, few groups sought feedback from their audiences (Othmer 1973, 33); phone
numbers posted for public comments at the end of programmes provided an opening for public
comments, but were seldom used.
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coverage on the 'New Left' student protests against the Vietnam war. Removed
from any comprehensible analytical framework, political protest was reduced to
colourful spectacle and political radicals were converted into media celebrities,
condemned to a "symbolic politics" without constituency or content (Gitlin 1980,
156 - 176). Marcuse described the rhythms of U.S. television news as an alternation
of "gorgeous ads with unmitigated horrors" (Marcuse 1965, 97). The effect of such
rapidly alternating perspectives was to undermine critical judgement, reducing world
events to a bizarre spectacle. Rational judgement is suspended and real events and
fictions become virtually equivalent. Programmes and advertisements collapse into
each other with overlapping credit sequentes, extended trails for successive
programmes, even news trails which match appropriate news stories to entertainment
programmes.
For the `culturalist optimist' school of media studies (Fiske, Willis, Hebdige), the
cacophonous 'white noise' of the media flow is precisely what makes television
viewing a liberating experience; the removal of 'official' judgement and analysis,
the stringing together of unrelated images and events and the alternation of 'fiction'
and 'reality', while disturbing for conservatives, may 'liberate' audiences, providing
an opportunity to exercise their 'symbolic creativity'. This argument is consistent
with a 'marketplace of ideas' model of broadcasting and a culturalist, libertarian
theory of media effects which places its faith in the individual choices of consumers
shopping for ideas. The counter-argument is of course that the ideas on display in
this market are remarkably similar, because a system based purely on economic
competition between broadcasters cannot be expected to yield competition between
ideas; instead of pursuing diversity of content, a commercial system will naturally
aim to reduce risk and maximise profit by duplicating successful formulae.
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'Public access' channels have become part of this movement towards media 'noise'
and a purely quantitative increase in 'diversity'. By the early 1990s Engelman
estimates that around 2,000 access channels were broadcasting for approximately
15,000 hours per week, more programmes than the networks put out over an entire
year (Engelman 1996, 260). The difference between this formal proliferation of
'private' voices and a reanimated public sphere can be summarised in three related
distinctions. Firstly, public access channels are oriented towards the speech rights of
the broadcaster, not the public information needs of listeners; once the first rush of
political activism subsidised, these rights were claimed not by 'community groups'
but by individuals. Secondly, as a result of the emphasis on speakers over listeners,
public access programmes rarely provide an entry point for debate, either with
viewers or with other broadcasters; each programme exists in its own ideological
vacuum. Thirdly, this self-contained, disconnected quality is reproduced in the
wider world of television 'abundance', especially in television news; while new
channels have become available, the mass of new ideas and information has not been
placed in any coherent framework and offers no clear entry point for audiences.
These distinctions return us to the distinction between the 'marketplace of ideas' and
the 'public service' model of broadcasting. Where the 'marketplace of ideas' trusts
in the quantitative availability of different sources of information, entertainment and
self-fulfilment and the rational choices of individual consumers, the 'public interest'
rationale demands that these sources be framed within a shared concept of the
common good.
The 'neutral resource' model of media access is premised on a 'common carrier'
model of broadcasting. The two key features of a common carrier are the guarantee
of universal access and the separation of the means of distribution from the means of
production. Examples of 'common carrier' status are telephone companies or taxis;
common carrier status (or in Britain, 'public utility' status) is normally required of a
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monopoly distribution network, so that for example, a telephone company must
make its connections available to other operators without discrimination. The
separation of distribution and production, as at Swindon Viewpoint (Dunn 1977;
Halloran 1976, 77) is likewise intended to prevent abuse of monopoly power; if a
telephone company owns a network, it is barred from competing against other users
of that network by offering rival services, as with British Telecom's attempts to
carry video services over conventional telephone lines 88 . While this arrangement
removes the threat of legal liability, it also removes the opportunity of financial
profit; a common carrier cannot be charged if a telephone chat line or a public
access programme is obscene or libelous, nor can it enter the same market as a
service provider.
If we extend 'common carrier' status into a general principle in broadcasting, as
suggested by Pool (1983), two problems arise. First, the industry is moving towards
integration of production and distribution, attempting to roll back existing 'common
carrier' regulations, as with British Telecom's current demands to be allowed into
the domestic cable market (House of Commons 1995; Goodwin 1995). Under these
circumstances, as the Sloan Commission recognised over twenty years previously
(Sloan 1971, 147 - 148), it is highly unlikely that private investors and companies
will agree to support a 'common carrier' network, fibre optic or otherwise, and then
stand back while other companies and investors reap profits by selling products and
services over this 'common' network. Integration of production and distribution
offers increased profitability and reduced risk, resulting in 'convergence' between
telephony, broadcasting and information services; thus U.S. telephone companies
invest in British and European cable companies and vice versa, or computer software
companies buy up computer hardware companies. As products and services
distributed by broadcasters, computer networks or telephone companies become
88 BT's 'common carrier' status is currently in dispute; see Goodwin 1995, House of Commons
1995).
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virtually interchangeable, the distinction between 'production' of media services and
'distribution' of media becomes problematic. Today the key to profitability is
neither production nor distribution but the licensing of copyrights over the
dissemination of information; on the internet, 'distribution' has become the
'product'. In these circumstances it is difficult to apply 'common carrier' status;
questions of 'liability' and 'ownership' in the media have become extremely difficult
to disentangle, as illustrated by the U.S. Congress's convoluted attempts to introduce
a Communications Decency Act for the Internet.
The second problem for a 'common carrier' network is that, like the 'neutral
resource' model of community television, it fails to take account of 'structural'
inequalities among users and the information needs of consumers. With the removal
of editorial discrimination, the only qualification for access to a common carrier is
ability to pay; inevitably this tends to favour commercial use. The imposition of
'must carry' rules on U.S. cable operators in 1984 legislation obliged cable
operators to carry 'local' stations, which included the affiliates of the big three
broadcasting networks; in 1992 home shopping channels succeeded in becoming
part of the 'must carry' package (Price 1995, 168). On the other hand, with the
reduction in non-leased public access channels, opportunities for access for non-
commercial groups or non-profit organisations have actually diminished over the
same period.
The 'common carrier' thus returns us to the problems of a 'marketplace of ideas'
and the 'neutral resource' model of public access. Three problematic assumptions
emerge from this model as it developed in the early 1970s. Firstly, by overlooking
inequalities of class, education and media literacy, the 'neutral' model assumes that
access is the same thing as equality. Secondly the model focuses on the process of
communication from the perspective of participants rather than on the product as it
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affects audiences, assuming that an aggregation of individual voices amounts to a
civic dialogue; in the U.S., the cacophony of public access channels was highly
individualistic and did little to create dialogue between broadcasters and audiences,
or between different broadcasting groups. Thirdly, the public access movement
assumed that the industry would voluntarily provide an effective space for
oppositional and alternative viewpoints on more than an experimental, temporary
basis. While public access channels limp on in the U.S., they provide little in the
way of a genuine alternative public sphere; instead they offer a sideshow of
eccentricities which gives sufficient appearance of pluralism to disguise an industry
trend towards economic and technological integration and cultural homogenisation.
Price's cynical view that access in U.S. broadcasting has been "a means of
legitimating the dominant voices by showing a toleration of difference and dissent"
(Price 1995, 195) is supported by the use of access channels in the early 1970s as a
means of legitimating the emergent cable industry.
The flawed assumptions of 1970s access experiments stem from a 'marketplace of
ideas' model premised on the individual rights of communicators and the fictive
construction of an audience of consumers shopping for ideas in a free and open
market. If we want to get beyond the libertarian model of free speech and a merely
quantitative definition of pluralism, we are returned to the problem of defining a
normative 'public interest' and 'affirmative' obligations for broadcasters as the basis
for some form of regulation.
4.7	 Access and the public interest: theoretical background
Having rejected a 'marketplace of ideas' model of public access, I now want to
explore an alternative, 'public interest' rationale.. Where public interest broadcasting
draws on the idealist tradition of Reith and Arnold, 'public interest access' depends
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upon a slightly different conceptual framework, in which 'the search for a common
culture' gives way to a more modest attempt to define a 'public sphere'. The
remainder of this chapter is devoted to theoretical, judicial and practical aspects of
this attempt.
'Public interest' broadcasting assumes that broadcasting should serve a collective
common interest; the definition of this common interest and the best way to serve it
remain moot. In British and other European countries, state-supported 'public
service broadcasting' institutions have defined the public interest in relation to
national identity, although the character of this 'national identity' has frequently
been contested (Price 1995, 60 - 80). British and European governments have also
assumed that the 'public interest' is best served by a unitary national broadcasting
system; this system has depended on a system of national monopoly, underwritten
by government regulation. State regulation and financial support have also insulated
the system from external competition in the marketplace. In this section I will
consider the theoretical rationale for a 'public interest' model of media access.
Applying the public interest rationale to the argument for media access, the common
'public interest' is no longer seen in 'unitary' terms but as a diversity of competing
viewpoints which are 'representative' of a pluralistic culture and society; this
redefinition accords with more recent models of public service broadcasting, from
the BBC under Hugh Greene in the 1960s to Channel Four in the 1980s. 'Public
interest access' thus attempts to reconcile the pluralism of the 'marketplace of ideas'
model with the collective, communal emphasis of public service broadcasting. In
discussions of media theory, this balancing act corresponds with attempts to define a
'public sphere', following the lead of Habermas (1962/1992); in discussions of
policy, it is related to the attempt to reinvent 'public service broadcasting' to take
account of the shifting boundaries of the 'public interest'. The old version of public
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service broadcasting, typified by the pre-war BBC under Reith, was based on a
confident sense of national identity and national consensus. That national version of
the 'public interest' is now under attack from below, as local communities and
diverse 'communities of interest' assert their collective identities, and from above, as
global economic and cultural forces in broadcasting intersect across the boundaries
of the old nation state (Sandel 1992b). Accordingly media policy is expected to
operate at a global level, taking into account the international dimensions of the
industry and global questions of equity (MacBride 1980, 47 - 67; Garnham 1986,
52 - 53).
In this section I will review the theoretical literature describing the 'public sphere' as
a model for media policy. During this review I will raise what I consider to be the
key problems for a concept of 'public access' grounded on a 'public interest'
rationale: how and by whom is the 'common interest' or 'community' to be
defined, and what are the underlying assumptions about audiences?
Habermas (1962/1992) described a 'bourgeois public sphere' in eighteenth century
Europe, within which private individuals came together 'as a public', engaging in
'rational-critical public debate' (Habermas 1962/1992, 30); debate in this 'public
sphere' informed action in the political sphere. The emergence of the public sphere
was linked with the rise of bourgeois individualism and market economics. While
acknowledging that access to this 'public sphere' was in practice limited by
education and property ownership to a 'small minority' (ibid., 84 - 85), Habermas
nevertheless idealised the eighteenth century public sphere and lamented its historical
decline through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This decline was as much
due to the erosion of the 'private sphere' as the corruption of the 'public sphere';
Habermas described a loss of subjectivity on the one hand ("the deprivatised
province of interiority was hollowed out by the mass-media" - p. 162), and on the
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other the replacement of genuine critical debate by the charade of "representative
publicity" in which the 'staged display' of political decision-making was presented
for 'legitimation' and 'acclamation' (ibid., 196 - 222). The "public of critically
reflecting private people" had thus been replaced by an ersatz illusion of political
participation which disguised the "refeudalization of the public sphere" (ibid., 181 -
195). The solution to this problem, according to Habermas, echoing John Dewey
(1930, 1935), was to move beyond the merely defensive "injunction-like" individual
rights of the "liberal constitutional state" towards an "active promotion" of
collective or 'social' rights (Habermas 1962/1992, 227 - 228). The media could
play a key role in this task through the promotion of "critical publicity" (as opposed
to 'staged' or 'representative' publicity) and the reestablishment of the
"communicative interconnectedness of a public" (ibid., 249).
Habermas' argument about the 'public sphere', especially the idea of collective
rights and media responsibility, is thus connected with a 'public interest' rationale
for media policy and media access. Applying this argument to the two policy
dilemmas noted above, the definition of the 'public interest' and the definition of a
'public', Habermas' position is more complicated than some of his critics
acknowledge. The most frequent criticism of Habermas is that his public sphere
idealises the opinion-forming liberal, bourgeois intelligentsia, thereby excluding the
majority of the population (Hohendahl 1979, 104 - 109; Dahlgren 1991, 6 - 7);
furthermore, the historical basis for Habermis' public sphere is questionable,
resulting in a nostalgic attempt to recreate a 'lost world' of community and
consensus which may never have existed in the first place (Curran 1991a, 82 - 83;
Hohendahl 1979, 95 - 99). According to his critics then, Habermas has constructed
a collective 'public interest' out of the private interests of the eighteenth century
middle class; like the slave-owning democracies of Pericles or Jefferson, the
'common interest' here disguises the class interests of a powerful minority. The
230/
liberal variant on this Marxist 'class-based' critique is that the attempt to constitute
the 'public' of the 'public sphere' as a 'collective subject' is unworkable; any
attempt to create a normative public interest is destined to fail, because individual
interests can never be submerged in consensus and 'collective identity' (Hohendahl
1979, 99 - 102).
Habermas' version of the public sphere is more open-ended and pluralistic than these
criticisms suggest. His principal aim is to construct "the communicative network of
a public opinion made up of rationally debating private citizens" (Habermas
1962/1992, 247); this is not the same thing as an idealised pattern rooted in the
past, nor a socially engineered consensus based on a normative 'common interest',
with its concomitant dangers of romanticism, nostalgia and covert (class) bias. The
keynote is flexibility based on a multitude of 'counter-public spheres' and a
multitude of identities and roles; commenting on Habermas's attempts to clarify or
redefine his position in the 1970s, Peter Hohendahl suggests that the "early liberal
public sphere as an ideal pattern" has been replaced by "an open, emendable system
which can be developed further through collective learning processes" (Hohendahl
1979, 116 - 117). The concept of a series of inter-connected 'partial social systems'
perhaps provides a glimpse of a way through the thickets of post-national identity
politics; instead of pursuing a unitary national 'public interest' it might be possible
to link together different loyalties based on different communities of interest and
place, a series of inter-connecting 'public interests'. The other distinguishing feature
of Habermas' public sphere is the interdependency between the 'private' and 'public'
spheres; the individual, grounded in the private sphere of individual experience and
economic freedom, is free to participate in the public sphere of critical debate and it
is precisely this individualism which makes debate 'critical'. From a Marxist
perspective such individualism is the privilege of the bourgeois, while from a liberal
perspective the attempt to build a 'collective identity' from these individual building
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blocks is oppressively totalitarian. Habermas belongs to a tradition which includes
John Dewey, Lewis Mumford and Raymond Williams which argues that
individualism and collectivism are not irreconcilable opposites but mutually
supportive; thus Habermas"intersubjectivity' is not unlike Williams' 'structure of
feeling' in describing an interaction between individual and collective experience.
Returning to the 'public interest' model of broadcasting, Habermas suggests that
collective interests are multiple, interconnecting and dynamic; he also suggests that
the construction of the audience needs to take into account their different roles,
identities and loyalties rather than attempting to aggregate them in unitary blocks.
This construction, like the 'ethnographic' perspective in audience research proposed
by Ien Ang, with different 'selves' defined by "the multiplicity of situated practices
and experiences in which television audiencehood is embedded" (Ang 1991, 165),
suggests a public sphere based on debate and difference, not on smooth consensus.
In the U.S. a theoretical 'public interest' rationale for media access was available in
the U.S. Constitution (the communitarian interpretation of the First Amendment)
and in broadcast regulation (Part 1 of the FCC's 'Fairness Doctrine'). In 1969, this
rationale received a significant boost with the U.S. Supreme Court's judgement in
the court case Red Lion Broadcasting vs. FCC. While the case centred on the
individual model of free speech, individual free speech was to be protected not as an
end in itself but as a means of promoting collective goals; in the phrase of the
Alexander Meiklejohn, individual free speech is seen to have "collective good
consequences" (Horwitz 1991, 33). These collective good consequences include an
informed citizenry and rational public debate. Red Lion thus stood at the crossroads
between a private, rights-based view of media access and a 'public interest' view
which stresses the virtues of public dialogue, debate and accessible information as
necessary attributes of a functioning democracy.
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In the original dispute a political journalist and author, Fred Cook, had demanded a
'right of reply' under FCC rules to an attack broadcast by the Reverend Billy James
Hargis on a small Pennsylvania radio station. The radio station had refused, the
FCC had intervened and the radio station's owners, Red Lion, had taken the FCC to
court. In its judgement, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the case from
private rights to public responsibilities. At issue was the FCC's mandate to regulate
broadcasting in the 'public interest, convenience and necessity'. First the Court
unequivocally adopted an affirmative view of the First Amendment; the goal of the
First Amendment was "producing an informed public" (US 1969, 392).
Accordingly, "it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
market-place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself
or a private licensee" (ibid., 390). The right to free speech "did not embrace a
right to snuff out the free speech of others" (ibid., 387). Secondly the Court
reaffirmed part 1 of the Fairness Doctrine, arguing that "it is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount" (ibid., 390).
Broadcasters were therefore "obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters
of great public concern" and should demonstrate "a willingness to present
representative community views on controversial issues" (ibid., 394).
With its expansive view of broadcasters' responsibilities and its vindication of the
FCC's broad mandate to enforce these 'public interest' obligations ("a power 'not
niggardly but expansive" - US 1969, 380), Red Lion was a landmark in
broadcasting law and gave great encouragement to the media access movement
(Barron 1973, 137 - 149). However, the judgement was also compromised by a
familiar set of contradictions. In their judgement, the Supreme Court had skilfully
stitched together the 'private rights' and 'public interest' rationales for access.
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Broadcasters were obliged to open their programmes to 'representative' views, but
they were also expected to prioritise "speech concerning public affairs", satisfying
the collective informational needs of a notional 'public'. Red Lion was partly a
refinement of the 'marketplace of ideas', challenging monopoly and privilege in the
search for a 'perfect marketplace' (Horwitz 1991, 32 - 34); yet it also hinted at the
need to serve a collective 'public' with shared needs, beyond the separate
'representative' interests of groups and individuals.
For media access advocates the importance of Red Lion lay in the affirmative
concept of broadcasting 'fairness'. What Barron calls "the legal imposition of
affirmative responsibilities" in broadcasting (Barron 1967, 1674) was the flipside to
the libertarian, First Amendment absolutist defence of individual rights of
broadcasters and citizens. The privilege of addressing a mass audience carried a
social cost and access to a mass audience was conditional on a constructive use of
that privilege. The problem of course lay in agreeing what precisely these
'affirmative obligations' might cover. The Supreme Court acknowledged the
dangers of majoritarian tyranny in this `communitarian' position, noting that its
ringing endorsement of FCC powers was not a mandate for censorship or direct
intervention in programming (US 1969, 395). Again the problem lay in defining
which 'public' was being served or protected, and what the common 'interest' of
this public might be.
Habermas' conceptual framework of the public sphere and the U.S. Supreme
Court's argument that broadcasters' have 'affirmative' obligations to 'represent'
communities provide a theoretical starting point for 'public interest access'.
However, there is a tendency in these theoretical debates and models describing
'ideal' communication systems to remain trapped at a high level of abstraction (cf.
Curran 1991a, 1991b; Garnham 1983; Dahlgren 1991; Elliott 1986). Discussion
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of the public sphere also tends, as Curran notes, to focus on a narrowly political
interpretation of the public sphere as a forum for competing political loyalties,
ignoring the latent political contents of competing cultural products and images
(Curran 1991b, 32 - 33). While I believe these theoretical debates are useful and
will return to them in due course, I want first to consider the practical dilemmas of
public interest access, beginning in the U.S.
4.8	 Public interest access:	 'the community of neutrality' and 'the
community of loyalties'
In this section I will relate the theoretical arguments of the previous section to the
US public broadcasting system. I will explore some of the conflicts in US public
broadcasting policy in relation to a theoretical contradiction between two versions of
community, the 'community of neutrality' and the 'community of loyalties'.
'Public interest access' describes the attempt by broadcasters to reconcile the
'marketplace of ideas' model of broadcasting, based on individual rights and
pluralism, with the 'public interest' model, emphasising collective obligations and
consensus. This balancing act is associated both with the new generation of public
service broadcasting (Greene's BBC and U.S. Public Service Broadcasting in the late
1960s, Channel 4 in the 1980s) and with the 'community' broadcasters of the 1970s
and 1980s. The problem with this balancing act is that it repeatedly teeters on the
edge of the same reductive patterns as its precedents; if we overemphasise the
public interest, we risk new forms of political and cultural closure and hierarchy, but
if we abandon the attempt to define some overarching public interest, we open up a
new marketplace of ideas in which irresponsibility, monopoly and fragmentation are
the only norm. This dilemma is the subject of this section.
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The balancing act of 'public interest access' reflects a fundamental contradiction
between two conceptions of community and two ways of 'constructing' the media
audience. At one level, community describes the point where individual and
collective interests and experiences intersect; the geographical 'community of place'
or the 'community of interest' form the basic building blocks of 'community
broadcasting' and underpin the pluralism and accountability sought by the post-
Reithian BBC under Hugh Greene, Channel Four's eclectic diversity and the U.S.
system of localised public service broadcasting established in 1967. I will refer to
this version of community as the community of loyalties. At the same time
'community' in broadcasting also refers to a consensual framework within which
these competing local clusters of interests and experiences can interact. For local
'community' broadcasters this broader framework is the cosy consensus of 'the
whole community' in a particular area, overarching 'special interests' and
minorities; for national broadcasters, the framework is the 'national interest' and
describes the cohesive political public sphere of dialogue and debate which
transcends local loyalties, seen as essential to a democratic state. I will refer to this
version of community as the community of neutrality.
Obviously these two versions of community are liable to come into conflict. Local
communities of loyalty may acquire their cohesiveness directly from their fear of the
broader community of neutrality. For example in Sweden, racist groups in Malmii
used neighbourhood radio stations (ndrradio) to campaign in 1985 elections, thereby
offending collective social norms of tolerance and justice in the broader Swedish
public; similarly in the former Yugoslavia, territorial, political and ethnic conflicts
were initially fuelled by broadcasters playing upon audience 'loyalties' (Price 1995,
47 - 49). In British and U.S. public service broadcasting the conflict between the
local community of loyalty and the national community of neutrality has emerged in
questions of taste and decency. In the U.S. public broadcasting system the
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combination of local production units and national networking capability results in
frequent clashes between stations over acceptable levels of quality or over political
content, exacerbated by the imbalance between the larger, wealthier stations which
through their purchasing power are able to impose their tastes on the system as a
whole (Powell and Friedkin 1986, 253 - 255).
More important than the inevitable conflict resulting from these competing
conceptions of community is the question as to how either conception measures up to
the reality of what Ang calls "the social world of actual audiences" (Ang 1995, 13).
According to Ang, broadcasters solve the problem of never knowing how, why or
by whom television is really watched by conjuring up a fictional image of their
audience. This fiction serves to reinforce the "institutional point of view",
objectifying the complex processes of television viewing around static categories to
be manipulated by policy makers and marketers. In Ang's terms, what I have
labelled the community of loyalty and the community of neutrality are no more than
convenient fictional categories.
The myth of a national common cultural framework lay at the heart of Reith's vision
of broadcasting as a national monopoly and of the 'trusteeship' model of U.S.
commercial broadcasting in 'the public interest'. Rather than directly challenge this
idea of consensual broadcasting, community media advocates simply transferred it to
the local level, aiming to create a local public sphere ('lokale Offentlichkeit') based
on an assumption of 'common interest' and 'shared relevance' and an elision of
'local and 'community' media (Hollander and Stappers 1992, 21 - 22). Local public
service broadcasting follows the same logic. In the U.S. the Carnegie Commission
saw localism as a guarantee of community involvement (Carnegie 1967, 87 - 88); in
Britain official reports and parliamentary white papers expected BBC and
commercial local radio to make "a significant contribution to the democratic life of
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local communities" (Wright 1982, 50). The 'local community' was seen as the
cornerstone of public service broadcasting and the building block for democratic
politics; by making local politicians and local political issues accessible, local media
would mobilise a grassroots political involvement. The myth of a 'community of
neutrality', open to all yet devoid of any materially defined characteristics, was thus
used to support a connection between cultural democracy and political democracy.
This ideal of a local 'neutral space' for community involvement, especially political
involvement, was a direct extension of the nineteenth century settlement house's
universal, 'neutral' community of culture, removed from sectarian and class
interests. The educational mission of U.S. public television can be seen as a
continuation of the 'self-improving' educational institutions of the nineteenth
century89 . The unattainable ideal of neutrality may explain why U.S. public
broadcasting continues to be criticised for its 'middle class' conservative
undercurrent, even though the diversity of its programming and its audiences
compares favourably with the more crudely segmented approach of commercial
broadcasting.
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS), created in 1967, extended the U.S. 'public interest' access model introduced
in Red Lion. U.S. public broadcasting was thus premised on a 'neutral' public
sphere within which 'alternative' viewpoints could be articulated and within which
'the public' could become involved in dialogue and debate in 'public' issues. At the
same time it sought to 'represent' the various 'communities of loyalties', the
minorities and 'special interest' groups excluded or marginalised by commercial
broadcasting.
89 Revealingly the Carnegie Commission's 1967 manifesto for public television reproduced the
testimonial of E B White, comparing public television to "our Lyceum, our Chautauqua" (Carnegie
1967, 13).
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The dual challenge for public broadcasting in the U.S. was to define a normative,
collective 'public interest' and to define its relationship with its audience. Without
this normative framework, public broadcasting would become no more than a
glorified public access channel, with competing groups demanding their 'right' to be
heard and separate audiences tuning into 'their' programmes and ignoring the rest.
Public broadcasting responded to this challenge in two ways. First, separate,
competing communities of interest and their constituent perspectives were framed
within a highly professionalised, 'neutral' world view which drew on U.S.
broadcasting's tradition of 'objectivity' and balance, modelled on the FCC's old
standard of 'fairness'. Secondly, U.S. public broadcasting, in the public service
tradition, constructed its audiences as a public of citizens, not a market of
consumers. Modelled on eighteenth century Enlightenment ideals of 'citizenship', it
was assumed that this idealised public was be interested in debate and dialogue
involving issues affecting their lives, not just in immediate 'gratifications'.
Individual taste would thus be shaped by memberships of communities and social
responsibilities.
As with the British 'community television' experiments of the 1970s, the idea of
'neutrality' in U.S. public broadcasting remained highly suspect. Studies of public
television's programmes, including the flagship news programme 'McNeill-Lehrer
Newshour', have confirmed a tendency to favour 'establishment' viewpoints and
spokespersons over 'minority' or 'oppositional' perspectives (women, ethnic
minorities, trade unions) (Aufderheide 1988; Hoynes 1994, 72 - 85), while cultural
offerings tend towards a pastiche of 'respectable' culture, drawing heavily on bland
British imports. These observations suggest that public television, like commercial
television, is pitching a 'safe', inoffensive programming strategy in order to attract
advertisers and a `consensual' viewing public. Three related explanations have been
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offered for this 'mainstreaming' effect;	 the first is economic, the second
professional, the third organisational.
First, most critics agree that the conservative tilt in U.S. public service broadcasting
has an economic basis, with the system's insecure funding base, dating especially
from the Nixon presidency in the early 1970s and the attack under Reagan in the
early 1980s, resulting in an increasing dependence on advertising income or
'underwriting' and subscribers 90. The needs and interests of 'underwriters',
subscribers and internal fundraising staff have inevitably influenced programming
policy, favouring a predominantly 'safe' (non-controversial, reassuring)
programming mix directed at middle class opinion formers, consumers and
subscribers in the audience.
Secondly, the professional journalist's cult of 'objectivity' has neutralised and
sanitised controversial opinions within a reassuringly bland framework, much like
the 'media frames' in commercial television criticised by Kellner (1990) and Gitlin
(1980). While this neutralising effect is partly a reflection of professional
journalistic and production codes in television news (Entman 1989, 39 - 74), in
public television the 'realm of expertise' has been predominantly white, male and
middle class (Aufderheide 1988). Professional 'neutrality' here shades into an
exclusion of dissidents and minorities, as with the McNeill-Lehrer Newshour's
preference for 'civil interviewing' over strident confrontation and for 'official'
interpreters over 'activists' (Hoynes 1994, 85; 76 - 80).
90 In 1973 public television received 70% of its funding from the public purse and less than 30%
from 'private' sources. In the early 1980s public funding declined and private funding dramatically
increased; by the mid-1980s public television relied on private sources for over half of its income.
In 1990 the 53.4% proportion of 'private' income included 21.9% from subscribers (three times 1973
figures) and 16.8% from business (four times 1973 figures) (Hoynes 1994, 92). 'Enhanced
underwriting', introduced in 1984 as part of the Reagan-inspired deregulation of public television
advertising, was little more than a euphemism for advertising. (For more details, see: Hoynes 1994,
15 - 17; 93 - 107); Rowland 1976, 127 - 130; Rowland 1986, 260 - 269; Powell and Friedkin
1986; Engelman 1996, 193 - 5)
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The third explanation offered for public broadcasting's conservative 'frame' is
organisational (Rowland 1976, 120 - 127, 132 - 133; Engelman 1996, 168 - 169).
It is argued that the balance of power between the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting and member stations was undermined during the Nixon presidency.
The effect was to centralise production decisions within the CPB and a handful of
larger stations, and to centralise programming decisions within conservative local
boards, resulting in a conservative, 'mainstream' bias at local and national level.
While these factors have undoubtedly had a constraining effect on public television,
I believe that the central problem for U.S. public television has not been the
insidious imposition of middle class control, but the pursuit of an unattainable ideal
of 'neutrality' in its audience. The community of neutrality, based on a fictional
construction of the television audiences as disinterested 'citizens' ruled by their best
selves, is a nineteenth century invention. As in the nineteenth century, the conscious
shedding of class interest may itself be seen as a product of middle class guilt; self-
denial and the cult of service reflect a strand of middle class opinion at odds with its
own inheritance of privilege and 'useless' education. In this sense 'neutrality' may
be seen as a form of middle class self-deception, not as a devious attempt to
reintroduce elite control and 'hegemony' under the cloak of consensus. The
problem for U.S. public broadcasting has not been 'middle class control' so much as
its deference to a non-existent consensus.
A similar deference to a 'neutral', consensual community prevails at the level of
British local broadcasting, reflected in its "bland and breezy consensual style"
(Wright 1982, 53). Commercial local broadcasters in Britain use the fiction of the
'whole community' to relegate other community ties (ethnic background, class,
common interests) to the status of 'special interests'. Thus the managing director of
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Radio Hallam in Sheffield argues that to broadcast 'minority' programmes would be
"selfish and indulgent" and "a firm switch-off for everybody else" (MacDonald
1978) while according to Piccadilly Radio in Manchester, "every programme
broadcast to a narrow minority excludes an alienated majority" (Crookes and Vittet-
Philippe 1986, 131). Politically, this argument rests on the idea that audiences are
unitary collective entities with clearly demarcated interests and tastes; any attempt
to define audiences as complex, diverse entities with multiple, conflicting needs is
rejected as a form of sectarian special pleading.
The community of loyalties is no less 'fictive' than the community of neutrality.
Here instead of a 'neutral' consensus, 'community' broadcasting is based on
clusterings of common interests, ethnicity, taste or age bracket or on geographical
boundaries. The attempt to define cultural and political loyalties according to
geography is the great red herring of 'community' broadcasting. Politically
'community' issues are not confined to the local level; as Crookes and Vittet-
Philippe note, most economic and political decisions affecting individuals and
communities are made higher up the line at the national (or international) level,
overriding the "deliberately marginal structures" of local community broadcasters
(Crookes and Vittet-Philippe 1986, 131). Culturally, individuals do not necessarily
conform to the 'ideal type' of the community consensus, seeking to escape
community ties either by attaching themselves to some larger, external aggregate
(consumerism, the global village) or to alternative 'minority' sub-cultures within the
normative consensus (youth cultures, ethnic groups). In a study of cable television
viewers in Norway, K Lundby has noted differing degrees of 'territoriality' and
'distancing' in viewers; some identify closely with the local `territorial' community,
some want to distance themselves from local attachments, while others seek both
'territoriality' and 'distancing' simultaneously. In turn Lundby notes 'cosmopolitan'
and 'local' orientations in viewers corresponding with 'outward' and 'settled'
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relations to local communities; these different orientations are satisfied by different
types of media, with subjects in one community in the study preferring local,
community channels and the other preferring transnational satellite channels (Lundby
1992). Lundby concludes that local television appeals to "a shrinking base of settled
people in a given territory - essentially enclaves in the society at large" while "the
"outward-oriented part of the population is growing and seeking new channels in
order to feed their distance-oriented mode of interaction and communication" (ibid.,
40)
Attempts to hold broadcasting accountable to a collective 'community of loyalties'
have repeatedly failed to allow for the fluid, multiple attachments observed by
Lundby. In the 1980s the Dutch `pillarisecl' broadcasting system, based on audience
'membership' of discrete religious and political communities, was undermined by a
combination of internal (commercial) and external (satellite) competitors who
challenged audience loyalties by providing a 'post-loyal' programming mix
(Abramson et al. 1988, 190 - 210; Smith 1973; Price 1995, 68 - 69). The
subsequent reforms of Dutch broadcasting in the 1987 Media Act contained an
acknowledgement that audiences did not conform to the fixity of `pillarisation' and
that loyalties were more fluid than a fixed attachment to a single 'community'. In
their research into British radio audiences, Barnett and Morrison found that
individual attachments to communities, whether based on geographical or
'voluntary' ties, tended to be flexible and conditional (Barnett and Morrison 1989).
The result of this flexibility is that community broadcasters are often superseded by
commercial, 'post-loyal' broadcasters, as occurred in France and the Netherlands in
the 1980s. The 'post-loyal' broadcaster may form a temporary alliance with the
'community' broadcaster in order to defeat the common enemy of monopoly
broadcasting, only to abandon its local attachments for a more schematic, generic
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programming strategy when the economic reality of commercial competition begins
to bite.
On the one hand audiences are modelled according to a 'community of loyalties' in
which individual preferences are modelled according to the fixed categories of
geography, social class, race, or 'sub-culture'; this logic results in the diversity-by-
numbers of Dutch pillarisation or the U.S. experiment in 'ownership access',
whereby the FCC sought to guarantee a particular brand of ethnic content by
granting ownership of a station to a particular ethnic group. On the other hand,
audiences are expected to rise above these merely local loyalties in order to
participate in a 'community of neutrality', where debate and dialogue replace
separatism and 'special interests'. Neither of these versions of 'community' reflects
the real experiences and interests of audiences; consequently the community
broadcasters have found themselves under attack from 'post-loyal' commercial
broadcasters better able to cope with the unpredictable whims of consumer demand.
If audiences are 'post-loyal' and 'community' is no more than a convenient fiction,
we are returned to the atomised individualism of the marketplace of ideas. Yet this
model of broadcasting, as noted in the previous section, is based on a similarly
'fictive' construction of audiences, namely the idea that audiences are merely
consumers whose various needs can be satisfied by a sufficient range of products and
services. I believe that audiences' needs and wants are more complex, and that a
media system must satisfy collective as well as individual needs. To discover a way
through the 'public interest' and 'marketplace of ideas' rationales for broadcasting
and media access, we must return to Habermas's public sphere, applying a more
fluid, multiple idea of community and identity beyond the static consensus of fixed
communities.
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4.9	 Splitting the difference: community and postmodernity
In this section I will close the current chapter by examining how new definitions of
community and individual identity open up new possibilities for cultural and media
policy, suggesting how a modern 'democratic' media system might respond
simultaneously to competing 'materialist' and 'idealist' assumptions about culture's
relationship to the community and the individual.
Commentators attempting to define 'community' have noted a shift in Western
societies over the last thirty years from territorial communities of place to "multiple
social networks"; this shift is linked with improved communications, improved
transport and changing patterns of work and residence (Wellman 1979, 1204 - 8;
Wilmott 1989). The shift may also be at least partly dependent on social class;
Wilmott notes that the traditional working class 'territorial' community, based on
long residence, shared workplace, kinship ties and lack of transport appears to be in
decline, while the middle class enjoy easier access to more disparate, more fluid
social networks (Wilmott 1989, 13 - 17). The 'liberated' model of community
described by Wellman depends on the ability to forge and sustain a "loosely bounded
web" of multiple connections in place of "tightly bounded solidary communities"
(Wellman 1979, 1216). From a feminist perspective, the `new' forms of community
may be especially liberating for women who have been forced into subservient roles
in the older 'involuntary' community (Friedman 1992). While the consensus among
commentators seems to be that the new, multiple forms of community are gradually
taking the place of the older, rooted communities of place, the trend may not be
universal. 'Multiple social networks' depend upon a degree of social and economic
mobility, and are more likely to develop among the relatively affluent middle class;
they are also more likely to develop among the young, among city dwellers and
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among those who are dissatisfied with 'traditional' social roles (Barnett and
Morrison 1989, 52).
Applying these trends to 'community' media, 'local media' depend primarily upon
working class communities of place rather than middle class communities of choice,
and are more likely to appeal to rural communities and older people than to city
dwellers and the young (Barnett and Morrison 1989, 57 - 69). By the same token,
city dwellers are likely to demand other forms of 'community media' based on life-
style or ethnic identity rather than location, as in the range of youth-oriented music
and ethnic radio stations in London (ibid., 70 - 71).
New patterns of allegiance or community and new forms of 'community media'
among young urban audiences are also related to new forms of ethnic identity. Not
only are British and U.S. cities characterised by an increasingly diverse mix of
races, religions, languages and cultures, but also individual citizens are likely to
characterise their ethnic and cultural background as an intersection of loyalties; this
is the phenomenon of the "modern hyphenate citizen" noted by the 2000 Partnership
in Los Angeles (2000 Partnership 1991, 7). This confused sense of ethnic identity is
for many immigrant communities a matter of necessity, caught between an estranged
'parent' community and an inhospitable 'host' community; meanwhile white ethnic
groups may undergo a similar identity crisis as a matter of choice, as they attempt to
reinvent themselves or to escape burdensome associations and affiliations (Price
1994, 50 - 54). The contemporary convergence of ethnic minorities and young
bohemians in British and American cities can be seen as a repetition of the shared
identity crisis of middle class college graduates and European immigrants in the
nineteenth century settlement house. For ethnic minorities, race routinely emerges
as a more salient factor in defining community identity than social class (Price 1994,
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59); for immigrant groups, race is clearly also likely to be a more salient factor in
determining identity than geographical location.
'Postmodern' formulations of a crisis in personal identity thus have specific roots in
changing patterns of British and U.S. society, especially in the context of urban
living. We can expect the modern 'hyphenate' citizen to assume a number of
different roles in relation to a range of different, sometimes overlapping
communities. The tendency towards multiple roles and attachments is exacerbated
by similar tendencies in modern media. First of all, as noted by Ang (1991) and
Silverstone (1990), the qualitative experience of watching television is complicated
by context and content; viewers draw on a multitude of different social roles while
identifying with `polysemic' television texts. While role-play is not taken to the
extremes of interactive media such as computer games, television offers similar
possibilities both for escapism and for oblique recreations of 'real' social situations.
Secondly, the quantitative impact of multiplying channels and the fractured flow of
'non-stop' programming encourages a similar multiplicity of responses.
Returning to Habermas' public sphere, reformulated according to Hohendahl as a
series of interconnecting 'counter-public spheres' and 'partial social systems'
(Hohendahl 1979, 116), a more fluid and flexible version of the 'public interest'
becomes available. The 'public interest' is open and emendable because, according
to Hohendahl, different 'norms' are "constructed from identity projections" (ibid.)
and individuals are constructed from different 'memberships' of different
communities. This idea of multiple, overlapping 'public interests' is not to be
equated with straightforward cultural relativism because values and meanings are
negotiated collectively, both within and between competing groups. Similarly, the
idea of multiple social roles replaces the private / public dichotomy in Habermas's
original eighteenth century version of the public sphere.
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This concept of a multi-dimensional public sphere offers a potential compromise
between 'public interest' and 'marketplace of ideas' versions of broadcasting. The
'marketplace of ideas' is premised on private rights and individual transactions
between consumers and producers; while it challenges the vested interests of
monopoly broadcasters and the fiction of a 'mass' public, the model fails to account
for collective needs based on public rights to information as the cornerstone of a
democratic political system. The 'public interest' model is premised on a collective,
common interest to which broadcasters owe public duties and obligations; this
system avoids the atomism of individual 'rights' but is based on static, collective
categories of 'community' which bear only a 'fictive' relation to the real social
world of audiences. There is also a danger that the fictive 'public interest' is
coopted by some private interest group which claims to 'represent' the public will
(the state executive, professional lobbyists, political or religious extremists) and used
to exclude minorities and opponents. The multi-dimensional public sphere is
premised on an idea of individual identity shaped by a shifting pattern of collective
interests; this pattern reflects the multiple roles and memberships available to the
individual, while at the public level it describes a collective public interest which is
continually being renegotiated according to different interactions between groups and
individuals.
This attempt to redefine the relationship between private rights and the public
interest has recently been the subject of a debate between `communitarians' and
'liberals' (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992; Kymlicica 1992; Mulhall and Swift 1992;
Etzioni 1995). Where the debate in the 1960s centred on the allocation of material
goods and rights of ownership, the debate in the 1980s and 1990s has taken a more
metaphysical turn, centring on theories of the 'self'. John Rawls, usually identified
as a 'liberal', has used the concept of an 'unencumbered self' or an 'original
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condition' as a rhetorical device to describe the attempt to set aside personal self-
interest in the search for 'objective' social justice; Rawls" original position', like
Schiller's distinction between 'person' and 'condition' describes two separate tiers in
identity, the public and private self, but he also implies (like Schiller) that these
selves cannot be separated. Ultimately, Rawls suggests that 'objective' social justice
(a collective, 'normative' value) remains an unattainable ideal because the individual
'unencumbered self' cannot step outside collective beliefs, interests and values.
Meanwhile 'communitarians' have echoed Rawls' dualism, describing a 'thick' and
'thin' self, with the autonomous, individual self encrusted with layers of collectively
negotiated values and meanings, the product of a loose aggregate of socialising
influences analogous to Williams' 'structure of feeling'; while communitarians tend
to see these ties between the individual self and the community not as 'voluntary
associations' but as inevitable facts, both liberals and communitarians describe a
multiplicity of such associations ('nesting multi-memberships') and a complex
interaction between individual and collective identity. In a repeat of the Marxist
debate over 'determination' in the 1970s, communitarians and liberals in the 1980s
and 1990s differ only in the degree of importance they attach to external
'socialising' influences on the individual; where they agree is in shunning either a
purely autonomous or determinist view of individual identity and stressing a mutual
interaction between individual development and collective allegiances and
influences.
Using the idea of a private self and a public self (based on multiple loyalties or
memberships), it is possible to sketch the requirements for an 'accessible' and
'democratic' media system. First, the needs of a 'hyphenate' citizen are not to be
met by a single 'public interest' broadcaster; any concept of 'public service'
broadcasting must be both pluralistic and capable of reinventing its own
categorisations, instead of becoming trapped in static constructions of 'what the
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audience wants / needs'. Such a system is likely to require public subsidy, since
reliance on advertising income has, in the past, pushed broadcasters towards
advertiser-friendly aggregates of consumers, determined by fixed demographic
categories which have little to do with real audience interests and behaviour.
Secondly, broadcasters needs to take account of the different ways television
programming is watched. Specifically, we can make a distinction between the
'public' and 'private' needs of the viewer (Aufderheide 1992, 60 - 62). According
to Aufderheide, while commercial, entertainment-oriented television is designed to
satisfy the 'private' needs of individual consumers, public, non-commercial
television aims to satisfy public needs for information. Public television assumes
that its audience is 'public-spirited'; the standard for judgement in assessing the
'public interest' according to William Melody should be "what does the public need
to know in order to function most effectively as a responsible citizenry in a
participatory democracy?" (Melody 1990, 36). It is clearly unrealistic to expect
audiences to behave as 'public-spirited citizens' all of the time; for part of the time
they will also behave as private consumers. Public interest and public access
channels have always represented a marginal part of the U.S. broadcasting system
when measured in terms of audience share; however, they are likely to have a
powerful effect on viewers on the occasions when they watch (Aufderheide 1992,
60). The 'public interest' broadcasting channels will therefore be expected to exist
alongside commercial entertainment channels, posing familiar problems of
competition and viability.
Finally, public access and community broadcasters must recognise the distinction
made by Monroe Price between 'open' and 'closed' terrain of free speech (Price
1995, 216 - 223). 'Closed' channels target specific communities and have no
responsibility to appeal to those outside these communities; the open terrain of
broadcasting meanwhile aims to promote a common culture between different
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communities, through shared events, a shared political sphere and a dialogue
between separate interest groups. Price notes that the current trend is towards
closure, with channels not only focusing on "intense diasporic communities" but
also setting up economic barriers (pay-per-view, premium cable channels) which
separate out the information haves and have-nots, while the open terrain of
broadcasting is being gradually abandoned. Access advocates have in the past
tended to pursue a 'closed' version of media access in which 'representative'
channels narrowcast to a specific audience. This community-building, `diasporic'
form of broadcasting is undoubtedly important, especially for minorities and other
groups marginalised from 'mainstream' broadcasting. However, public access
advocates also need to promote some form of dialogue between these divergent
channels of communication, allowing viewers to transfer allegiances and experiment
with alternative 'memberships', hence avoiding the static, monolithic fixity of so-
called 'community' broadcasting. The analogy here is with the search for 'open-
minded space' in urban planning (Walzer 1986), or the need for access to
"centralised mainstages" alongside "culturally specific resources" in arts policy
(Yoshitomi 1991, 205 - 206). Such 'open-minded space' provides something other
than a 'marketplace for ideas', a space "designed for a variety of uses, including
unforeseen and unforeseeable uses, and used by citizens who do different things and
are prepared to tolerate, even take an interest in, things they don't do" (Walzer
1986, 470).
In trying to imagine what a two-tier broadcasting system might look like, I believe
we must begin with the idea of multifunctionalism. Different media offer different
opportunities for 'open' and 'closed' communication. The most recent example has
been the various uses of the interne, where 'closed' forms of communication
(private e-mail messages, specialist information services, 'chat' rooms and bulletin
boards) coexist with 'open' forms (the world wide web, electronic publishing, the
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practice of internet `surfing'); it is also possible to blur these distinctions, by
making private conversations public or by switching from an 'open' forum to a
private e-mail. The promise of the internet today is an ironic reminder of the earlier
technological utopianism of 'new media' in the 1970s; it remains to be seen whether
the system can retain its flexibility and multiple uses in the face of increased
commercial exploitation and official censorship. For the time being however, the
interne is an exception to the rule of specialisation, closure and privatisation of the
public sphere, and may offer lessons for broadcasters. 'Interactive' television has
until now been either pipe dream or gimmick; it is however possible to imagine a
combination of public access channels, teletext services and specialised cable
channels functioning like a computerised 'bulletin board' or newsgroup, with or
without the added novelty of genuine two-way communication. Similarly it is
possible to imagine a televised equivalent of the world wide web, based on ongoing
live coverage of public affairs and 'raw' news (C-SPAN's coverage of the US
Senate and Congress is a current example) through which the viewer may 'surf'
without interference from official mediators. Finally we can imagine connections
between private (closed) and public (open) channels. Private forms of
communication may become public, as with the BBC Community Programme Unit's
Video Diaries, giving private stories a public significance, or the Gulf Television's
Project's leap from narrowcast 'access' programming to national coverage by way of
the U.S. public broadcasting network (Paper Tiger 1991 35 - 38). Public channels
might likewise splinter into private discussion groups, using the televisual equivalent
of hypertext.
Of course such a flexible, multifunctional system of broadcasting would require a
reversal of the current trend towards homogeneity, 'streamlining' and
monofunctionalism (the single function being the provision of mass entertainment);
it would also require an active public prepared to 'use' television in unaccustomed
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ways, the kind of unpredictable public described by Ten Ang and Paul Willis.
Private enterprise has always been ready to exploit new functions of television for
profit, from home shopping to telephony; public broadcasters need to do the same.
Finally, if public 'multifunctional' television is to coexist with a privatised system
still fixated on a 'mass' public of passive consumers, any new 'two-tier'
broadcasting system would also require a reversal of the current laissez-faire
approach to media monopolies; public broadcasters and local broadcasters would
need to be ring-fenced, allowing them the space and resources to experiment, not
just to survive. A genuinely multifunctional broadcasting system is unlikely to
flourish in a 'free' market where the bottom line concern is with delivering passive
audiences to advertisers.
Returning to the 'open' and 'closed' distinction, and to the two versions of media
access described in this chapter, I would argue that these forms of broadcasting are
actually complementary. Broadcasting has a role to play in defining and reinforcing
distinctive individual and community identities and in providing a platform for
eccentric and marginal points of view; it also has a responsibility to provide
opportunities for collective deliberation and exchange. Such a view of the 'public
interest' in broadcasting is premised on a polycentric view of social structures and a
multiperspectival view of individual identity; 'communities' are not fixed entities
but are born out of competing and conflicting loyalties which are continually being
renegotiated. As Gerald Yoshitomi notes, American citizens "live on the hyphen"
(Yoshitomi 1991, 214); broadcasters must be prepared to live on the borders




5.1	 Contradiction and Equilibrium
In this study I have described an 'incurable structural contradiction' between two
conceptions of culture, the idealist concept of culture as a transcendent 'general
perfection' and the materialist concept of culture as a 'superstructure' determined by
social and economic relations. This contradiction has spilled into other concepts, in
particular into competing theories of a 'common culture' and 'community' as the
basis for 'cultural democracy'. Over the last hundred years, these contradictions
have erupted into 'moments' of crisis, including (but not limited to) the four
'moments' reviewed in this study. During the crisis, different factions have
mobilised to promote 'new' cultural policies, reacting against the supposed
limitations of 'established' cultural policies of the past. However, rather than
breaking with the past, these competing factions have succeeded only in rearranging
the pattern of inherited contradictions into a new, temporary equilibrium, perhaps
with a different centre of gravity. In time old contradictions have resurfaced, and
the cycle has been repeated.
In this conclusion I want to link this pattern of contradiction and crisis to a current
perception of 'post-policy' and 'collapsing rationales' in contemporary cultural
policy (Bennett 1995). In particular I want to return to the idea of a 'common
culture' as the basis for a revived cultural democracy and consider whether this
notion must indeed be consigned to the intellectual scrap-heap.
Personally I find 'letting go' of the intellectual props of cultural idealism and
cultural materialism extremely difficult. This is not merely nostalgia; the effects of
'post-policy' are arguably already upon us, reminding of what we stand to lose if we
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discard 'outmoded' ideologies of the past. Perhaps it is possible to construct our
own 'unstable equilibrium' out of the ideological wreckage of 'idealist' and
'materialist' conceptions of culture and community, a new 'usable past'. In the last
remaining pages of this study I am not going to present a blueprint for such a
reconstruction, only to argue that the attempt is both necessary and not entirely
hopeless.
I will begin by reviewing 'materialist' and 'idealist' assumptions in recent cultural
policy and cultural analysis. I will argue that these positions are indeed no longer
convincing, either theoretically or pragmatically / empirically. I will then consider
two possible reactions to this collapsing intellectual framework. The first position is
a kind of intellectual resignation which accepts the inevitability of 'post-policy'.
The second position is an attempt to rediscover what is valuable in the old
intellectual positions and to reconnect them with a revitalised search for 'cultural
democracy'. Finally I will return to the alternative theoretical tradition, advanced
by Williams, Gramsci, Habermas and others, which attempts to bridge the
'incurable' contradiction between materialism and idealism. Can the 'politics of
equilibrium' provide an alternative rationale for cultural analysis and cultural policy,
a new basis for 'cultural democracy'?
5.2 Breaking Point: Materialism and Idealism Revisited
In this section I will explore the impacts of 'materialist' and 'idealist' assumptions
on cultural policy and analysis. I will argue that the historical pattern, in which
contradictory assumptions are momentarily reconciled only to re-erupt into fresh
conflicts, can also be applied to ouur own situation. Familiar assumptions have been
stretched to a new 'breaking point', leaving cultural policy and analysis in a state of
confusion.
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The impacts of idealist and materialist assumptions on cultural policy and analysis in
this study fall into three phases. First, in the initial phase of cultural policy
formation, 'materialist' and 'idealist' assumptions have provided various policy
makers with coherent but competing rationales for cultural policy. By playing upon
these competing and often contradictory assumptions it has been possible to mobilise
coalitions of stakeholders in support of various 'new' cultural institutions and
policies. Thus in the late nineteenth century different strands of middle class
opinion drew on competing idealist and materialist rationales in their support for the
new 'free' institutions and contradictory arguments were mobilised by supporters of
the public libraries in the House of Commons. However, behind this coalition lay
deep contradictions between different expectations and beliefs; Jane Addams,
Robert Woods, Samuel Barnett, national 'Progressive' politicians and local
philanthropists may all have suubscribed to 'the university settlement idea' but they
did so for very different reasons.
In the second phase of policy development, coalitions between 'materialist' and
'idealist' rationales have disintegrated into mutual recrimination and factional
conflict, as with the stand-off between ideological puritans and pragmatists in the
British community arts movement in the 1980s or the conflicts between local
administrators and federal directors of the federal arts projects in the 1930s. At the
psychological level, contradictory and competing assumptions have also been
internalised by many of the cultural missionaries, artists and activists committed to a
'democratic' culture, for example, the nineteenth century settlement worker who
turned her external doubts over the meaning and value of a `culturalisr educational
tradition into an internalised process of self-disgust, self-denial and self-doubt, or the
'committed' artists who attacked their own bourgeois individualism in the 1930s.
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The third phase of impacts takes place not at the level of cultural policy but in
cultural theory and analysis. Here the process of coalition and disintegration
(factional conflict, internalised self-accusation) in the formation of cultural policy
and institutions has been subjected to contradictory 'materialist' and 'idealist'
critiques. Thus there have recurred in this study radically different accounts of
'democratising' cultural institutions and policies, from the competing 'heroic' and
`hegemonic' accounts of the nineteenth century library to the more recent debates
between `culturalist optimists' and 'cultural determinists' over the relationship
between culture, community and class and over the 'ideological effects' of the
media.
In each of these three phases, the stitching together of 'materialist' and 'idealist'
assumptions in order to rationalise the construction of cultural institutions and
cultural policy positions, whether at the level of policy formation or of retrospective
analysis, is highly unsatisfactory. Once we pick apart the assumptions behind each
moment of 'unstable equilibrium' and expose the underlying idealist and materialist
positions, we are left with two fundamentalist belief systems, neither of which is
convincing. In the late twentieth century, the underlying 'materialist' and 'idealist'
assumptions which prop up cultural policy have again unravelled and been stretched
to breaking point. Exposed in all their naked, threadbare extremity, they are no
longer convincing as a basis for cultural policy or cultural analysis. If we are going
to try to stitch them back together, we must first attempt to revise them, removing
some of their excesses. Alternatively, we can simply discard 'idealism' and
'materialism' altogether and enter the brave new world of 'post-policy' and 'anti-
theory'; however, I will argue that this `postmodernist' position carries its own
dangers.
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Based on the scheme outlined above, I will begin by picking out what I believe to be
the 'fundamentals' of cultural idealism and materialism in cultural policy formation.
I will then consider how 'second phase' conflicts have brought latent contradictions
between these ideological positions into the open, and how these conflicts have in
turn been reproduced in cultural analysis (phase 3). Applying this model to our
contemporary situation, the three phases described below define a 'breaking point' in
cultural policy and analysis, setting the framework for the remainder of this
conclusion.
Phase 1: Materialism, Idealism and Cultural Policy Formation
In a materialist theory of culture, culture is determined by 'social relations'; in
other words different 'artistic' cultures (culture as works of art) will arise out of
different 'anthropological' or 'sociological' cultures (culture as the way of life of a
particular community or social class). Crucially, the artistic 'superstructure' (works
of art, 'texts', artists themselves, all the processes of artistic production and
consumption) is seen to be subordinate to and dependent upon the 'productive
forces' of the 'base' (for example social class, the political economy of the culture
industry, dominant political and economic structures). The secondary, subordinate
place of artistic production and consumption in the materialist scheme results in a
kind of contempt for artistic culture based on its ineffective, dependent status (the
source for the 'secret self-contempt' noted by La.sch and the sense of 'uselessness'
experienced by Addams). Taken to its extreme this 'materialist' logic results in a
blinkered populism, based on a reductive and stereotypical view of the relationships
between class, community, culture and the individual.
'Populist' cultural policies are based on a distinction between an 'authentic' culture
which is the product of social class or 'community' (the materialist 'base') and an
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artificial culture which is created through the patronage of the elite. Thus both
Holger Cahill and Jane Addams sought to preserve a popular folk culture rooted in
indigenous communities (eg. the revival of handicrafts in the Hull House Labor
Museum, the preservation of American folk arts in Cahill's Index of American
Design). At the same time both attacked the rootless artificiality of contemporary
culture; Cahill criticised European masterpieces and Parisian salons as representing
an art which was 'dislocated' from its social context, while the young Addams
reflected on the 'burden' of culture which separated her from the realities of
ordinary experience during her 'grand tour' of Europe. In contemporary cultural
policy, this logic leads to attacks on subsidised 'elite' culture because it has ceased to
connect with the common culture of 'ordinary people' or 'the working class' (cf.
Braden 1978).
Populist attacks on elite culture cut across the political spectrum. For a leftist like
William Morris, the irrelevance of 'bourgeois' art stems from its removal from "the
labour of the mass of mankind"; thus "art under plutocracy" degenerates into mere
"sham ornament" and "upholstery" (Morris 1884/1979, 62 - 67). Morris's
arguments lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is only through the abolition of
'sham' art that 'true' art can flourish; only by crossing the 'river of fire' and
creating the new society can we recover the lost harmony between art and labour.
For the right, Morris's nostalgic medievalism is replaced by an idealisation of a
coherent national consensus; thus in Nazi cultural policy, authentic culture must
relate to the 'natural' tastes of 'ordinary, decent citizens', not to the decadent tastes
of minorities and degenerate art dealers. For the 'New Right' the popular will is
expressed through the market; subsidy and state interference only serve to distort
this market's efficient operation by creating artificial centres of production and
consumption. In each case, it is only through the abolition of a perverse, 'artificial'
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culture that an accountable, 'authentic' culture can be 'spontaneously' created by the
people.
While the British Left deployed a leftist populist rhetoric against the Arts Council in
the 1970s, it was left to the American Right to take the populist argument to its
logical conclusion in the late 1980s. Although they attacked 'unaccountable' artistic
subsidies as the source of an 'irrelevant', elitist culture, British community artists,
unable to escape their own debilitating 'grant addiction' (Kelly 1984), had a vested
interest in the system's survival. In the U.S. a coalition of political opportunists,
free marketeers and moral majoritarians, broadened the attack on a handful of
'unaccountable', 'anti-American' artists into a wholesale attack on federal patronage
(Bolton 1992). Unlike the British critics of Arts Council policy, they felt they had
nothing to lose.
The U.S. 'culture wars' of the late 1980s were sparked by a few photographs by
Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano which, it was claimed on their behalf, had
offended the sensibilities of conservatives and Christians. Neither artist's work
could be said to have been a product of subsidy. In Mapplethorpe's case the only
public funding involved had gone to the gallery which organised the touring
exhibition; Serrano had only received a small NEA grant, not specifically tied to the
offending 'Piss Christ' photograph. Both artists owed more to the 'free market' of
private galleries and individual collectors than to the NEA. Nevertheless, the
controversy was turned into a populist attack on the NBA, with Senator Jesse Helms
proposing an amendment preventing the NBA from funding work which was
offensive to the 'values and beliefs' of the American people. By focusing on the
NEA's 'elitism' and 'alienation' from majority opinion and values, the American
conservative right successfully exploited precisely those arguments for community
accountability and social responsibility which had been deployed by Holger Cahill in
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the 1930s and by British community artists in the 1970s 91 . Whether hostile
'community' feeling was a response to the work of the artists or the NEA or to the
accompanying political and media blitz is highly debatable 92 .
This populist position leads logically to a policy of 'laissez-faire'. If 'authentic' art
is determined by communities in defiance of the artificial machinery of state-
subsidised 'elite' culture, there can be no justification for interfering in the
'spontaneous' processes of cultural production. Base will determine superstructure.
From a political left perspective, this position translates into a faith in 'the
community' or 'the working class' as the source for a new, authentic culture
emerging spontaneously from the grassroots. Strictly speaking, the community artist
or animateur who genuinely believes in this alchemy has to pretend he or she does
not exist, melting into the background in order to give community creativity centre
stage. Similarly government intervention in culture has to be disguised as non-
intervention in order not to preempt local initiative; as Hoggart noted in 1976, "you
want a spontaneous autochthonous culture, and you have to try and bring it to life by
government action" (Simpson 1976, 92). For the right, the assumption is that the
free market will respond efficiently to consumer demand, with every community
getting the culture it deserves, ignoring the market's crude aggregation of individual
wants into collective approximations of 'what people want' and the incompatibility
between different 'markets' (the market for profit, the market of ideas, the market
for loyalties) each operating at cross purposes. In spite of the right's faith in the
free market and the the left's faith in community, whenever local communities have
91 Ironically a leftist critique of artistic 'irresponsibility' was also available in the U.S. culture wars
(cf. Becker 1990). However, leftist critics of Mapplethorpe were in a quandary, unwilling to lend
support to the other side of Helms' political agenda, an opportunistic bid for the votes of the
conservative, Christian right. With a few exceptions, most of the left-wing contributors to Bolton's
book maintained a scrupulous political silence, preferring to defend Mapplethorpe and Serrano in
purely aesthetic terms (cf. Carole S Vance, in Bolton 1992, 108 - 114).
92 As Bolton notes, most of the public had not heard of Mapplethorpe or Serrano before the affair
broke "and they did not seem to get very exercised about them once they had" (Bolton 1992, p. 14).
Visitors to the exhibition, prior to the controversial Washington showing, were similarly mixed in
their response to the work.
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received access to cultural resources (a library, a community television station),
cultural consumption and participation have tended not to follow predictable lines of
accountability and 'common interest'; instead different factions, primarily the
upwardly mobile lower middle class and middle class activists and volunteers, have
taken advantage of the opportunities and moulded the new cultural resources in their
own image.
The materialist conception of culture assumes that cultural consumers and producers
will behave in predictable ways based on a simplistic, determinist model of the
relationship between 'base' and 'superstructure'. It follows that 'community' or
'class' represents a consensual block vote in favour of a particular brand of culture;
thus the working class, gay men and black people will automatically support the
production of 'working class', 'gay' and 'black' culture respectively. Not only is
this patronising, it assumes a coherence in the common culture of 'class' or
'community' which rarely exists in practice. The assumption that every
'community' will produce its own coherent 'culture' overlooks the complex
intersecting needs and interests which undermine any notion of community
'consensus'. The notion of 'the British working class' or 'ordinary, decent
Americans' being reproduced in a coherent, unified, 'authentic' culture ignores
precisely those sub-divisions of taste and sub-cultural versions of community
referred to by Serrano and Mapplethorpe; Serrano and Mapplethorpe positioned
their work in relation to one set of 'sub-cultural' communities (eg. gay, Hispanic,
ex-Catholic) and provoked opposition from others (eg. white, Protestant, straight).
Attempts to classify audience needs in terms of demographic categories based on
class, race, geography or 'community of interest' ignore these multiple community
memberships, the 'hyphenate' sense of cultural identity and the multiple uses of the
media and cultural resources which make cultural consumers unpredictable. Finally,
the determinist logic of materialism results in a kind of revolutionary fatalism on the
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left or a laissez-faire free-market liberalism on the right, with interventionist
culturalist policies seen as at best a harmless diversion, at worst a dangerous
distortion.
The idealist conception of culture takes the unpredictability of individuuals and
communities as its starting point. Social class, 'community' and the political
economy of culture are seen to be of a secondary level of importance in the
production and consumption of culture. Through culture, individuals are granted an
opportunity to perfect their 'best selves'. The idealist conception of culture
therefore focuses on the magical acts of individual transformation, not the collective
patterns of community and class. It is not that the cultural idealist is unaware of
these patterns; it could be argued that 'cultural idealists', such as Roy Shaw,
Richard Hoggart or Matthew Arnold, have a more sophisticated understanding of
social class than many of their materialist opponents. However, the cultural idealist
believes that the distinctions and barriers which define separate communities and
classes can be transcended or dissolved through culture. Accordingly an 'idealist'
cultural policy is concerned primarily with access and education; because
individuals are not 'determined' by their social position or their private beliefs, the
gift of culture opens opportunities for all, but will be received only by the few as an
act of individual 'free' choice. Cultural artifacts are seen in similarly anti-
determinist terms, as a universal common good, not the possession of a particular
social class, and cultural institutions are seen as ideologically neutral; there may be
physical and metaphorical barriers which need to be broken down through education,
but great art is seen to be universal. Cultural policy therefore consists in making the
best available to the most and awaiting the improving consequences on individual
'character'.
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The whole machinery of cultural and educational improvement, the public libraries,
university extension, settlement houses, the Open University, the BBC, the Arts
Council, is premised on the belief that individuals can choose to detach themselves
from their everyday social circumstances and receive the gift of culture, 'one by
one', as a matter of personal choice. Secondly it is assumed that cultural institutions
can (again, provided they choose to do so) exist outside and independent of the
determining structures of social and economic power.
However, the evidence in this study suggests that cultural institutions can never be
wholly ideologically neutral, no matter how they try; nor can the 'culture' that they
promulgate be stripped of its specific roots in a particular class or community or
history. Thus the cultural institutions of the late nineteenth century appealed
especially to an upwardly mobile, white-collar constituency, precisely because such
institutions represented an exclusive and privileged world of genteel middle class
living. The 'neutral' media resource centres of the 1970s had a similar in-built
middle class bias, requiring a level of creative and technical proficiency which
favoured a self-selecting, educated minority, not a broad social mix.
Individual free choice is similarly constrained by the individual's material roots in a
collective 'culture' of class and community which idealist cultural policy seeks to
dissolve or deny93 . Matthew Arnold recognised that the decision to accept the gift
of culture was a form of self-sacrifice, a surrender of one's 'ordinary self' in order
to perfect one's 'best self'. That sacrifice of one's 'ordinary self' entails a denial of
the 'class' culture that cultural idealists dismiss as a sociological fantasy or self-
involved philistinism. For the politically and economically vulnerable, the surrender
of collective cultural identity in pursuit of cultural self-improvement represents an
93 Winding up a Council of Europe seminar on `socio-cultural animation', Roy Shaw claimed
that there has been been no distinctive tradition of British working class culture since the Industrial
Revolution (Shaw 1978, 60)
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act of cultural self-destruction, cutting off a vital source of collective support and
resistance. The settlement workers, who so readily `sacrificed' their own middle
class culture by plunging into the 'classless' settlement house, could not understand
why their working class neighbours should feel reluctant to abandon their own
ethnic, class and family ties; in the minds of the settlement workers, the separate
'material' culture of the immigrant working class either did not exist or was merely
an extension of their 'ordinary selves', an obstacle to real enlightenment.
Structurally, neutrality is threatened externally by the 'political economy' of the
culture industry, internally by the 'post-loyal' cultural consumer. Externally the
'neutrality' of the new infrastructure is vulnerable to commercial take-over and the
reprivatisation of public resources. Attempts to ring-fence a 'local public sphere' in
the television and radio markets have proved ineffective; most of Europe's 'free'
radio and television stations of the early 1980s, like the 'local' broadcasters of the
early U.S. system, were rapidly re-absorbed within commercial networks. The
same reprivatisation of the public domain can be observed in the commercial take-
over of British town centres (Worpole 1992), or on the internet, where 'neutral',
unfiltered access to information and ideas is increasingly being funnelled through
service providers, 'gatekeeper' technologies and commercial websites. Once the
'neutral' communications infrastructure is established, it is repeatedly cooptet1 or
reabsorbed by commercial entrepreneurs whose concern is not localised cultural
autonomy, but profit. Internally the pursuit of a 'neutral' communications
infrastructure or a 'perfect market' ignores the unpredictability of individual
consumer demand and the interlocking multiple loyalties which lie behind the facade
of unitary communities; as with the pillarised Dutch media system, a 'perfect'
communications infrastructure based on community representation may ultimately be
too monolithic and too static to cope with the multiple strands of 'post-loyal'
consumer demand.
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To summarise, the materialist conception of culture requires policy makers to follow
a reductive 'determinist' template which ignores unpredictable individual needs and
the complexities of real communities. The idealist conception of culture
underestimates the importance of social class and collective experience in shaping
individual cultural needs. Both assume the existence of a 'common culture', albeit
in contradictory forms. The materialist imagines a series of 'common cultures'
based on clear lines of demarcation between unitary, unified communities. The
idealist imagines a universal, 'neutral' common culture within which these same
lines of demarcation can be dissolved. Neither of these perspectives adequately
describes the complexities of 'real' communities and the unpredictability of
individual behaviour.
Phase 2: Conflict and Exposure
Once the assumptions behind 'materialist' and 'idealist' cultural policies are isolated
and exposed, they appear fundamentally misguided, sometimes absurdly so. Yet the
'fundamentals' of materialist and idealist assumptions are often difficult to pin down
because they are rarely exposed in their 'pure' form. Instead they merge and
overlap in the contradictory, indistinct and barely articulated rationalisations of real
cultural policies and institutions, some of which have been considered in this study.
In this context the rare 'moments' of outright conflict and contradiction provide
cathartic moments of clarity when underlying assumptions are briefly dragged into
the open, before the familiar round of compromise and self-deception begins again
and the 'real' cultural policy assumptions of competing stake-holders are deftly
reconciled into a bland, 'consensual' mission statement.
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In the 'moments' of crisis and contradiction considered in this study, some of the
most violent upheavals have occurred not at the original point of departure for the
'new' movement (the attack on the 'establishment), but as a second phase of
internal conflict within the new movement (factional conflicts, mutual
recriminations). In this category we can include the internal arguments within the
settlement movement between Addams and Woods over 'Americanisation' during
the First World War (or between Barnett and Beveridge over the value of 'culture'
in Britain), Hallie Flanagan's battles against New York producers and regional
administrators, the bitter splits within the community arts movement. During this
phase of internal upheaval, the original coalition between 'idealist' and 'materialist'
factions begins to fall apart; ideological differences and latent assumptions, which
were previously overlooked in the rush for reform, are now starkly exposed.
This phase of internal conflict and self-doubt has also emerged at a psychological
level. As with Jane Addams' semi-autobiographical portrait of a young settlement
resident, or the arts graduate who becomes an arts administrator and guiltily rejects
Leavisite culturalism in favour of a relentless, 'professional' practicality and a self-
conscious rejection of `culturalise assumptions, the self-abnegating attack on the
'burden' of culture is not merely fashionable posturing, it betrays what Lasch
describes as the "secret self-contempt" of the cultural and educational elites (Lasch
1965, 349). As in the nineteenth century, conflicting tendencies are intensified by
education, in the struggle between generalist 'cultural' education and vocational,
'practical' training. Caught in the crossfire between humanist traditions of
'education' and a burgeoning vocational training sector, many of today's arts
administrators have become frighteningly adept in jargon and wilfully contemptuous
of their earlier philosophical and theoretical investigations. In the settlement house
this conflict was internalised as a guilty self-accusation, preventing the individual
from coming to terms with her true cultural identity; instead she sought refuge in a
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middle class fantasy of community and a self-abnegating anti-culturism. Freighted
with a cultural inheritance at odds with the zeitgeist's demand for `useful' vocational
skills and utilitarian pragmatism, the culturally privileged seek to dissolve their
social and educational distinction in the middle class fantasy of cosy, indeterminate
(classless) `community' and `useful' practical tasks.
An example of this 'second phase' of internal conflict at the institutional level was
the Greater London Arts Council's 'community arts' policy in the early 1980s. The
policy document, `Community Arts Revisited', commissioned in 1981 and
eventually published in 1982, consciously positioned GLC policy as a 'revisionist'
attempt to redefine community arts policies developed over the previous decade
(GLC 1986, 140 - 146). In the document, the GLC's policy advisers took the
original attack on Arts Council policy and turned it back upon the community artists
themselves: community artists had never shed their idealist faith in culture as a
common good and their sentimental view of 'community' as a cosy consensus, ("a
bourgeois democratic 'general interest"). Here the conflict between the `culturalist'
assumptions of many individual community artists and the rigidly determinist logic
of the movement's ideologues was brought into the open. The GLC policy took its
materialist assumptions seriously. Different art forms were praised or buried, based
on the assumption that artistic form was a product of social class and historical
conditioning; 'popular' art forms (video, outdoor events, circus arts) were thus
considered more accessible to the majority of Londoners than 'nineteenth century'
art forms (opera, theatre, dance). Audience needs were similarly classified
according to a hierarchy of deprivation, with some groups (eg. the Irish community)
classified against their wishes as 'minorities', others (eg. the white working class)
overlooked. Finally artists themselves were categorised according to the same
rigidly determinist logic. Thus certain 'bourgeois' artists were identified with a
`middle class agenda' and `dominant cultural forms'. The GLC Community Arts
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Sub-Committee was particularly suspicious of the Association for Community Arts
and deliberately excluded the professional community arts sector from consultations
during the creation of the new community arts policy94.
Domestic disputes tend to be the most violent. In this case neither side emerged
with much credit. The vague 'idealist' notion of a universal, 'consensual'
community, which undoubtedly inspired many of the community artists of the day
(and probably still does), was mercilessly attacked by the GLC's policy advisers;
this 'community' excluded many marginal social groups and minorities while
privileging artists themselves as a self-appointed leadership. Meanwhile the GLC's
own 'materialist' version of community appeared no less arbitrary and exclusive in
its crude categorisations; admittedly policy was being formulated at breakneck
speed, with the emphasis on getting the money out quickly, in the face of judicial
challenges regarding the legality of the GLC's 'expansive' policy mandate95.
However, what these hasty bureaucratic formulations of policy exposed was a crude
determinist logic which had little understanding of the complex dynamics and
multiple memberships of real communities; artists who were excluded under the
new policy were surely right to complain that one closed system had been replaced
by another.
In this 'second phase' of community arts policy, contradictory materialist and
idealist assumptions were brought into the open and their inadequacies exposed
through a process of mutual accusation. The old arguments for a common culture,
the idealist notion of 'community consensus' and the materialist notion of fixed
boundaries and clear lines of determination linking community, class and culture,
94 Interview with Alan Tomkins, author of 'Community Arts Revisited', March 1995.
95 Interview with Alan Tomkins, as above. The GLC's own policy advisers would later make the
telling admission that "we had to choose to spend the money or make the policy" (GLC 1986, 37).
For the judicial restrictions under the 1972 Local Government Act, see Mulgan and Worpole (1986,
79 - 85)
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have by now been stretched to breaking point. Before considering the implications
of this terminus for contemporary cultural policy, I want to review a similar
'breaking point' in cultural analysis.
Phase 3: Cultural analysis, from theory to anti-theory
Cultural studies have alternated between an idealist view of culture and cultural
institutions existing in a rarefied, ideal realm at arm's length from collective self
interests and everyday circumstances, and a materialist view of culture and cultural
institutions as 'determined' by class interests. Based on these assumptions, the
search for a 'common culture' has been viewed alternately either optimistically as a
'heroic' narrative of pioneering cultural institutions and individuals, or sceptically as
a `hegemonic' attempt to impose middle class cultural authority on the working
class. Critical orthodoxy has swung between these two extremes in a continuing
academic 'war of position'. Thus in media studies the 'empirical' audience research
of the 1940s and 1950s, highlighting the 'free agency' of audiences and
broadcasters, was replaced by the analysis of 'ideological effects' in the 1970s,
based on a 'materialist' analysis of social and economic structures 'encoded' in the
media. This in turn provoked a culturalist backlash in the late 1980s and 1990s with
the emergence of 'audience theory' and the self-referential language games of
postmodernism, returning us to a view of cultural production and consumption as
indeterminate and unpredictable.
The materialist school of cultural analysis is seductive for two reasons. First the
vantage point of materialism flatters the cultural critic, placing him above and
outside the business of cultural policy which is made to appear banal and ineffective.
Securely entrenched in "the elegant simplicity of a vulgar Marxism" the materialist
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critic accuses his subjects of failing to see beyond the "mirage of idealism" to the
'real world' of class relations, of economic and political power (Mattelart and
Piemme 1980). Secondly, the patterns of social class and material effects have a
pleasing symmetry, allowing the analyst to 'position' cultural policies and
institutions according to a preconceived series of social and economic coordinates.
Instead of providing an analytical tool, the theoretical template of 'determinism' here
becomes a form of intellectual closure, reducing complex cultural processes to
abstract theoretical categories. What is missing is any sense of how 'culture' and
'class' are reproduced, reinterpreted and 'handled' by competing objective realities
and subjective experiences. As in Thompson's irascible attack on the neo-
determinism of French structuralist theory (Thompson 1978), cultural criticism is in
danger of losing the plot, degenerating into "a game of 'chicken' in which each
theorist strives to be 'more revolutionary than thou'."96
The `culturalist' approach to cultural analysis is no less reductive. Here the critical
machinery of 'ideological effects' is resolutely ignored, allowing the critic to focus
on the magical processes of cultural creativity and cultural consumption. Liberated
from considerations of ideology, class, economics and history, cultural institutions
and policies are considered to be ideologically neutral. Thus the search for a
'common culture' is taken at face value as the pursuit of a neutral 'general
perfection', not the product of competing factions each struggling to mould cultural
institutions in their own image and interest. The various strands of idealist or
culturalist analysis, from the 'heroic' account of nineteenth century cultural
institutions to the 'uses and gratifications' school of media research and
'postmodern' analyses of value-free cultural consumption share a tendency towards
complacency. The failure to analyse the broader picture of social and economic
96 "Isolated within intellectual enclaves, the drama of 'theoretical practice may become a
substitute for more difficult practical engagements. Moreover this drama can assume increasingly
theatrical forms, a matter of grimaces and attitudinising, a game of 'chicken' in which each theorist
strives to be 'more revolutionary than thou'" (Thompson 1978, 184 - 5).
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relationships encourages a naive faith in 'consumer sovereignty' and 'open' cultural
texts as the basis for a 'common culture'.
From a methodological viewpoint, neither of these modes of cultural analysis is
promising. We are offered a Hobson's Choice between too much theory or too
little. What is needed is a more flexible analytical framework, in which awareness
of the connections between material forces and cultural production and consumption
is not translated into crude determinism.
Given the apparent failure of 'idealist' / `culturalise and 'materialist' forms of
cultural analysis to account for the multiplicity and contrariness of real cultural
institutions, policies, consumers and practices, one possible response is to reject
theoretical frameworks altogether. E P Thompson's 1978 attack on Althusserian
structuralist theory signalled the beginning of an 'anti-theory' backlash in British and
U.S cultural studies. Thompson's attack on a relentlessly 'over-determined' theory
of culture and society in the 1970s has been succeeded by postmodernist predictions
that we have reached 'the end of theory'. As with the collapsing definitions of
'community' and 'common culture' noted above, the old theoretical formulations no
longer seem viable; more specifically, neither the materialist-Marxist tradition,
premised on the determining categories of class (or 'community', race, gender), nor
the idealist-culturalist tradition, premised on cultural transcendence, seem to offer a
convincing explanation of the relationship between real cultural policies and
institutions and their social contexts.
5.3	 'Letting Go': postmodernism and cultural policy
If the old formulas no longer seem viable, perhaps the time has come to dispense
with them altogether. This is one response to the contradictory and mutually
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destructive conceptions of 'community' and 'common culture', exposed throughout
this study and dragged into the open in recent debates on cultural policy and
analysis. Arguably this is precisely what has happened in contemporary cultural
policy; having passed through a phase of confident mobilisation and a second phase
of mutual recrimination, the community arts movement's initial challenge to cultural
policy makers seems to have fizzled out. All that remains is a patchwork of
threadbare concepts (empowerment, accountability, community, etc.) incorporated
into the jargon of arts policy but rarely taken seriously in practice. In this section I
will attempt to outline what I see as the consequences of 'letting go' of the
materialist and idealist assumptions which have provided cultural policy makers and
cultural institutions with an ideological framework (admittedly one that is shot
through with contradictions). I will focus on two trends in particular,
'instrumentalism' and 'specialisation', or niche marketing.
The postmodern rejection of totalising 'meta-theories' in the 1980s, together with the
'post-marxist' rejection of class analysis, is not altogether new. There is a parallel
between our current position of 'post-policy' and the fall-out from previous moments
of crisis reviewed in this study. These moments of crisis have passed through an
initial period of mobilisation in which the contradictions of 'old' cultural policies
and institutions are exposed and exploited and a new coalition proposes a `new'
position. A period of 'unstable equilibrium' has then been succeeded by a second
phase of internal dispute and debate within the new movement, leading up to the
'breaking point' referred to above. For the American settlement movement this
breaking point was reached in the years immediately preceding American entry into
the first world war; for the federal arts projects a similar point was reached in the
1940s before American entry into the second world war. Here underlying utilitarian
and culturalist assumptions repolarised cultural policies and institutions. Old
rationales came under attack and the first generation of leaders found themselves
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either marginalised or excluded by a new emphasis on professionalism and political
expediency; Jane Addams found her internationalism and pacifism out of step with a
new emphasis on 'Americanisation' and patriotic mobilisation for war, while Hallie
Flanagan's exclusion in the 1940s was more drastic, with the entire Federal Theatre
Project abolished and most of the remaining federal and regional directors either
sacked or placed in ineffectual administrative roles.
In the ensuing period of fall-out, the trend to an 'instrumental' cultural policy has
taken two forms. The first has been the imposition of expedient bureaucratic
functions (service provision, the will of the state(s), utilitarianism). The second has
been a kind of policy fetishism; old ideological positions have been formally
repeated, but new policies bare little resemblance to the old ideals. We are left with
the empty husks of bureaucratic language, or 'simulacra' of discarded ideologies.
Examples of this include the reduction of Cahill's idealised communion between
artist and community to the utilitarian application of artistic talents to propaganda
posters and camouflage design, the reduction of Flanagan's arguments for cultural
decentralisation and democratisation to a matter of geographical deconcentration and
'states' rights', the replacement of Addams' tolerant 'neutral zone' for American
immigrants by the universalisation of American values in settlement
'Americanisation' programmes during the war.
In these historical examples, the policy vacuum left by contradictory and collapsing
policy rationales was filled by a pragmatic, bureaucratic 'common sense'. A few
terms and concepts may have survived, but they were no longer translated into
effective ideological principles and practices. In the more recent example of post-
1980 community-oriented cultural policy in Britain, a similar process has taken
place. The gap left after the community arts movement destroyed itself through
inner faction and resurgent contradiction in the early 1980s has been filled by a new
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instrumentalism where the only guiding principle is a utilitarian response to short
term needs. The process began with the GLC's attempt, outlined above, to build a
community-based cultural policy from scratch, based on 'materialist' assumptions in
their 'pure' form. Following the GLC's abolition in 1986, the bureaucratic
structures and language created by the GLC were enormously influential on
'community-oriented' cultural policy. Bureaucratic categories of need, the reductive
typology of different art forms ('high' and 'low' culture), segregationist models of
community and the mistrust of 'unaccountable' artists have all found their way into
contemporary local authority arts policies. Yet the ideological principles behind the
GLC classifications, basically a crude form of Marxist determinism, have been lost
in translation. Accordingly, all that remains is a commitment to 'serve' the 'needs'
of the 'community', with precious little thought given to what these various terms
might mean in practice.
The tendency to instrumentalism has been reinforced by the prevailing economic
orthodoxy of 1980s cultural policy; having discovered the 'economic importance of
the arts' in the late 1980s (Myerscough 1988), cultural policy makers, especially at
the local level, downplayed the social impacts of the arts in order to concentrate on
the economic benefits of new cultural initiatives, pursuing an instrumental policy of
short term economic development whose long term social effects remained untested.
The success of cultural policy initiatives was accordingly measured according to
extrinsic benefits, for example the provision of temporary employment, the
attraction of inward investment, the selling of icecreams and the filling of hotel
rooms. Several commentators (Bendixen 1994, Bille Hansen 1995, Van Puffelen
1996) have commented on the partial nature of Myerscough's analysis; not only
does instrumental cultural policy avoid any assessment of the non-economic costs
and benefits of cultural provision, it also complacently avoids a larger consideration
of the structures of political and economic power through which the trickle of
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economic benefits and opportunities are channelled. This complacent dismissal of
the Marxist 'meta-narrative' is of course perfectly attuned to the seasoned
pragmatism and relentless practicality of the professionally trained arts manager.
'Instrumental' cultural policies at the local level contain residual elements of
materialism and idealism. First, the idealist promise that culture can change or
transcend material reality is reduced to a more limited promise, that cultural activity
might produce new jobs in the local service economy, or provide a means of
publicity. Secondly, residual 'materialist' assumptions are reproduced in the
argument that cultural needs are determined by the base of material conditions,
according to bureaucratic categories of need (welfare, education, public health,
social services). What is missing is any broader analytical framework; instrumental
cultural policy is concerned neither with the larger 'materialist' problems of cultural
equity and political economy, nor with the 'idealist' search for a unified common
culture. Instead, policy is measured out in localised 'impacts' and piecemeal
'improvements'. Instrumentalism can be seen as a form of 'post-policy' because it
is driven by a response to particular situations and short-term needs rather than any
coherent ideological programme. This pragmatic absence of ideology is of course
itself ideological; the lack of a coherent rationale for government intervention
leaves cultural institutions at the mercy of the market and cultural policy in thrall to
short term political and economic interests.
The second form of 'post-policy' I wish to consider, related to the first, is the
tendency towards niche marketing and specialisation. Here the failure of
'materialist' and 'idealist' concepts of 'community' to account for the particularities
of individual taste, intersecting 'multiple memberships' and 'hyphenate' cultural
identities is translated into a search for ever smaller market units. The trend to niche
marketing in contemporary media, especially in television, was noted in chapter 4;
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instead of the idealist tradition of Reithian public service broadcasting, premised on
the possibility of a 'universal' common culture, specialist multi-channel cable
networks work on the principle of diversifying product to meet diverse consumer
needs. Specialisation is also a response to the 'post-loyal' cultural consumer; where
the 'materialist' broadcaster attempted to predict consumer needs according to
collective categories determined by shared material conditions (ie. demographics),
the `post-loyal' broadcaster has taken this process a stage further, in pursuit of ever
smaller, preciser market segments, in place of the old 'fictive' approximations.
Profitable markets are therefore sub-divided into more specialised 'sub-markets', as
with the proliferation of specialised sports programmes on cable and satellite
channels, or the replacement of 'general interest' magazines by specialist
publications devoted to specific lifestyles (new lads, young parents), even to specific
products (Volkswagen cars, premiership football teams). Even the old-style British
community arts centres of the 1960s and 1970s have had to change their spots,
forced to pursue a more specialised role as they attempt to define a distinctive
market brand in order to win paying customers, visiting artists and funders; instead
of appealing to 'the whole community' in a local area (with support from the local
authority), they are under increasing pressure to carve out a distinctive niche as
specialised regional venues (as part of the RAB's regional `portfolio').
The logical extension of this trend towards market segmentation is the 'market of
one', where cultural products and services are customised to meet the individual
needs of a particular consumer; service providers on the Internet, including
Compuserve, now offer a customised clippings service which supplies the consumer
with a specified range of information on preferred topics. The functional
convergence of personal computing, telephony and television will shortly open up
similar possibilities for a wide range of cultural products and services. Here 'post-
policy' is a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the old (materialist-Marxist) logic; the
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frantic sub-directories of individual taste have replaced the confident aggregates of
class analysis.
Specialisation in cultural production and the 'market of one' are a reflection of the
collapsing 'materialist' and 'idealist' rationales for cultural policy, specifically the
notion of 'community'. However, the new 'specialised' institutions make their own
reductive assumptions about consumer demand. Niche markets and postmodern
theories of cultural consumption assume that consumer demand can be satiated by
customised products based on individual wants, without reference to collective
needs; they assume that individuals do not crave the collective security blanket of a
'common culture' which has been so discredited in theory and in institutional
practice. Yet the continuing popularity of 'mass' spectacles (sporting events, the
British monarchy at home and abroad, sopa operas) suggest that individuals are not
yet ready to let go' of the idea of community, even if it survives only as a 'fictive'
spectacle (Coronation Street, after all, bears as little relation to 'real' working class
community life as it does to modern Manchester).
The danger with rejecting 'meta-narratives', whether in cultural theory or in cultural
policy, is that we succumb to a despairing inactivity; since it is impossible to come
up with a convincing 'total theory', either we surrender to a sublime pragmatism or
we pursue some absurd managerial simulacrum of the old rationale. Yet those
critics who lament 'the poverty of theory' or 'collapsing meta-narratives' are not
necessarily proposing an apocalyptic 'end of theory'; rather they are arguing that
the grand totalising theories of the past must be replaced by a more sophisticated
theoretical framework more consistent with empirical observation and contemporary
conditions. 'Postmodernism' is after all consistent with the rhetoric of academic
'originality', where opposing theories are built up and knocked down in order to
prove the greater sophistication of one's own 'original' synthesis, salvaged from the
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wreckage of those same discarded meta-narratives. In concluding this study I will
consider how such a synthesis might be applied to the materialist and idealist 'meta-
narratives' of community and culture.
5.4	 'Holding on': revisionism and synthesis
Having rejected the extremes of 'idealist' and 'materialist' conceptions of culture
and community as the basis for cultural policy, it remains to be seen whether
something can be salvaged from their remnants. In particular I want to reconsider
the idea of a 'common culture' by resorting to 'revisionist' and 'heretical' variants
of orthodox 'materialist' and 'idealist' positions.
I will begin this recovery programme with the 'revisionist' theories of Gramsci,
Hall, and Williams. What these theorists share is an attempt to rescue predictive
models of materialism and determinism in orthodox Marxism, arguing for a more
flexible understanding of the relationship between culture, community and 'material
conditions'. For example, Williams described his concept of 'cultural materialism'
as an attempt to rescue Marx from "the naive dualism of 'mechanical materialism'",
a conceptual aberration Williams identified not with Marx himself but with the
"dominant" tradition of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Marxism
(Williams 1977). As noted in the introduction, Williams' metaphor of 'the guiding
string' (Williams 1958, 269) replaced the absolute determinism of base-
superstructure Marxism with a looser collective pattern (the 'structure of feeling') in
which various internal and external influences set outer limits to an indeterminate,
unpredictable process. Cultural production and consumption were thus seen to enjoy
a 'relative' autonomy, and material conditions were 'handled' in different ways by
individuals. While a degree of cultural autonomy and free agency has been
incorporated into the system, Williams (like Gramsci and Hall) nevertheless insists
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that structures of economic and political domination still matter; we may not be
'determined' by our social and economic coordinates in a wholly predictable way,
but these factors will have a significant influence upon our behaviour and our
'culture'.
Habermas has undertaken a similar rescue operation for the cultural idealists in his
concept of the 'public sphere'; here the eighteenth century notion of an inclusive,
'universal' deliberative community has given way to a more sophisticated model of
multiple overlapping, 'counter-spheres'. The 'idealist' common culture is replaced
by an idealised theory of communication; according to Habermas' revisionist
idealism, we may not all share the same 'common culture' but we can at least speak
the same language and communicate within a unifying and unified framework (the
so-called 'ideal speech situation').
If we bring these remnants of 'materialist' and 'idealist' arguments together, we can
begin to construct a model of 'community' and 'common culture' in which
individuals are neither wholly determined nor wholly undetermined by their
culturally specific roots. This version of 'community' accords with the
'ethnographic' research into television audiences described by Ien Ang and Roger
Silverstone (Ang 1991, 160 - 165; Silverstone 1990). Here communities are
defined by overlapping demographic categories (race, family, gender, age) and
'communities of interest' which intersect and contradict each other.
The idea of 'multiple memberships' also requires a revised concept of individual
identity. Liberals and communitarians have debated the relationship between
individual identity and collective 'norms' and values. According to the liberals,
individual identity consists both in the 'unencumbered' self and in the particular
needs and wants defined by collective self-interest; for the communitarians,
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individual identity consists in the 'thick' and 'thin' self, based on 'embedded social
roles' and 'voluntary attachments' respectively. Both liberals and communitarians
concur in making a distinction between an autonomous self capable of free agency
and a 'thick' self determined or shaped by the successive 'encrustations' of social
networks. 'Community' and 'individual identity' are thus seen to operate at more
than one level. The communitarians refer to the multiple social memberships which
shape individual identity and collective values; the liberals refer to the overarching
framework within which competing self interests are negotiated and compromised.
If we apply these models of community and individual identity to cultural policy, we
are returned to the 'two-tier' model of 'open' and 'closed' cultural resources
outlined in chapter 4, as with Gerald Yoshitomi's demand for a "parallel system of
support" combining "culturally specific resources" and centralised "mainstages".
'Closed', culturally specific resources reinforce cultural differences and discrete
cultural identities, providing a mosaic of potential cultural identities for the
individual to explore or reject. Communitarians argue that the construction of
localised institutions, for example churches, families, schools and community
councils, should be supported by the state, recreating de Tocqueville's model of "a
pluralistic society laced with communities and voluntary associations" (Etzioni 1995,
22). These "organised public spaces" will reinforce community loyalties and
common values; closed, culturally specific resources provide the individual with a
framework of fixed cultural reference points, even if they are ultimately rejected.
Liberals counter that the emphasis on local institutions betrays the conservative,
moralistic agenda of communitarianism; liberals seek a 'neutral', non-
institutionalised 'open' public space as a forum for individual development and 'free
choice'. Here the emphasis is on creating an 'open terrain' in which individuals can
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construct their own cultural identities through a network of 'voluntary attachments'.
Criticising the latent oppressiveness of "communities of circumstance", liberals have
accordingly sought to created "communities of choice"; Friedman describes the
liberating effect of 'communities of choice' from a feminist perspective, allowing
women to escape conventional gender roles and pursue alternative models of identity
(Friedman 1992).
Taken separately, the 'liberal' and `communitarian' models of community share
many of the respective assumptions of the 'idealist' and 'materialist' conceptions of
community already referred to. The liberal position shades into a 'free market'
ideology and the culturalist myth of consumer sovereignty. The communitarian
position resembles the materialist model in its reliance on fixed points of reference
and the weight of social conditioning.
Again, if we bring the liberal and communitarian arguments together, we can
perhaps begin to cancel out some of their respective deficiencies. Combining a
network of localised culturally specific resources with guaranteed access to an
indeterminate public sphere of 'open' cultural resources might allow individuals to
cross the boundary between 'neutral' and 'specific' versions of community. These
transitions, between culturally specific resources (special interest magazines and
media, ethnic cultural resources, local news services) and 'open' cultural resources
(the internet, internationally syndicated music and television), depend upon access
and opportunity. The difficulty, of course, is in accommodating these different
dimensions of culture and community within a coherent, accessible framework.
However difficult this balancing act may prove to be, the alternative is to accept a
growing separation between a 'global' culture, disconnected from the interests and
needs of culturally specific communities, and a 'local' culture which turns in on
itself, preventing access to alternative 'communities of choice'.
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'Letting go' of the conceptual framework of idealist and materialist conceptions of
culture and community creates a policy vacuum. As noted in the previous section
this vacuum is filled by instrumental policies and the logic of the marketplace. Yet
if we 'hold on' too tightly to materialist and idealist conceptions, we succumb to the
extremes of 'determinist' and `culturalist' policies and assumptions reviewed in this
study. On the one hand, a rigidly materialist theory of culture insists on grounding
cultural consumption and production in ever smaller localised units and sub-
categories, trapping the individual in a cage of determinist cross-references and sub-
categories. A pure idealist conception meanwhile refers outwards to an
indeterminate, 'universal' common culture, where localised identities must be cast
off. The political cost of holding onto these conceptions is reflected in the immense
gulf between localised, materialist 'cultures' and a national, even supranational,
'common culture'. While the Western elites cling to an idealist rhetoric of universal
brotherhood, where all countries are created equal but some have larger trade
deficits, many smaller states, already marginalised by the the new world order of
trade without frontiers, have retreated into ancient religious and tribal loyalties.
Conceptually, if we are to bridge the gap between 'closed' and 'open' terrain in
cultural policy, we need a more flexible definition of community and culture which
no longer insists upon determination or absence of determination in cultural
consumption and production. In Williams' 'structure of feeling' and Habermas'
'public sphere' the hard boundaries between a determined sphere of closed,
localised, culturally specific resources and a universal sphere of open, universal,
globalised, common cultural resources become less rigid; a dialogue is opened.
Michael Sandel has described the need for a new 'post-national' democracy. Noting
that the nation-state is "too large to give expression to particular communal identities
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and too small to cope with global economic forces", Sandel recommends a new
principle of subsidiarity in government, combining devolution of political authority
to "localised spheres" with a universalisation of individual human rights: "Any
agenda for revitalised self-government and the effective empowerment of smaller-
scale communities must contain the devolution of power to smaller units and the
universalization of rights on a supranational level" (Sandel 1992b). Such a system
would draw on a "revitalized federalism" in the U.S. and on the new European
regionalism. Post-national political democracy requires a new concept of cultural
democracy. Individuals require access to a communitarian, materialist culture
determined in the last instance by culturally specific conditions; they also need to
escape from predetermined social roles and predispositions into the 'neutral', 'open-
minded' culture of a generalised 'public sphere'. Admittedly the distinction between
'open' and 'closed' culture requires further research and analysis; admittedly it will
be difficult to dislodge the equation of 'community' with localism and of
'universality' with the national interest. However, a two-tier system, combining
cultural communities and 'post-loyal' cultural resources, may offer a step forward in
the search for cultural democracy.
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